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The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act requires large bank holding companies (BHCs) to implement 
strong risk governance structures. Utilizing a difference-in-differences design that exploits BHCs’ 
staggered adoption of the new rules, this study examines whether the mandates have affected bank 
risk. I find no evidence of a relation between board-level risk committees and bank risk. I then 
construct a summative measure of risk governance quality, the Risk Governance Index, that 
incorporates board-level risk oversight and functional risk management activities. Results using 
this measure are weakly suggestive that the Dodd-Frank risk oversight and risk management 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
 
In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereafter, 
Dodd-Frank, or the Act) was signed into law with the intent of building a safer U.S. financial 
system (White House, 2010). Many have attributed the preceding financial crisis, at least in part, 
to systematic failures of financial institutions’ risk management and oversight practices (e.g., 
Acharya, Philippon, Richardson & Roubini, 2009; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Yellen, 2015). A subset of 
Dodd-Frank, known as Enhanced Supervisory and Prudential Standards (hereafter, EPS), requires 
large bank holding companies (BHCs) to form board-level risk oversight committees and 
implement robust enterprise risk management practices (collectively, risk governance). In this 
study, I use the passage of the Act as a quasi-natural experiment setting to examine the outcomes 
of the EPS mandates with respect to bank risk.1 
Many of the practices required under the EPS rules are not unique to the post-Dodd-Frank 
period, and have therefore been examined, either directly or indirectly, in prior literature. Most 
extant studies use single (often binary) measures of banks’ risk management and board-level risk 
oversight activities, and provide inconclusive support for the potential efficacy of the rules: the 
within-study findings are mixed, and the results across studies are inconsistent (e.g., Aebi, Sabato, 
& Schmid, 2012; Hines & Peters, 2015; Minton, Taillard, & Williamson, 2014). A few studies 
combine various risk governance measures, almost exclusively with principal component analysis, 
                                                 
1 As the Dodd-Frank EPS laws apply at the holding company level, bank holding companies (BHCs) are the unit of 
analysis in this study. Throughout this paper, the terms “bank holding company,” “BHC,” “financial institution,” 




and generally find that stronger risk governance is associated with lower risk (e.g., Ellul & 
Yerramilli, 2013; Lingel & Sheedy, 2012). However, the latter group of studies leaves the extent 
to which any of the individual mechanisms explains results unclear, and none of the related prior 
literature employs similar operational definitions of risk management and oversight 
characteristics, which hinders comparability from a meta-analysis perspective. Furthermore, the 
evidence in prior literature is drawn exclusively from the pre-Dodd-Frank era, when risk 
governance practices were still emerging and voluntary. As I show in this paper, there have been 
fundamental shifts in bank’s risk governance structures – at both the board and operations level – 
over the past decade. To my knowledge, no extant study has examined the consequences of these 
changes. Whether mandated risk governance affects bank risk is therefore an important, and as of 
yet, unanswered, empirical question. 
The reforms are based heavily on the notion that enhanced risk governance will improve 
the stability of the financial system (12 C.F.R. §252, 2012). Before 2010, risk management was 
often considered an obligatory support function or cost center, rather than a foundation for good 
business. Managers regularly pushed or exceeded internal risk limits in pursuit of short-term 
profits (Kirkpatrick, 2009; Carney, 2015), and boards were often unaware of, or not informed in a 
timely manner about, banks’ risk exposures (Kirkpatrick, 2009). In contrast, regulators and 
standard setters now expect risk management to be at the top of the board’s agenda (Carney, 2015). 
Buy-in and adherence to the organization’s risk strategy should be evident throughout the firm, 
and board members should be able to both clearly articulate the firm’s risk profile and provide 
effective challenge to management’s decisions (e.g., Deloitte, 2015; BGFRS, 2016).2 Furthermore, 
                                                 




compliance with regulatory expectations represents a significant cost for banks of all sizes. From 
a pragmatic standpoint, then, an examination of the effect of the EPS mandates may yield 
important practical and policy implications.  
Given the above, the new rules represent an externally imposed “treatment” that may shift 
the banks’ risk management practices away from a compulsory exercise and towards a way of life. 
If this is the case, then compliance with the new regulations should be associated with lower risk, 
ceteris paribus. 
As with most regulations, though, there are substantial doubts as to whether mandated risk 
governance will be effective in limiting bank risk. For one, legal and advisory professionals 
caution that a separate, board-level risk committee is not a cure-all solution, and that any 
committee can only be as good as the information it receives (e.g., Eggleston & Ware, 2009). Some 
have raised concerns that by the mere creation of a board-level risk committee, board members 
and managers not involved in the risk management process may adopt a “subconscious attitude of 
delegation,” thereby undermining any risk management efforts (Protiviti, 2011). Recent risk 
management failures, such as the concurrently headlining Wells Fargo debacle, raise concerns over 
whether it is even possible for large, complex BHCs to identify and mitigate risk (Hurtado, 2016).3 
In a similar vein, it is possible that many BHCs have adopted the mandates in form, but not in 
function (as a form of window-dressing). Altogether, the effectiveness of these risk oversight and 
risk management reforms is ultimately an empirical question. 
                                                 
3 In September of 2016, Wells Fargo disclosed a $185 million settlement with the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB), the City and County of Los Angeles, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) over 




A common challenge in identifying the effect of any regulation is the lack of a true control 
group, or a set of firms that is not affected by the regulation (e.g., Beatty & Liao, 2014). If all firms 
simultaneously adopt reforms, the researcher cannot separate the effects of the regulation from the 
passage of time. Given that the Act coincided with the end of the financial crisis, this is a serious 
concern when attempting to identify any causal effect on bank risk.  
A crucial identifying feature in this setting, however, is that individual banks have 
implemented the EPS requirements at different times throughout the post-Dodd-Frank period, 
while the remainder of Dodd-Frank, and the post-crisis economic recovery more generally, have 
affected the sample banks relatively equally. This variation allows for the use of what is essentially 
a difference-in-differences approach to examine the effect of the risk governance requirements. 
The design controls for time-invariant firm characteristics by using the same firm over time, and 
for time-variant trends by using similar firms – subject to the same regulatory and/or 
macroeconomic environment, but in different stages of EPS adoption – as controls. Any difference 
in risk that I find to be associated with risk governance is therefore incremental to other post-crisis 
period factors that affect all sample banks’ risk, and also incremental to post-Dodd-Frank changes 
common to all BHCs to which the law applies.  
Using hand-collected information from BHCs’ public filings, I begin my analysis by 
examining risk governance structures for large, publicly traded, U.S. bank holding companies 
across the period from 2004 to 2016. This process reveals significant cross-sectional and time-
series variation in BHCs’ risk oversight practices, offering some insights into prior studies’ lack 
of, or conflicting, results with respect to risk committees and other risk oversight mechanisms. 
Using the EPS rules, I define a risk committee as a separate, or standalone, board-level committee 




than definitions used across the extant literature, I find that only 18 sample BHCs (approximately 
21.5% of the sample) have standalone enterprise-wide risk committees as of the end of 2009. By 
contrast, if I apply the risk committee definitions used within comparable prior studies, then 
anywhere from 39 to 70 of the sample BHCs could be considered to have a risk committee by the 
2009 year-end. A thorough examination of these additional committees’ roles, however, reveals 
that most either oversaw risk as a secondary subset of overall responsibilities, or only oversaw a 
subset of risks (versus enterprise-wide risks). Moreover, since 2010, all of the sample banks have 
made visible changes to their risk governance practices to conform to the EPS rules, which 
suggests that pre-existing policies and practices, either in fact or in appearance, were insufficient.  
Beyond changes in the existence, form, and scope of the risk committee, itself, I also 
document a notable overhaul of the sample BHCs’ corporate governance, risk governance, and 
risk management characteristics over the sample period. From the presence and stature of a 
dedicated Chief Risk Officer with enterprise-wide risk oversight responsibilities, to the depth of 
risk committee members’ experience and quality of disclosures supporting the committee’s role, 
to the overall composition of the board, today’s average bank stands in stark contrast to the average 
bank in the years leading up to the financial crisis. Collectively, these transformations work 
together to challenge the notion that banks’ compliance with the EPS rules has been superficial in 
nature, and further motivate the research question in this study.  
In the empirical tests, I first examine whether the presence, at the board level, of a 
dedicated, standalone risk committee with clear responsibility for enterprise-wide risk oversight is 
associated with any difference in several measures of aggregate (i.e., enterprise-wide) bank risk. 
More specifically, I employ two market-based measures of risk, downside tail risk (e.g., Ellul & 




and several operating and balance sheet measures of risk (earnings volatility, regulatory capital 
adequacy, and asset composition). Aside from one set of tests with weak evidence that risk 
committees are associated with lower proportions of higher risk assets in the post-Dodd-Frank 
period, I find no evidence to suggest that dedicated board-level risk oversight committees are 
associated with meaningful differences in any of the other risk proxies.  
Farrell and Gallagher (2015) argue that the enterprise risk management process “cannot be 
simply characterized by one or two defining components or attributes” (p.630). This suggests that 
the lack of results for risk committees could be a symptom of omitted information – about the 
entire system of risk governance – from my use of a single binary measure of risk oversight. 
Beyond stipulating that BHC boards form risk committees, the final EPS rules include specific 
requirements for committee composition and procedures, as well as rules regarding the presence, 
organizational stature, and independence of a Chief Risk Officer. While some prior studies have 
examined the combination of some of the mechanisms (e.g., Ellul & Yerramilli, 2013; Lingel & 
Sheedy, 2012), to my knowledge, none have examined whether the specific combination of the 
EPS mechanisms, in the post-Dodd-Frank era, have affected bank risk-taking. 
Accordingly, I next develop a novel measure of risk governance quality, which I call the 
Risk Governance Index (RGI). The variable measures the extent of banks’ compliance with the 
EPS mandates, and improves upon the RC indicator by capturing observed variation in banks’ risk 
governance practices, as well as substantive changes in those practices over recent years both 
within and between the sample BHCs. The multivariate results using the RGI measure, although 
still not entirely conclusive, are generally stronger than the results with the risk committee 
indicator: risk governance practices in line with the EPS mandates are associated with moderately 




Ratios and risk-weighted assets. Though the results are modest, it is worth stressing that these 
effects are incremental to both changes in risk levels for all sample BHCs over time, and in relation 
to Dodd-Frank. To my knowledge, these results provide the first empirical evidence of the 
effectiveness of the sum of the EPS risk management mandates in reducing bank risk. 
The final appendix of this paper provides an in depth reconciliation between the findings 
of this study and those reported within Ellul and Yerramilli (2013; henceforth, E&Y). That study 
documents that for the period from 1998 to 2009, stronger risk oversight is associated with lower 
risk, ceteris paribus. The objective of the reconciliation exercise is to explain why I generally do 
not find this relation for a standalone, board-level risk committee. Despite using the same sample 
BHCs, I was unable to replicate E&Y’s primary measure of interest. I do find, however, results 
consistent with E&Y when using a measure of board risk oversight that includes the audit 
committee. I also find that relative to banks with audit committee risk oversight, banks with 
standalone enterprise risk committees – the specific form of board risk oversight mandated by the 
EPS rules – are associated with significantly higher risk in the pre-Dodd Frank period. This 
suggests that prior to Dodd-Frank, standalone enterprise risk committees may not have operated 
to constrain risk. Instead, BHCs that formed separate enterprise risk committees before 2010 may 
have done so either for regulatory appeasement (window dressing) or to hedge higher risk 
strategies. 
Evaluating the effect of the EPS requirements is important for several reasons. First, the 
mandates represent the first time that large financial institutions face a legal requirement to comply 
with specific risk governance standards (Mayer Brown, 2014). Despite the costs of complying with 
these standards, prior literature provides very little evidence to support the very specifically 




and a comparatively objective blueprint for defining what does, and what is does not, constitute 
risk governance, to expand both our understanding of the role of risk management as a tool of 
corporate governance (e.g., Kaplan, 2011), and the role of regulation in the effectiveness of 
corporate governance (e.g., Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2013). The evidence suggests that on average, 
stronger risk governance practices – as defined by the EPS rules – were not associated with any 
differences in risk prior to Dodd-Frank, but that after Dodd-Frank, stronger risk governance is 
associated with moderately lower risk. I attribute this finding to the mandatory nature of risk 
governance practices in the post-2010 period – or the shift in the purpose and organizational 
importance of BHCs’ risk management and oversight practices in response to the new regulatory 
expectations. To the extent generalizable, the findings in this study may have important 
implications for mandated risk governance for other industries, especially those with inherently 
complex operations or high risk. 
Second, while a robust literature has, in recent years, thoroughly examined whether 
shortcomings in bank corporate governance contributed to crisis outcomes, fewer studies have 
examined the outcomes related to the many subsequent changes in banks’ governance. In 
evaluating the effects of one of the few bank-specific, or micro prudential, Dodd-Frank mandates, 
this study also provides a wealth of descriptive evidence that serves to highlight the changing 
corporate governance landscape among large U.S. bank holding companies in recent years. This 
information may yield new insights when examining important questions – both old and new – 
about the effectiveness of bank governance.  
Finally, this study also contributes more broadly to the enterprise risk management 
literature by introducing a straightforward and flexible measure of the strength of risk controls. As 




or risk governance characteristics ignore the remainder of the risk governance system. The typical 
alternative, thus far, has been to use principal component analysis (PCA) to form a summary score, 
or a linear combination of weighted variables, to measure the strength or quality of risk controls. 
Despite the appeal of this approach, the variable weights and resulting scores from PCA procedures 
are sample-specific in both derivation and interpretation, and this limits the external validity of 
research in this area. The RGI measure developed in this study is replicable for any sample of firms 
for which the necessary information is publicly available, and for any time period. As innovations 
in the field become leading practices, the measure can easily be altered to reflect new knowledge. 
Moreover, the measure is not so particular to banks that a similar approach could not be used in 
studies of risk management among other industries, or even adapted to measure other types of 
internal information and control systems. In this sense, this study addresses calls for the 
development of more comprehensive measures of governance that incorporate management and 
that better capture governance processes, rather than singular characteristics (e.g., Carcello, 
Hermanson, & Zhongxia, 2011). 
This paper proceeds as follows. I discuss the institutional background and prior literature 
for this setting in the next section (Section 2). I then discuss the hypotheses (Section 3), sample 
and data collected (Section 4), research methodology (Section 5), and risk committee results 
(Section 6). I then discuss the construction of, and results using, the Risk Governance Index 





2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR LITERATURE 
 
 
2.1. Institutional Background 
2.1.1. Bank Risk 
Bank risk is “the potential that events, expected or unexpected, will have an adverse effect 
on a bank’s earnings, capital, or franchise or enterprise value” (OCC, 2013). The Federal Reserve 
classifies sources of bank risk into six broad categories: credit risk, market risk (which includes 
price, interest, and foreign exchange risks), liquidity risk, operational risk, legal risk, and 
reputation risk (BGFRS, 1997; BGFRS, 2008).4  In practice, banks’ activities generally give rise 
to correlations and concentrations, both within and across a BHC’s business lines and legal entities, 
across several types of risk (BGFRS, 2016). Underscoring the importance of comprehensive risk 
management and oversight practices, decentralized decision-making and the nature of banks’ 
balance sheets amplify these interrelationships, as a bank’s aggregate risk profile can change 
rapidly (Becht, Bolton, & Rӧell, 2011; Stulz, 2015). 
 
2.1.2. Risk Governance versus Risk Management 
In this paper, the term risk governance refers to the combination of (a) the board’s oversight 
of the risk management framework, and (b) the structures, culture, processes, and lines of 
communication that serve as the foundation for effective risk management (PWC, 2012; 
Lundqvist, 2015). In contrast, risk management denotes the functional, or operations-level, 
                                                 
4 Strategic risk, or the risk that a bank will not be able to carry out its strategy, encompasses each of these six 




application of the organization’s risk management framework. Risk management involves the 
identification, measurement, monitoring, and mitigating of specific risks. The scale of this process 
can range from the management of individual risk types to a more holistic, portfolio approach that 
considers all risks in consolidation. Risk governance formalizes and integrates organization-wide 
risk management processes, and is the “identifying component of an enterprise risk management 
system” (Lundqvist, 2015, p. 442). An important implication of this relationship is that even the 
most sophisticated and comprehensive risk management process is not truly “enterprise-wide” 
without sufficient organizational buy-in, structure, and oversight (Lundqvist, 2015).5  
Understanding the difference between risk management and risk governance is critical to 
understanding banks’ risk failures during the financial crisis. Certainly, most banks had in place 
the functional “tools” of risk management – risk officers and risk management departments, risk 
models, and risk limits – prior to the crisis. Anecdotal accounts of the meltdown, however, suggest 
that the ineffectiveness of those tools resulted from inadequate risk governance (Kirkpatrick, 
2009). Risk limits, if established, were frequently overridden or ignored (SSG, 2008; Kirkpatrick, 
2009). If identified, mounting risk concentrations were either never reported to the board of 
directors, reported with a significant delay, or downplayed in severity (SSG, 2008; Kirkpatrick, 
2009).6  Moreover, until recent years, many of the largest BHCs lacked one of the most basic 
                                                 
5 The converse is also true: board-level risk oversight is clearly not a sufficient substitute for a deficient risk 
management function (e.g., Protiviti, 2011). 
6 For example, UBS’s risk management group first identified potential subprime losses during the first quarter of 
2007. It was not until August 6, 2007, that the full extent of the firm’s exposures were communicated to the board. 




elements of a formal risk governance framework: a formal statement of risk appetite.7  These lapses 
reflect both deficiencies in board practices and board members’ qualifications, as well as 
inadequacies in organizational policies and processes for risk ownership and risk reporting. 
Banks create value by taking risks (e.g., Becht et al., 2011). As a result, effective risk 
management should be considered a key component of a bank’s productive technology - one that 
maximizes firm value (Stulz, 2015). The sampling of risk management failures described above 
does not, however, validate this conjecture. Instead, these lapses likely reflect conflicting interests 
between bank regulators and shareholders with respect to the net benefit of investments in risk 
management. Regulators acknowledge that risk is intrinsic to the banking business, and therefore 
the purpose in mandating risk controls is not for banks to eliminate all risks. Instead, regulators 
expect risk management practices to support the safety and soundness of the financial system, as 
a whole, by reducing the likelihood of individual bank distress or failure (12 CFR § 252, 2012). 
In contrast, BHCs’ shareholders appoint directors whose fiduciary duty is to ensure that 
managers pursue the level of risk that maximizes shareholder value (Johnson, 2011; Stulz, 2015; 
Macey & O’Hara, 2016). This level of risk may not be optimal from the regulator’s standpoint. 
Furthermore, the institutional features unique to banks – high leverage, opacity, deposit insurance, 
government safety nets, and regulatory restrictions on activities and ownership that limit the 
effectiveness of market discipline – not only dilute the incentives to invest in risk management, 
but also encourage risk-taking (e.g., Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993; Laeven & Levine, 2009; 
Acharya et al., 2009; Bushman, Hendricks, & Williams, 2015). The recent financial crisis suggests 
                                                 
7 JPMorgan Chase, for example, first adopted a firm-wide risk appetite statement in December of 2010. A firm’s risk 
appetite is the level of risk that the firm is both comfortable with, and capable of, pursuing (e.g., Nocco & Stulz, 
2006). A formal statement of risk appetite can be thought of as a “roadmap” that guides risk-based decisions in order 




that the tension between these two stakeholders’ objectives broke toward shareholders’ interests 
more often than not.8 The Dodd-Frank risk governance requirements, described in more detail 
below, are intended to align bank directors’ actions with regulators’ micro-prudential objective of 
promoting safety and soundness at the individual bank-level. 
 
 
2.2. Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: 
Enhanced Prudential Standards 
Title I, Subtitle C, Section 165 of Dodd-Frank, commonly referred to as “Enhanced 
Prudential Standards” (EPS), mandates risk governance and risk management reforms for large 
financial institutions.9 The law assigned the task of drafting and enforcing the functional EPS rules 
to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB). Under the same title (i.e., EPS), 
the FRB released proposed rules for public comment in January of 2012, and issued the final rules 
on February 18, 2014. With few exceptions, the final rules are substantially similar to the 
requirements outlined in the 2012 proposal, as well as within Dodd Frank. The rules first became 
effective for U.S. BHCs in 2015, and the Federal Reserve expected full compliance with the EPS 
rules as of the effective date.10 I provide a summary of the EPS requirements in the paragraphs 
                                                 
8 Consistent with this conjecture, recent studies find that banks with more pro-shareholder governance mechanisms 
were more profitable in years leading up to the crisis, yet were among the worst performers through the financial 
crisis (e.g., Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011; Minton et al., 2014). 
9 Dodd-Frank weighs in at roughly 2,300 pages. A complete discussion of the legislation is beyond the scope of this 
study. See https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf for the full text of 
the Act. 
10 The EPS effective date for BHCs with at least $50 billion ($10 to $50 billion) in assets was January 1 (July 1), 
2015. For both groups, initial application is based on average consolidated assets over the four quarters from July 1, 
2013 to June 30, 2014. Any BHC that subsequently has average total assets, for four consecutive quarters, of $10 




that follow. For reference, additional details related to each stage of the EPS legislative and rule-
making process are provided in Appendix C, Figure 1. 
The EPS rules require all U.S. BHCs with at least $50 billion in consolidated assets, as 
well as all publicly traded U.S. BHCs with at least $10 billion in consolidated assets, to establish 
a board-level risk committee (RC) responsible for oversight of the enterprise-wide risk 
management function.  The RC must review and approve the BHC’s formal risk management 
framework and statement of risk appetite, and monitor management’s effectiveness in maintaining 
the organization’s overall risk strategy. The chair of the RC must be an independent director, and 
at least one committee member must qualify as a risk management expert, or a person with 
experience managing and evaluating the risks of a comparable organization. Minimum procedural 
standards require the RC to adopt a formal charter, to meet at least quarterly, and to maintain 
detailed records of all meeting discussions and risk management decisions. 
In line with the greater risks that larger institutions pose to the financial stability of the 
greater economy, the rules for covered institutions (i.e., BHCs with assets over $50 billion) are 
more stringent.11 Within this group, the risk committee must be a standalone committee of the 
BHC board with enterprise-wide risk management oversight as its sole function: the RC may not 
be a subcommittee of another committee, and it may not have substantive responsibilities unrelated 
to risk.12  The standalone requirement is intended to ensure that the board dedicates sufficient 
                                                 
11 Both size groups are governed under Regulation YY, Subpart C (§ 252.22), and covered institutions (those with 
total assets ≥ $50 billion) must also comply with Regulation YY, Subpart D (§ 252.33). Where applicable, I note the 
differences in the rules for these two groups. Unless otherwise noted, all remaining information in this section comes 
from these two sections of Title 12, Section 252 of the United States Code of Federal Regulations (12 CFR § 252, 
2014). 
12 Examples of inappropriate joint, or multi-purpose, committee structures, given within the preface to the final EPS 




attention to risk management, and that risk committee members have adequate time to dedicate to 
risk oversight. Covered institutions must also appoint an executive-level Chief Risk Officer 
(CRO), whose sole responsibility is to establish and oversee the enterprise-wide risk management 
function. The risk committee is charged with approving all CRO appointment and removal 
decisions, evaluating the CRO’s performance and compensation, and ensuring that sufficient 
resources are dedicated towards the risk management function so that entity-wide risk management 
objectives can be met. Finally, to support the independence of the CRO and the risk management 
function, the CRO must report directly to both the risk committee and the CEO. 
 
 
2.3. Prior Literature Examining Risk Governance Mechanisms 
The various EPS requirements, such as board-level risk committees, Chief Risk Officers, 
and risk management mechanisms, are not unique to the post-Dodd Frank period, especially among 
financial institutions. Motivated by the conjecture that risk management failures are at least 
partially to blame for the financial crisis (e.g., SSG, 2008), a handful of recent studies within the 
accounting and finance literatures have therefore examined – either directly or indirectly – the 
association between risk controls and bank risk and performance among financial institutions. 
Many are largely exploratory in nature, with an emphasis on explaining cross-sectional differences 
in crisis-period outcomes.  
In the following discussion, I summarize the extant literature most relevant to the present 
study, focusing primarily on studies that directly investigate the effectiveness of financial 




findings from related studies that control for banks’ risk management and risk oversight activities 
while primarily examining a different research question.  
Within these studies, the empirical measurement of financial institutions’ risk management 
mechanisms generally falls into one of two categories: (i) singular, or indicator, measurement of 
the presence or structure of one or more constructs, and (ii) summary scores derived with principal 
component analysis (PCA). To the extent possible, the organization of the below discussion 
mirrors these groupings. I conclude this section with a discussion of the limitations in comparing, 
and therefore drawing inferences from, these studies’ findings. 
 
 
2.3.1. Individual or Singular Risk Control Constructs 
2.3.1.1. Chief Risk Officers 
Aebi, Sabato, and Schmid (2012) 
Academics have long endorsed the notion that bank corporate governance is different from 
that of non-financial firms (e.g., Adams & Mehran, 2003; Macey & O’Hara, 2003). Because risk 
governance may be an important, but little understood, element of banks’ corporate governance 
structures, Aebi, Sabato, and Schmid (2012) examine whether risk governance mechanisms are 
related to bank performance during the recent financial crisis.  
The Aebi et al. (2012) sample includes 372 public U.S. commercial banks and savings 
institutions, each with at least $100 million in total assets by the end of 2006. All risk management, 
governance, and financial characteristics are measured as of year-end 2006, and performance is 
measured from July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008 with both stock returns (cumulative monthly 




variables include the presence of a CRO, the presence of a board-level risk committee (RC), the 
fraction of board members with financial services experience, and other structural corporate 
governance characteristics, such as board size and board independence. For a subset of 85 larger 
banks (henceforth, “large bank subsample”), the authors also collect the reporting line of the CRO, 
the number of RC meetings during 2006, the size of the RC, and the fraction of RC members that 
are independent. 
Aebi et al. (2012) define a risk committee as a “dedicated committee solely charged with 
monitoring and managing the risk management efforts within the bank” (p.3215). If there is no 
committee in charge of RM oversight, or if the AC assumes this responsibility, the authors set the 
RC indicator to zero. The data shows that 8% of the main sample (30 of 372 banks), and 23% of 
the subsample of larger BHCs (20 of 85 banks), had a board-level risk committee meeting this 
definition as of year-end 2006. Within large bank subsample, the average RC met around four 
times in 2006 and had 3.8 members, 56.4% of which were independent.13 
The CRO indicator takes a value of one if the company has a CRO that is a member of the 
executive team. Among the main sample of 372 financial firms, 47 have an executive CRO present 
in 2006. Within the subsample of 85 larger banks, 31 have an executive CRO. Among these, six 
(seven) of the CROs report directly to the CEO (board of directors). A director is considered to 
have a finance background if he or she has current or previous experience as an executive officer 
of a bank or insurance company. As of 2006, 22.5% of the sample firms’ directors have a finance 
background.  
                                                 
13 The authors do not incorporate RC size nor RC independence in the reported multivariate results. A footnote 




In multivariate tests, the results across the majority of specifications indicate that director 
financial expertise is related to worse performance during the crisis. This contradicts critics’ claims 
increasing board members’ industry experience will enhance board risk monitoring efforts. Across 
both sample groups, Aebi et al. (2012) find that neither risk committees, nor CROs, have any 
relation to crisis-period performance. Within the large bank subsample, upon the inclusion of the 
number of RC meetings along with the RC indicator, Aebi et al. (2012) find some evidence to 
suggest that the subset of larger financial institutions with risk committees in place in 2006 have 
lower stock market and operating performance during the crisis, but that more active oversight by 
the RC (i.e., more frequent meetings) mitigates this relation.14 The authors interpret this finding as 
evidence that the presence of a board-level risk committee, alone, is a noisy measure of the board’s 
dedication to risk oversight.  
The study’s key finding and primary contribution, however, is related to the reporting line 
of the CRO. Aebi et al. (2012) find that a direct reporting line from the CRO to the board (to the 
CEO) has a significantly positive (significantly negative) association with both accounting and 
stock returns during the crisis. As noted above, the number of observations disclosing the CRO’s 
reporting line is relatively small; nevertheless, the study provides the first empirical evidence to 




                                                 
14 As the number of RC meetings is measured for 2006, only, there are fewer concerns about more frequent meetings 
in response to higher risk during the crisis, so the presumption that more meetings reflect more active (or even 




Other Evidence on the Importance of the CRO 
Similar to Aebi et al. (2012), other studies find evidence that the relative importance and 
independence of the CRO seem to be important dimensions along which risk management’s 
effectiveness varies. Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig (2009) find that risk manager “centrality,” or 
the ratio of CRO-to-CEO compensation, is positively related to sub-prime mortgage origination 
quality. Employing a similar definition, Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) find that CRO centrality has 
a positive relation with BHCs’ crisis-period accounting returns, and a weak negative relation with 
tail risk over the period from 1995 to 2009.15 For a sample of international financial institutions, 
Lingel and Sheedy (2012) find that the CRO’s organizational status (the simple average of an 
indicator for whether or not the CRO is an executive, and whether the CRO is among the top five 
highest paid executives) has a strong negative association with return volatility, and a moderate 
negative relation with tail risk.16 Taken together, these study’s findings imply that a risk manager’s 
independence and relative status within the organization have a strong moderating effect on bank 
risk-taking. 
 
2.3.1.2. Risk Committees 
Hines & Peters (2015) 
Motivated by the lack of empirical evidence to support recent calls and regulatory mandates 
for improvements in board risk oversight (such as Section 165 of Dodd-Frank), Hines and Peters 
(2015) investigate whether voluntary risk committee formation among U.S. public financial 
                                                 
15 These results are tabulated in the study’s internet appendix. 




institutions is associated with measures of subsequent risk and performance. Across the period 
from 1994 to 2008, the authors identify 47 firms that establish board-level risk committees. Each 
of these “treatment” firms is matched with a similarly sized control firm, in the same two-digit 
SIC, that does not form a RC in the same year.17 
Hines and Peters (2015) first explore the determinants of RC formation in year t as a 
function of hypothesized explanatory variables measured in year t-1. The probit regression results 
indicate that the likelihood of forming a standalone board-level risk committee is strongest for 
firms with international banking activities, larger and more independent boards, recent merger 
activity, and recent restatements.18 RC formation is also marginally more likely with higher levels 
of net loan charge-offs, higher leverage, CRO presence, and having a Big N auditor. 
As the focus of the paper is on voluntary board-level actions, all subsequent tests include 
the inverse Mills ratio from the aforementioned determinants model to control for self-selection 
bias. The primary tests examine whether RC formation in year t is associated with changes, from 
year t-1 to t+1, in non-performing assets, net loan charge-offs, hedging and trading derivatives, 
and risk-adjusted ROA (net income scaled by risk-weighted assets). The authors hypothesize that 
changes in outcome variables, post-RC formation, are more likely to be observed among firms that 
have deviated sufficiently from acceptable levels of risk or performance. Accordingly, the 
                                                 
17 The sample of financial firms in Hines and Peters (2015) includes banks with two-digit SIC codes 60 (Depository 
Institutions) and 61 (non-depository credit institutions). 
18 A significant portion of this study’s front matter is devoted to the discussion as to whether or not risk oversight 
should be a responsibility of the Audit Committee (AC). Whether financial reporting quality improves after risk is 
split off from the AC’s responsibilities is an important – and as of yet, unanswered – empirical question. To the 
extent that the majority of the “treatment” firms in Hines and Peters (2015) shifted risk oversight responsibilities 
from the AC to a newly formed RC, the result that RC formation is more likely after a restatement may suggest that 
RC formation is perhaps seen as one solution to relieving an already over-burdened Audit Committee from more 
ancillary responsibilities (see, for example, related discussions in Hines and Peters (2015, p.270 and p.278) and 




specifications allow the effect of RC formation to vary across firms with an indicator for unusually 
high (or in the case of hedging derivatives, unusually low) lagged values of the dependent 
variable.19 Controls include each of the variables determined to be significant predictors of risk 
committee formation, except for the restatement indicator, as well as size, and regulator and year 
fixed effects, among others.  
Tests within the matched sample yield no evidence that RC formation is associated with 
short-term changes in any of the selected risk or performance measures.20 More specifically, the 
main effect on the RC indicator is never different from zero, and joint tests for the conditional 
effect of RC formation among “high risk” firms do not support the authors’ hypotheses. The results 
for within-firm robustness tests (using only the “treatment” firms) are similarly null, with the 
exception that RC formation is followed by increases in non-performing assets. The authors 
interpret their findings to suggest that on average, board-level RC formation is a “symbolic” 
governance practice (i.e., window-dressing).21  
 
Hines, Masli, Mauldin, & Peters (2015) 
Hines, Masli, Mauldin and Peters (2015) investigate the whether banks’ board-level risk 
oversight activities are associated with audit fees. The premise of the authors’ hypotheses is that 
                                                 
19 The indicator is based on the sample-wide median of the dependent variable, measured in year t-1; however, as 
the number of firms (including both treatment and control firms) in any given year is very small, it is not clear what 
this indicator – and its interaction with RC – is actually capturing. Unfortunately, tests without the “high risk” 
interaction are not presented. 
20 The authors report that untabulated results, estimated with a longer test window (specifically, examining changes 
from t-1 to t+2), yield qualitatively similar results. 
21 As for the results for the CRO control variable, the matched sample test results suggest that the presence of a CRO 
is marginally associated with improvements in risk-adjusted ROA (p < 0.10, one-tailed) post-RC formation. Results 
of the within-firm tests suggest that CRO presence is weakly related to decreases, post-RC formation, in both 




the presence of a risk committee will affect audit fees through the external auditor’s risk 
assessment process (i.e., a supply-side explanation, where the auditor’s efforts change in response 
to ex ante evaluations of inherent and/or control risks). The study covers the time period from 2003 
to 2011, for an unbalanced sample includes 3,980 bank-year observations and a maximum 
(minimum) of 495 (334) unique banks per year.22 
Hines et al. (2015) identify risk committees with word searches of the Audit Analytics and 
Morningstar board databases: a committee is a “risk committee” if the word “risk” is in the 
committee’s name. The study’s RC indicator consequently includes committees with and without 
enterprise-wide scope, as well as both standalone and multi-purpose committees (such as an “Audit 
and Risk” committee). The authors also include AC is RC, an indicator variable equal to one if the 
audit committee has the word “risk” in its name, in all tests. 23 
In the main analysis, Hines et al. (2015) consistently find a positive association between 
the presence of a board-level risk committee – that is separate from the audit committee – and 
audit fees. One interesting result, not addressed within the study, is that having a joint Audit-and-
Risk committee appears to mitigate this effect.24 While the study’s research question primarily 
centers on the conjecture that a separate, board-level risk committee signals higher risk (and affects 
auditors’ judgments of inherent risk and control risk, accordingly), it may be that the client 
                                                 
22 I use the term “banks” somewhat liberally here. While the actual sample composition is not reported, the authors 
report that Compustat Bank Annual, the data source used for banks’ characteristics, includes SIC codes 6020 
(commercial BHCs), 6035 (Federally chartered savings institutions), and 6036 (non-federally chartered savings 
institutions). All tests include four-digit SIC industry fixed effects. 
23 For observations where AC is RC equals one, RC is also equal to one. 
24 The coefficient estimates on RC are positive and significant in three out of three tests, and the estimates for AC Is 
RC are negative and significant in two of the three models. The authors do not present joint tests for the sum of the 




demands greater testing and assurance of more extensive risk controls. In that case, higher audit 
fees would likely signal lower, not higher, overall firm risk.25 
 
2.3.1.3. Board Members’ Financial Services Experience 
The EPS rules stipulate that at least one RC member has risk management experience 
commensurate with the BHC’s structure and risk profile. In addition, the FRB expects all 
committee members to understand sound risk management practices with respect to banking 
organizations. Since the financial crisis, most banks have increased the number of outside board 
members with industry experience (PWC, 2016), and I observe, in my data, that many of those 
directors sit on BHCs’ risk committees. To my knowledge, no extant study directly examines the 
relation between bank risk-taking and risk committee members’ financial services experience, 
much less of board or RC members’ risk management expertise.26 Given that critics of banks’ pre-
crisis corporate governance efficacy frequently point to the lack of qualified directors on BHC 
boards as a significant flaw (e.g., Kirkpatrick, 2009; Macey & O’Hara, 2016), it is perhaps even 
more surprising that few studies have examined the relation between bank performance or risk and 
the extent of financial expertise among the full board. The following discussion is therefore limited 
                                                 
25 Because prior literature has found that audit fees are lower among companies subject to regulation, a secondary 
research question in Hines et al. (2015) is whether the association between RCs and audit fees is any different post-
Dodd-Frank. More specifically, Hines et al. (2015) add the variable MANDATORY, an indicator equal to one for any 
bank with assets of at least $10 billion in either or both of years 2010 and 2011, to all tests. The estimates on this 
variable are negative and moderately significant in four of five reported tests. As the variable is not interacted with 
the RC indicator, the authors’ interpretation that the RC-audit fee relation varies across voluntary and mandatory 
conditions lacks validity. Instead, the negative estimates simply indicate that in 2010 and 2011, banks with assets of 
at least $10 billion have lower audit fees, on average, relative to banks with assets below $10 billion. As I am not 
aware of any other reason to expect this relationship, I assume it simply means that either this group of banks (> $10 
billion) faced higher audit fees in years before 2010 and 2011, or that various discretionary audit services were 
either cut or delayed, or negotiated downward as the larger banks continued to recover from the crisis. 
26 There is some indirect evidence about risk committee members’ financial services experience found within the 
additional analyses of Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and Lingel and Sheedy (2012). As both studies’ primary 




to the single extant study that directly examines the association between board members’ financial 
expertise and U.S. financial institutions’ risk and performance.27  
 
Minton, Taillard, and Williamson (2014) 
Independent directors generally face higher costs of acquiring information about the firms 
they oversee (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2007); these costs should be lower, however, for industry 
experts. Lower information asymmetry, along with depth of experience, should enable 
independent directors to understand and recognize risks that may be unsound, and to more 
efficiently monitor management risk-taking. Boards also play an advisory role, and have a 
fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder value. Thus, board financial experts may identify, and 
even encourage management to pursue, risk-taking strategies that increase shareholder value. With 
these competing theories as the backdrop, Minton, Taillard, and Williamson (2014) directly 
investigate the claim that in the years leading up to and including the crisis, financial firms’ 
directors – and independent directors, in particular – lacked sufficient industry expertise to 
properly monitor management’s actions (e.g., Kirkpatrick, 2009). 
Using both commercially available data and hand-collected information, Minton et al. 
(2014) compile a large dataset of public U.S. financial institutions’ board and risk management 
characteristics for the 2003 to 2008 period. All sample institutions – the majority of which are 
commercial BHCs (banks) – have assets of at least $1 billion. Results for all tests are presented for 
                                                 
27 I use the terms “financial experience” and “financial expertise” interchangeably throughout this section. I intend 
for both terms to imply industry-relevant (i.e., banking and/or financial services) qualifications, rather than the usual 




the full sample, as well as for a subset of “large” banks, where the size cutoff varies annually based 
on the annual median of total assets. 
Following Güner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008), Minton et al. (2014) consider an 
independent director to be a financial expert if that individual (1) has held an executive-level 
position at a financial institution; (2) is an executive at a non-bank financial institution; (3) has 
executive-level experience in a finance-related position (e.g., CFO, accountants) at a non-financial 
firm; (4) has experience as a professional investor (e.g., hedge funds, private equity, venture 
capital); or (5) is an academic in a related field (finance, accounting, or economics).28 The measure 
of financial expertise employed in all tests is the number of independent directors meeting any of 
the above criteria, scaled by the total number of independent directors. Across the period from 
2003 to 2008, Minton et al. (2014) report that the average fraction of independent directors with 
industry-relevant experience among U.S. BHC boards ranges from 20% to 26%.  
The main tests of the study consist of OLS regressions with lagged independent variables. 
To address endogeneity concerns, Minton et al. (2014) present the main results with a matched 
sample (using propensity score matching), and incorporate tests designed to rule out alternative 
explanations about reverse causality. The main results hold under these alternative specifications, 
and are also robust to different definitions of financial expertise and independence, as well as the 
inclusion or exclusion of various subsets of financial institutions. In the interest of brevity, I 
therefore limit the following discussion to the study’s main results. 
                                                 
28 As current executives of depository institutions are prohibited from sitting on the board of another bank, the first 
grouping is strictly confined to past experience. While not stated explicitly within Minton et al. (2014), I assume that 




Minton et al (2014) find that independent financial expert directors are associated with 
more risk-taking and better performance in the years leading up to the crisis (2004 to 2006). More 
specifically, a higher percentage of financial expertise among independent directors in 2003 is, on 
average, associated with higher daily stock return volatility across 2004-2006, as well as better 
stock performance (nominal cumulative stock returns) for the period from January 2003 to 
December 2006. Minton et al. (2014) also find that real estate exposures were higher among banks 
with at least one independent financial expert board member. Among the subset of larger banks, 
however, independent director financial expertise, as measured in 2005, is associated with lower 
Tier 1 risk-weighted capital ratios in 2006. The latter result suggests that banks with more qualified 
boards did not internally hedge their risk-taking by holding more capital.  
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that Minton et al. (2014) find strong evidence that these 
same banks did not fare well in the crisis. More specifically, the study’s results indicate that a 
higher proportion of independent financial experts on the board in 2006 is associated with worse 
stock performance (nominal cumulative stock returns) across the January 2007 to December 2008 
period.29 The magnitude and significance of this result is strongest among the subset of larger 
commercial banks.30 
In all tests, Minton et al. (2014) also control for the presence of a CRO and the presence of 
a risk committee. The estimates for these indicators vary with the sample composition and the time 
                                                 
29 Using a similar design and for a similar time period, Aebi et al. (2012) also find that director financial expertise is 
associated with worse performance during the crisis. 
30 The main variable of interest is measured as the number of independent directors with financial backgrounds 
scaled by the total number of independent directors. Thus, one concern may be that the variable is inflated for banks 
with fewer independent directors, in general; however, all tests include controls for board size and independence. 
Interestingly, in seven of eight reported tests, board independence has a significant negative relation with crisis-




period examined. CRO presence is not related to any measure of risk or performance in the pre-
crisis period, but there is weak evidence that crisis-period stock returns were higher, on average, 
for firms with a CRO. When controlling for independent director financial expertise, risk 
committee presence is negatively associated with pre-crisis stock returns, but this result is only 
present within the full sample. Collectively, the bulk of the evidence presented within Minton et 
al. (2014) suggests that there is not a meaningful association between CRO or RC presence and 
the selected measures of bank risk and performance.31 
Overall, Minton et al. (2014) interpret these findings as evidence that independent financial 
experts either encouraged risk-taking as a means of increasing shareholder value, or were more 
permissive of risk-taking due to their familiarity with such strategies and their understanding of 
explicit and implicit government guarantees against bankruptcy. The authors’ conclusion, 
however, that these results “challenge the regulators’ view that more financial expertise on the 
boards of banks would unambiguously lower their risk profile” (Minton et al., 2014; p. 377), is 
somewhat of a straw man fallacy. While it is true that U.S. regulators have expressed their belief 
that all bank board members should have a general understanding of the underlying business, the 
only place where expertise is explicitly required is on the risk committee. Because Minton et al. 
(2014) do not investigate the committee assignments of independent financial experts, a plausible 
alternative explanation for the study’s findings is that the majority of these experts were not as 
directly involved in risk oversight as they perhaps should have been.  
Many have argued that the risk committee’s composition is crucial to effective risk 
oversight (Macey & O’Hara, 2016; Kirkpatrick, 2009), stressing that BHCs’ directors, and risk 
                                                 
31 Of 32 reported regressions including the CRO and RC indicators, all but four (three) of the estimates for CRO 




committee members in particular, should have sufficient relevant experience to provide effective 
challenge to management’s decisions (Pozen, 2010). Underscoring this argument, Macey and 
O’Hara (2016) assert, “ignorance is […] not a good strategy for risk control – relying on directors’ 
lack of knowledge to restrain risk is surely not a formula for a safe and sound banking system” 
(p.103). In light of these arguments, the expectation that risk committee members have a better 
understanding of the banking industry and of risk management practices is likely a necessary 
(although certainly not sufficient) condition for effective board-level risk oversight.  
 
 
2.3.2. Summary Scores of Risk Management & Oversight Quality 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), as a field of professional practice as well as within 
the academic literature, is relatively new. The term Enterprise Risk Management first surfaced in 
practitioner-oriented articles in the mid-1990s, and the first academic studies to use the phrase 
appeared in 2001 (Bromiley, McShane, Nair, & Rustambekov, 2015). One of the more significant 
hurdles faced by this developing line of literature involves settling on the appropriate measurement 
of not only the presence, but also the quality or maturity, of ERM practices.  
Each of the studies discussed in the previous section uses indicators (or otherwise singular 
measures) to capture the presence of certain risk management or risk governance characteristics 
(e.g., CRO or risk committee presence). Given that ERM is fundamentally a systems concept, the 
ERM literature has more recently acknowledged that there are at least two primary limitations to 
measuring risk management and oversight quality in this manner. First, narrowly defined 
indicators may not adequately distinguish between superficial disclosures and more 




variables fail to differentiate between stages of ERM implementation or maturity (e.g., Farrell & 
Gallagher, 2015; McShane, Nair, & Rustambekov, 2011). 
A naive solution to this measurement problem might be to include multiple indicators, 
perhaps along with their various interactions, for each observable component of an ERM system. 
However, as the various parts of a firm’s ERM system are interrelated – if not strictly conditional 
upon one another’s presence – multicollinearity concerns render such an approach infeasible. 
Instead, a summary measurement that incorporates multiple attributes of the organization’s ERM 
system not only addresses the multicollinearity problem, but also allows for finer differentiation 
across practices that may otherwise be categorized equivalently under dichotomous measurement. 
The relevant extant studies that take this approach use principal component analysis (PCA), almost 
exclusively, to combine attributes of the CRO and of board-level risk oversight to measure the 
strength of risk controls. I summarize those studies below, and then conclude this section by 
summarizing the takeaways from the extant literature on bank risk governance and bank risk. 
 
Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) 
Ellul and Yerramilli (2013; hereafter, E&Y) find robust evidence that higher quality risk 
management practices are associated with lower future risk and better crisis-period performance. 
Whereas the previously discussed studies are largely deductive in nature, E&Y take a more 
inductive approach towards evaluating the relationship between banks’ risk controls and risk. In 
addition to incorporating hedging theory into the analysis, E&Y acknowledge that BHCs’ risk 
control systems are endogenously determined. 
E&Y argue that while strong risk controls are a prerequisite for identifying and mitigating 




for implementing such systems in the first place. On the one hand, an institution with a higher risk 
appetite may implement strong risk controls to insure that risk levels do not exceed stated 
tolerances. E&Y refer to this as the “hedging” channel, wherein stronger risk controls will be 
associated with higher levels of risk. On the other hand, institutions with lower risk appetites may 
implement strong risk controls as a preventive measure, such that stronger risk controls will be 
associated with lower risk. E&Y refer to this as the “business model” channel. E&Y’s alternative 
hypothesis is that banks’ risk functions have no real power within the organization, such that there 
will be no relation between risk controls and bank risk. 
The E&Y sample covers the period from 1994 to 2010, and consists of 72 of the largest 
100 publicly traded U.S. financial institutions as of 2007. E&Y’s explanatory variable of interest 
is the risk management index (RMI), which is the first principal component, estimated on an annual 
basis, of six hand-collected risk management and oversight variables. The first four, CRO Present, 
CRO Executive, CRO Top5, and CRO Centrality, capture the presence and organizational status of 
the CRO. The other two variables, Active Risk Committee and Risk Committee Experience, 
measure the quality of board-level risk oversight in terms of the frequency of risk committee 
meetings and independent risk committee members’ financial services experience.32 
                                                 
32 In Appendix F, I discuss (at length) the definitions and shortcomings of E&Y’s RMI input variables. Some of the 
more important caveats related to the following discussion of E&Y’s findings are as follows: 
(i) The committee used as the RC (for Active Risk Committee and Risk Committee Experience) includes audit 
committees with risk oversight; for all types of risk committees, the scope of the committee’s risk oversight does 
not appear to have been a discriminatory factor; 
(ii) The CRO classification criteria includes, for “smaller BHCs mainly oriented towards retail banking,” silo-type 
risk officers, such as Chief Credit Officers, Chief Lending Officers, and Chief Compliance Officers. The specific 
rules followed, or BHCs for which this concession is made, are not disclosed; CRO Centrality takes a non-zero 
value even when a CRO (or equivalent) does not appear to be present within the organization;  
Taken together, (i) and (ii) imply that even without a dedicated risk committee and without a CRO, a BHC can 
conceivably have non-zero RMI scores. The descriptive statistics presented in E&Y’s Table 1 and the pre-crisis RMI 




Across the entire sample period (1994 to 2010), E&Y report that a CRO is present (is an 
executive) in 80.6% (40.2%) of the observations. The average for the CRO Top5 indicator, which 
captures whether or not the CRO’s compensation is disclosed for a given year, is 20.5%. This 
implies that the values of a key variable throughout the analysis, CRO Centrality (the ratio of CRO-
to-CEO pay; reported mean of 31.3%), are based on estimated compensation for nearly 80% of 
the sample.33 Risk committees meet, on average, 5.4 times per year, and 30.7% of risk committees 
have at least one independent member with financial services experience. Consistent with 
increasing attention towards risk management during the study’s time period, the annual means 
for each of the RMI input variables are generally increasing over time. 
E&Y first investigate the determinants of stronger risk controls (RMI), and find that RMI 
is increasing with bank size (although this relation is concave), the extent of non-traditional 
banking activities (e.g., derivatives trading, proportion of non-interest income), and the sensitivity 
of the CEO’s compensation to stock volatility (vega), but not to changes in share price (delta). In 
addition, several characteristics usually associated with better corporate governance, such as lower 
values of the G-Index, more independent boards, and less-entrenched CEOs (or, CEOs with shorter 
tenure), are positively associated with RMI. In contrast, higher Tier 1 capital holdings and the 
presence of board members with industry experience are both negatively associated with RMI. 
E&Y interpret this latter finding to suggest that regulatory capital and board member experience 
may act as substitutes for stronger internal risk controls. 
                                                 
33 The CRO’s compensation is not available if the CRO is not among the top five highest paid executives (79.5% of 
the sample). Rather than code CRO Centrality to zero, E&Y use either the compensation of the lowest of the top five 




E&Y next test whether banks with high pre-crisis RMI prior to the crisis fared better during 
the crisis. The dependent variables, measured in 2007 and 2008, include balance sheet-based risk 
measures, market-based risk (tail risk), and accounting and stock market performance.34 All 
control variables are measured in 2006 except for pre-crisis RMI, which is the BHC’s average 
RMI over the 2005 to 2006 period. E&Y report that higher pre-crisis RMI is associated with better 
performing loan portfolios, higher ROA and stock returns, and lower tail risk during the crisis.  
Higher RMI is also associated with lower tail risk across the full sample period (1995 to 
2010), and this result is robust to the inclusion of controls for CEO compensation structure, other 
corporate governance characteristics, and BHC fixed effects. The tail risk results are also robust 
to 2SLS instrumental variable regressions and dynamic panel GMM estimation, mitigating 
concerns that previous results are either driven by simultaneity, or are simply picking up a feedback 
effect between risk and RMI (such that causation runs both ways).  
To identify whether the “business model” or “hedging” channel is more consistent with the 
study’s findings, E&Y test whether the sample firms revised internal risk controls subsequent to 
the 1998 Russian financial crisis. The basic premise of these tests is that the BHCs which 
performed worst during the 1998 crisis will improve (or not change) their internal risk controls if 
the hedging (or business model) channel prevails. The results suggest that the BHCs with the worst 
                                                 
34 More specifically, the dependent variables include holdings of private-label (i.e., not government-guaranteed) 
mortgage-backed securities, derivatives held for trading purposes scaled by assets, non-performing loans scaled by 
assets, ROA, buy-and-hold stock returns, and tail risk. Tail risk is defined as the negative of a BHC’s average 
returns over the worst 5% return days for that BHC in a given calendar year. I use the same definition for the 




performance (above median values of tail risk) in 1998 did not change their RMI by as much as 
their peers over time, consistent with the business model explanation.35  
 
Lingel and Sheedy (2012) 
Lingel and Sheedy (2012; henceforth, L&S) extend the E&Y study to an international 
setting, using a sample of 60 financial institutions from 17 different countries across the 2004 to 
2011 period. The study’s primary risk proxies are weekly stock return volatility and tail risk, but 
L&S also examine whether stronger risk governance is associated with annual stock returns, 
accounting performance (ROA), and crisis-period loan quality.36 
Taking an approach similar to E&Y, L&S use PCA to summarize several hand-collected 
risk governance and risk management characteristics. Due to data quality and availability 
limitations, L&S construct the resulting risk governance indices with only four variables: CRO 
Executive, CRO Top 5, Active Risk Committee, and Experienced Risk Committee.37 Underscoring 
                                                 
35 Several caveats are necessary with respect to these tests. First, it appears that roughly 80% of the study’s 72 BHCs 
have data available for these tests. Given the number of significant bank mergers during the 1998-2000 era, this 
figure seems too high, and E&Y do not explain whether (and if so, how) adjustments were made for banks 
experiencing significant organizational changes during this time period (e.g., Bank of America and Nations Bank in 
1998; Wells Fargo and Norwest in 1998; Citicorp and Travelers Group in 1998; JPMorgan and Chase Manhattan in 
2000; etc.). 
Second, the instrumental variable in these tests is the change in comparable BHCs’ RMI from 1998 to 2000. The 
repeal of Glass-Steagall’s affiliation provisions, through the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act), likely played a far more significant role in large financial institutions’ risk control environment 
than did the Russian Financial Crisis of 1998. 
36 With respect to the risk proxies, L&S define Aggregate Risk as the standard deviation of the firm’s weekly 
abnormal returns (versus the MSCI World Index), and Tail Risk as the negative of the firm’s worst weekly abnormal 
return, both estimated for the fiscal year ended at t+1. 
37 All four variables are indicators. The CRO Executive variable equals one if an institution has a CRO or Chief 
Credit Officer that is a member of the senior executive team. Similar to E&Y, CRO Top 5 equals one if the CRO is 
one of the top five highest paid executives of the firm for a given year, and a risk committee includes any board-
level committee that oversees risk management, including the audit committee. Active Risk Committee equals one if 
the committee meets more times than the same annual median number of committee meetings, and Experienced Risk 
Committee equals one if the fraction of non-insider RC directors with prior experience in banking or financial 




the data-sensitive nature of PCA procedures, in general, L&S are not able to reduce the underlying 
variables to a single score (as in E&Y). The first principal component explains only 36.6% of the 
variation in the underlying variables, while the second and third components explain an additional 
25.7% and 22.6%, respectively. L&S therefore retain the first three components for inclusion in 
subsequent analysis (RGI_1, RGI_2, and RGI_3). The component loadings suggest that RGI_1 
measures the CRO’s organizational status, RGI_2 captures risk committee meetings, and RGI_3 
captures risk committee financial services experience.38 
The remainder of the L&S study essentially follows E&Y’s blueprint. Whereas E&Y find 
that stronger pre-crisis risk governance is associated with lower risk and better performance for 
the 2006 to 2008 time period, L&S find no evidence of this relation.39 Tests across the entire 2004 
to 2011 sample period, which include controls for time-variant firm characteristics as well as firm, 
year, and country fixed effects, are somewhat mixed. RC members’ industry experience (RGI_3) 
is generally associated with lower risk and better performance (buy-and-hold returns and ROA). 
Overall, the L&S results mostly support the notion that CRO Status (RGI_1) is at least weakly 
associated with lower stock return volatility and lower tail risk. L&S find no evidence that RC 
meeting frequency (RGI_2) has any relation to risk or performance. Taken together, the full period 
                                                 
38 To my knowledge, L&S is the only study in this area of the literature that presents the PCA loadings within the 
paper. In Appendix F of the present paper, I discuss my attempts to replicate E&Y’s RMI using E&Y’s exact same 
sample banks and following E&Y’s definitions for the underlying variables. The PCA procedure with my data yields 
component loadings that are quite similar to those reported within L&S, whether or not I include the additional two 
variables used in E&Y’s RMI. Several of the loadings are counter-intuitive, suggesting that these characteristics 
measure different underlying constructs. For example, RC Experience has a large and negative loading on the first 
component, while Active RC does not load (or is not meaningfully weighted). See Appendix F for further discussion. 
39 Instead, L&S find some evidence suggesting that banks with more experienced risk committees had higher levels 
of non-performing loans during the crisis. This is consistent with the Minton et al. (2014) finding that board 




results suggest that stronger risk governance, especially with respect to risk committee 
composition, is moderately related to lower risk and improved performance.  
 
Commentary on Ellul & Yerramilli (2013) and Lingel and Sheedy (2012) 
Sample differences aside, a direct comparison of the E&Y and L&S results is not possible, 
since the outcomes of the two studies’ PCA procedures were considerably different. At a high 
level, it can be fairly stated that for the main analysis, L&S find some evidence that supports, and 
no evidence that directly contradicts, the E&Y findings. A more straightforward comparison of the 
two studies’ results, however, is possible for some of the additional analyses, where both studies 
deconstruct the PCA-derived scores into two, similarly defined measures. 
The first measure is intended to capture the CRO’s relative organization status or power. 
E&Y use the CRO Centrality measure (the ratio of CRO-to-CEO pay), whereas L&S employ a 
new variable, CRO Status (the simple average of the CRO Executive and CRO Top5 indicators).40 
The second variable, Oversight Quality, is defined the same in both studies (the simple average of 
Active RC and RC Experience). 
When using these measures in place of RMI, E&Y find a weak negative relation between 
CRO Centrality and tail risk (p < 0.10) across the study’s full sample period (1994 to 2010), 
                                                 
40 Lingel and Sheedy (2012) discuss several challenges encountered in not only collecting, but also interpreting, the 
CRO Centrality measure for their sample banks. While data limitations in the international sample are partly at fault, 
the primary difficulty appears to have been that a number of the L&S observations have CRO Centrality ratios 
greater than one. L&S explain that this was because the CEO had foregone some or all of his or her compensation 
for the period. I also find this to be the case when replicating the E&Y study with the E&Y sample, although E&Y 
are silent on the issue. L&S also point out the “interesting” univariate relationship that risk and CRO Centrality are 
positively related (as I report in Appendix F, I also find this relationship within the E&Y replication sample). 
Concluding that the measure is “not a useful discriminator for risk outcomes,” L&S omit CRO Centrality from all 




although this finding does not hold in the presence of firm fixed effects.41 In contrast, across the 
2004 to 2011 period, L&S find that after controlling for both country and firm fixed effects, CRO 
Status has a strong negative association with stock return volatility (p < 0.01), and a weak negative 
relation with tail risk (p < 0.10). L&S also report that Oversight Quality is associated with 
marginally lower future stock return volatility (p < 0.05) and tail risk (p < 0.10), whereas E&Y 
find no relation between Oversight Quality and tail risk. 
E&Y’s lack of findings for these tests stands in contrast to the main results of the study. 
The authors conjecture that this is because the PCA-derived RMI measure incorporates aspects of 
the firm’s risk controls that are not fully captured by either CRO Centrality or Oversight Quality. 
On the other hand, the L&S results generally confirm their main findings, and again highlight the 




2.4. Synthesis of Prior Literature 
2.4.1. Limitations 
Through supervisory letters and the examination process, the Federal Reserve (FRB) began 
advocating for widespread implementation of the now mandated EPS practices as early as 1995, 
and began formally incorporating examiners’ evaluations of institutions’ risk management systems 
                                                 




into supervisory ratings in 1996 (BGFRS, 1997).42 Rather than prescribe specific roles and 
functions related to risk management and risk oversight, the FRB has historically evaluated banks’ 
compliance with these expectations in a context-specific manner, taking into account a given 
institution’s size, activities, and complexity (FRB, 1995; FRB 1997). 
Consequently, BHCs’ risk management and oversight practices were fairly diverse before 
Dodd-Frank. Due, in part, to a 2004 NYSE rule discussed in more detail, below, many publicly 
traded BHCs assigned some level of board risk oversight to the audit committee. Some boards also 
formed separate risk committees dedicated to overseeing subsets (or silos) of risks, such as credit 
risk or interest rate risk committees (Deloitte, 2013). Many boards delegated risk oversight 
responsibilities across multiple committees, while others retained risk oversight as board-wide 
responsibility. Prior to 2010, a few banks’ disclosures provided no indication whatsoever that the 
board played any role in risk oversight. It was objectively rare to have a dedicated, enterprise-wide 
risk committee at the board level. If present at all, the scope of risks overseen, and the composition 
(independence and qualifications) and activities of each bank’s designated “risk committee” varied 
substantially across banks. 
In light of this heterogeneity during the pre-Dodd Frank period, it is not surprising that 
each study discussed in the preceding two sections employs a unique empirical definition for each 
                                                 
42 Supervisory letters “address significant policy and procedural matters related to the Federal Reserve System’s 
supervisory responsibilities,” which are, fundamentally, to ensure that banks are managed in a safe and sound 
manner (www.federalreserve.gov). Supervisory letters are normative, rather than authoritative. For example, 
Supervisory Letter SR 08-8 uses language such as “guiding principles,” “should generally implement,” and 
“strongly encourage” in describing supervisors’ expectations for directors’ and managers’ activities (BGFRS, 2008). 
In practice, the distinction between supervisory guidance and definitive rules is not always clear; however, the fact 
that many large BHCs apparently did not comply with stated supervisory expectations prior to Dodd-Frank suggests 




risk management construct.43 Most studies fail to find that board-level risk committees affect bank 
risk. The default conclusion is that banks’ risk management and oversight mechanisms serve 
superficial, rather than substantive purposes (e.g., Hines & Peters, 2015). The null results within 
extant literature, however, are perhaps a consequence of noise, attributable to the extent of 
diversity among banks’ practices.  
Some studies use audit committee characteristics in the absence of an obvious risk 
committee (e.g., Ellul & Yerramilli, 2013; Lingel & Sheedy, 2012). Unless it is clear that an audit 
committee oversees enterprise-wide risk management efforts, treating the audit committee – by 
default – as a risk committee raises at least two inferential concerns. First, a few extant studies 
refer to a NYSE listing rule, which became effective in 2004, that requires audit committees to 
“discuss policies with respect to risk assessment and risk management” (SEC, 2003). That rule 
was cast in relation to Sarbanes-Oxley, and was adopted, nearly verbatim, from recommendations 
made within the 1999 Blue Ribbon Committee Report (which was, without question, entirely about 
improving financial reporting quality) (Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999). In that context, it is not 
apparent that an audit committee’s risk “discussions” would (or should) extend to any area beyond 
financial reporting-related risk.  
Second, several studies use the number of RC meetings, as compared to the sample annual 
mean or median, to proxy for “active” risk oversight. Relative to other board committees, audit 
committees usually meet more often in a given fiscal year; however, the extent to which audit 
committees actually discuss risk matters during meetings is not observable. A dedicated enterprise 
                                                 
43 The lack of an accepted, or well-defined, classification system for these mechanisms, now provided by the EPS 
rules, is likely at fault. Thus, I provide the following information not to criticize the various authors’ design choices, 




risk committee that meets only four times a year presumably has a more “active” role in risk 
oversight than an audit committee that meets twice as often (or more). Yet, under the “active” RC 
definition used in several extant studies (such as E&Y and L&S), the audit committee would be 
considered more the “active” of the two.  
On the other end of the spectrum, a few studies explicitly exclude the audit committee, or 
other specific committees, from the RC definition. For example, Aebi et al. (2012) and Hines and 
Peters (2015) restrict the RC classification to include only standalone, board-level risk committees, 
thereby excluding audit committees (presumably even if the audit committee does oversee 
enterprise-wide risk). Minton et al. (2014) define a risk committee as one that oversees risk-
monitoring, reports to the board of directors, and is “separate from the audit or asset and liability 
management committee” (Minton et al., 2014; p. 359). The third criterion is based on the authors’ 
observations that almost all sample firms have one or both of those committees.44  
Several extant studies identify risk committees with keyword searches of standard 
corporate governance databases (e.g., BoardEx), without considering the actual responsibilities of 
the committee as described in the firm’s proxy (e.g., Minton et al., 2014; Hines et al., 2015). A 
listing of the names of committees used for the present paper, provided in Appendix A.2, highlights 
the potential for measurement error if a keyword search fails to consider the committee’s remit: 
several “risk” committees shown in Appendix A.2 oversee only a subset of risk. 
With respect to the EPS chief risk officer requirements, a cursory synthesis of prior 
literature’s findings may suggest that on average, CROs are not meaningfully associated with bank 
                                                 
44 The exclusion of these two committees is based on the authors’ observations that almost all sample firms have one 
or both of those committees, so there would be no variation in an indicator that included them. By this same logic, a 
credit risk committee (or similar, such as a loan review committee) could also reasonably be excluded. These types 
of committees are omitted from the discussion throughout Minton et al. (2014), suggesting that the RC designation 




risk. In some cases, CRO effects are only present during the crisis period, or vary by sample 
composition. Again, the conventional explanation is that CROs do not have sufficient power to 
constrain other employees’ risk-taking incentives, but also again, the same criticisms of the 
empirical RC designation apply to the CRO position. Each of the previously discussed studies uses 
different classification criteria for CRO presence, as well as for determining when an individual is 
considered to be part of the executive team. For example, E&Y and L&S include chief credit 
officers within the same group as CROs. In contrast, Aebi et al. (2012) restrict this classification 
to include only those individuals with responsibility for the entire risk management function. Other 
studies (e.g., Keys et al., 2009; Minton et al., 2014) are silent on the CRO classification criteria, 
altogether. Finally, none of the papers discussed in this section explain, nor refer to by citation, the 
process followed when determining whether or not a CRO is an executive of the organization. 
 
 
2.4.2. Conclusions from Review of Prior Literature 
Taken together, prior literature provides little backing for conjectures about the effects of 
the EPS rules. Not only are there inconsistencies across studies, but the within-study findings are 
often also mixed (e.g., Aebi, Sabato, & Schmid, 2012; Hines & Peters, 2015; Minton et al., 2014). 
There is almost no evidence that risk committees, alone, are associated with differences in bank 
risk. On its own, the presence of a CRO does not appear to have a strong relation with bank risk 
of performance, although there is some evidence that this relation varies with the relative 
importance and independence of the CRO (e.g., Aebi et al., 2012; Keys et al., 2009).  
In contrast, the two studies that use PCA to combine several risk management and oversight 




evidence that stronger risk governance is associated with lower risk. However, this latter group of 
studies leaves unclear the extent to which any of the individual mechanisms explains the results.  
Perhaps most importantly, all extant research is drawn from sample periods that end by 
2011, and frequently, the various risk management and oversight mechanisms are measured in the 
pre-crisis period. For example, Minton et al. (2014) measure banks’ financial, governance, and 
risk management characteristics in 2003, 2005, and 2006, only. The Aebi et al. (2012) findings for 
the CRO’s reporting line are based on a single year of collected data: 2006. During this time period, 
few banks disclosed having CROs, and the majority of boards did not have separate risk 
committees. Furthermore, many of these practices were – at the time – only recently implemented 
(and therefore not well established), inconsistently disclosed, and perhaps most importantly, 
voluntary. Low power may therefore explain the null results in most extant studies, at least for 
CRO and RC indicators.  
Of the extant literature, Ellul and Yerramilli (2013; E&Y) is the only study to consistently 
find strong evidence that stronger risk management mechanisms are associated with lower risk and 
better crisis-period performance. E&Y’s findings generally support the authors’ “business model” 
conjecture that firms with low risk appetites adopt strong risk controls to limit the downside effects 
of excessive risk-taking.  
This has two important implications. First, some unobservable and fixed characteristic of 
the bank – call it the risk culture – drives both the choice of risk management strength and the 
bank’s risk appetite.45 Second, the E&Y findings imply that prior to 2010, riskier BHCs chose not 
                                                 
45 Consistent with this explanation, Bushman, Davidson, Dey, and Smith (2018) find that bank CEO materialism (as 




to implement robust risk controls (and safer BHCs implemented strong risk controls). If this was 
indeed the case, then the E&Y findings do not actually inform the question of whether strong risk 
controls constrain risk, as it is possible that less risky banks – those with stronger risk controls – 
would always have lower risk than banks with weaker controls. Within this context, the “business 
model” explanation is also an “entrenchment” story, whereby regulatory intervention is necessary 
to effect changes in management’s otherwise suboptimal practices. 
In summary, prior literature does not provide conclusive evidence to support the notion 
that board-level risk oversight practices (or risk governance, more generally) are associated with 
significant differences in bank-level outcomes. As I show in this study, there have been notable 
shifts in bank’s risk governance structures – at both the board and operations level – over the past 
decade. The Dodd-Frank Enhanced Prudential Standards (EPS) requirements present an 
opportunity to build upon previous work and by re-examining the association between risk 
oversight and risk in the post-Dodd-Frank period, when risk governance is a regulated matter. 
 
                                                 
Bushman et al. (2018) obtain the RMI measure directly from Andrew Ellul and Vijay Yerramilli. Interestingly, 
while E&Y (2013) presents results for only 72 BHCs, the Bushman et al. (2018) tests using RMI include up to 158 
unique BHCs. Whether these additional BHCs were added after the fact is not clear; however, the use of a larger 
sample for E&Y’s estimation of the PCA procedure to construct the RMI measure may at least partially explain the 




3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
While the majority of the reforms within Dodd-Frank aim to streamline the regulatory 
supervision of all financial institutions, the Section 165 risk management requirements (i.e., EPS) 
apply at the individual bank level, to all BHCs of a given size, regardless of the entity’s risk profile. 
As discussed in Section 2.1, banks are in the business of taking risks (e.g., Becht et al., 2011), and 
institutional features that are unique to banks limit the incentives for outsiders to monitor risk-
taking, as well as the effectiveness of market discipline. At the same time, the same institutional 
features encourage bank managers to take on more risk.46 Bank regulation emerged as a partial 
solution to the monitoring problem, but as history has shown, regulatory supervision, alone, is 
insufficient for adequately preventing excessive risk-taking and safeguarding the financial system.  
A strong risk management system is necessary for identification and prevention of 
excessive risk-taking (e.g., E&Y, 2013; Calomiris & Carlson, 2016). Since the distress or failure 
of one institution can put several others at risk, strong risk controls are a crucial, but often 
overlooked, aspect of the macro-prudential regulatory landscape. While some theorists contend 
that the appropriate solution to monitoring failures involves regulatory capital reforms (e.g., 
Acharya, Mehran, & Thakor, 2016), the effectiveness of bank capital regulation depends, to a large 
extent, on banks’ internal risk assessments, as well as their capacity to adequately measure and 
                                                 
46 Calomiris and Carlson (2016) hypothesize that absent deposit insurance, government safety nets, and limits on 
ownership concentration, banks will endogenously adopt corporate governance mechanisms that credibly manage 
risk in order to mitigate the agency conflicts between bank owners and creditors and between bank managers and 
outsiders. Using bank examination data from the 1890’s, when government guarantees and regulatory governance 
requirements did not exist, the authors’ findings support this conjecture. This implies that by dampening the 
monitoring incentives and disciplinary mechanisms of creditors and shareholders, the modern regulatory regime has 




manage those risks. In addition to enhancing boards’ and managers’ accountability for risk-taking, 
better internal risk management and risk oversight practices should therefore assist supervisors in 
evaluating the safety and soundness of individual banks (e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 252, 2012,). 
Regulators, practitioners, and other subject matter experts believe that strong risk 
management starts at the top, or at the board level (e.g., Beasley, et al., 2015; FSB, 2014). The 
FRB requires that the largest BHCs centralize the risk oversight function within a separate (or 
standalone), dedicated risk committee of the board. Implicit in this requirement is the notion that 
lawmakers and regulators believe this is most effective way for the board to carry out its risk 
oversight duties. 
Critics of Dodd-Frank point out that Congress failed to change bank directors’ fiduciary 
duty to monitor the effectiveness of risk management systems (Johnson, 2011). Case law 
precedent, or the “business judgment rule,” currently limits directors’ legal accountability for risk 
oversight failures to what essentially amounts to gross negligence (i.e., failure to respond to a 
known red flag). While this may suggest that minimum compliance with the rules is potentially 
sufficient to protect directors from being personally held liable for risk management failures (e.g., 
Johnson, 2011), case law is ultimately subject to change, and directors appear to be keenly aware 
of this fact. Anecdotally speaking, director sentiment in recent years reflects a heightened level of 
concern with respect to the legal, financial, and reputational consequences of being a board 
member. Confirming this empirically, Ormazabal (2018) documents that individual directors are 
more likely to depart from their riskiest directorships in the post-crisis era. 
In light of the heightened personal risks directors take on when accepting an appointment, 
board members have incentives to commit to effectively carrying out this duty now, more than 




In order to facilitate their own monitoring of management, boards may demand more transparent 
reporting (e.g., Armstrong, Core, & Guay, 2014), and direct additional resources towards the risk 
management function to ensure that those reporting demands can be satisfied. Because regulators 
can impose penalties with potentially severe consequences to long-term bank value if BHCs fail 
to meet regulatory expectations, the use of resources in this manner is value preserving, if not value 
enhancing.47 
By changing the tone at the top, dedicated risk oversight by the board can have a real effect 
on the underlying risk management policies and processes. Board-level involvement and attention 
may reinforce operational level practices and enhance the firm’s ability to identify, and coordinate 
actions to mitigate, interrelated and often hidden risks (e.g., Ittner & Keusch, 2015). In general, 
effective risk management practices should reduce the likelihood and costs of financial distress 
(e.g., Smith & Stulz, 1985). This suggests that for any level of risk-taking, stronger risk controls 
should be associated with lower risk, all else equal. 
Likewise, subject matter experts have long advocated that by improving both the board’s 
and management’s understanding of the firm’s risk profile, strong risk management should enable 
more efficient capital allocation and facilitate better strategic decisions about which risks to take 
on and which risks to lay off (Nocco & Stulz, 2006; Stulz, 2015; Kaplan & Mikes, 2016). If these 
actions are effective, all decisions – including some that may appear risky – should have more 
certain payoffs. In this case, we should observe that temporary increases in risk are smaller (or less 
severe) and less frequent. In other words, it may not be likely that we would observe that banks 
                                                 
47 For example, in response to failures of risk management and oversight, recent regulatory actions against Wells 
Fargo include a cap on total assets, forced board refreshment, loss of decision-making autonomy, and significant 
investments in reorganization efforts at both the operations and board level, all in addition to being hit with record 




engage in strictly less risk-taking in the post-implementation period, but if risk management 
delivers these purported benefits, then overall risk should be lower. 
Nevertheless, there are several reasons we might not observe a negative association 
between stronger risk governance and bank risk. The purpose of the new regulations is not to force 
all banks to reduce, or even eliminate, risk. Instead, regulators want banks to take risks that are 
within each bank’s risk management capabilities, and that banks are prepared to absorb the costs 
of any related losses. The risk committee, for example, is charged with ensuring that actual risk 
remains within the bank’s stated and board-approved risk appetite. If a bank can demonstrate that 
it can remain sound while pursuing this stated risk strategy, then there would be no reason to expect 
that risk would be any lower, much less any higher, post EPS-adoption. 
A primary concern amongst critics of the Enhanced Prudential Standards mandates is 
related to institutional theory, or the notion that firms’ governance mechanisms generally only 
serve to legitimize activities, and are rarely associated with effective oversight (e.g., Carcello et 
al., 2011; Beasley, Branson, & Pagach, 2015; Duchin, Matsusaka, & Ozbas, 2010). Taken at face 
value, however, window-dressing does not seem to be a plausible (or at least sustainable) concern 
in the heightened regulatory environment that characterizes the post-Dodd-Frank period. The 
Federal Reserve (FRB) now performs uniform supervisory stress tests and comprehensive capital 
adequacy reviews that involve not only a quantitative assessment of asset quality, liquidity sources, 
and regulatory capital adequacy, but also a qualitative evaluation of banks’ risk management and 
oversight practices. The FRB can fail banks based on the qualitative assessment – and has done so 
– even if the bank passes the quantitative evaluation. The FRB not only publicly discloses its 
rationale for qualitative failures, but can also restrict a bank’s ability to return capital to 




market expansion, until the bank remedies the articulated problems. The threat against 
noncompliance is therefore both real and costly.  
Finally, there is also some reason to believe that we could observe increases in risk, on 
average. Given the scant empirical evidence to support the specific nature of the final EPS rules, 
one must presume that the rules are based on the regulator’s private observations of what seem to 
be best practices. Nevertheless, the extant literature does not appear to support the notion that any 
specific form of risk oversight will be the silver bullet. Many of the individuals and organizations 
that submitted comment letters for the proposed EPS rules argued that because boards were more 
knowledgeable about their own internal processes and competencies, the Federal Reserve should 
not prescribe any specific committee type or structure. Many were staunchly against the idea that 
the board’s risk oversight duty should ever be delegated away from the board as a whole. Others 
have suggested that for some boards, it may be that the responsibility to oversee different kinds of 
risk is best divided among committees with the appropriate expertise, rather than assigned to one 
specific committee (Lipton, 2014). Each of these arguments reflects a common concern that forced 
adoption of a given risk oversight structure may ultimately result in a decline in the quality of risk 
oversight.  
Given the preceding discussion, the effects of the Dodd-Frank EPS requirements are 
ultimately an empirical question. I therefore state the following hypothesis in the null: 





4. SAMPLE & DATA SOURCES 
 
 
4.1. Sample Banks 
I obtained annual financial data from BHCs’ consolidated financial statements (FR Y-
9C’s), downloaded from the Federal Reserve Board of Chicago website, and stock return data from 
CRSP.48 The full sample is comprised of publicly traded U.S. BHCs that either (a) have average 
total assets of at least $10 billion as of June 30, 2014, or (b) cross (or anticipate crossing) the $10 
billion threshold at some point thereafter.49 
The sample includes a number of BHCs that are not yet subject to most of Dodd-Frank, 
much less the EPS provisions, as of the end of the sample period. All sample BHCs with assets 
under $10 billion as of December 31, 2016 have since crossed the threshold, or disclosed the 
implications of – and ongoing planning activities for – doing so in the near future. Examples of 
these preparation activities include forming a board-level risk committee, engaging external 
                                                 
48 The web address for the FR Y-9C reports is https://www.chicagofed.org/banking/financial-institution-reports/bhc-
data. I obtain BHCs’ CRSP identifiers (PERMCOs) from the CRSPFRB link table, available at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York website (address included in references; see: FRBNY, 2017). 
49 To determine if, and when, a BHC is subject to Dodd-Frank (i.e., meets the minimum size threshold), I use 
average total assets on a rolling four-quarter basis (which mirrors the scope of application within the EPS rules). I 
then check that all banks with average assets of at least $10 billion – at least one time between July of 2010 and 
December of 2015 – subsequently remain above the size threshold. 
One BHC, MB Financial, Inc., had average assets above $10 billion during 2010, but assets subsequently fell – and 
remained below – the $10 billion mark for all of 2011 through mid-2014. With the acquisition of Taylor Capital 
Group ($5.9 billion) in 2014, MB Financial again passed the $10 billion threshold, ending the 2014 fiscal year with 
$14.6 billion in assets. A review of MB Financial’s disclosures for each year between 2011 and 2014 confirmed that 
the BHC was not, in fact, subject to the EPS provisions of Dodd-Frank until after this acquisition. All reported tests 
for the DF Bank sample include this bank, but inferences are not different if I change this BHC’s sample group 




consultants, upgrading information systems and data capabilities, and hiring qualified staff to 
ensure the company is ready to meet heightened regulatory expectations. 
 The sample excludes the U.S. holding companies of foreign banking institutions, non-bank 
financial institutions, and companies not under the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve for the 
duration of the sample period.50 I further impose a minimum requirement that all sample BHCs 
have complete data for at least one year before, and at least three years after, the signing of Dodd-
Frank (in 2010), although the majority of the sample BHCs (87%) have complete data for all 13 
years in the sample period.  
The largest resulting sample is comprised of 84 bank holding companies (982 bank-year 
observations), and covers the period from 2004 to 2016.51 When restricting to DF Banks, or BHCs 
that become subject to the provisions of Dodd-Frank before the end of the sample period (i.e, by 
the beginning of 2015), there are 59 unique BHCs (maximum of 693 bank-year observations).52 A 
few BHCs are not publicly listed until later years in the sample period, but have complete data for 
some tests that do not require market data. Since sample size is already a constraint, I retain these 
BHCs in the main sample. 
                                                 
50 Holding companies not under the FRB’s jurisdiction do not file FR Y-9C’s, so incorporating these banks into my 
sample would require the use of an alternative (and less rich) source for financial data. In addition, since some 
holding companies became subject to FRB oversight as a result of Dodd-Frank, the latter exclusion helps to rule out 
concerns that any observable changes in risk are attributable to changes in a group of banks’ regulatory oversight 
regime, rather than to governance changes. Examples of financial firms that are excluded as a result of this 
restriction are investment banks and brokers/advisors (e.g., Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, e*Trade, TIAA) and 
savings and loan holding companies (e.g., CIT Group, First Niagara, Astoria FC). 
51 As the risk governance information I use in this study is hand-collected, I consider 2004 to be a reasonable start 
year, as it allows for several years of pre-Dodd Frank (and pre-crisis) data. Further, expanding the sample to include 
earlier years would not Provide additional insights for my research question, as I find that only one sample BHC has 
a standalone board-level risk committee with enterprise-wide risk oversight responsibilities in 2004 (see Table 1, 
Panel B).  
52 Since neither sample is balanced, I perform robustness checks, for all tests, with a more balanced sample that is 
restricted to banks with at least 11 firm-year observations, as well as a completely balanced sample of the 73 BHCs 




Table 1, Panel A displays the distribution of sample observations by year and regulatory 
size category (i.e., average total assets of less than $10 billion, $10 to $50 billion, and over $50 
billion). In addition, Appendix A, Table A.1 contains a listing of all 84 sample BHCs, their 
respective Federal Reserve System entity ID (RSSDID), the years each bank is included in the full 
sample empirical tests, and each bank’s average total assets at year-end 2010 and 2014. 
 
 
4.2. Risk Governance Data 
I hand-collected a substantial amount of data in order to document and measure the sample 
banks’ board risk oversight practices. This information was collected primarily from disclosures 
in the sample BHCs’ proxy statements (Form DEF 14-A) and annual reports (Form 10-K and the 
Annual Report to Shareholders).53 Occasionally, it is supplemented with information from other 
public filings (e.g., 8-Ks, 10-Qs), BHCs’ investor relations websites (e.g., committee charters, 
investor presentations), and in some cases, LinkedIn and Google searches (namely in relation to 
the individual holding the CRO position). 
The resulting dataset contains information about (1) board-level risk committee existence, 
form, and scope; (2) risk committee meetings and composition (size, member qualifications, and 
independence); (3) the primary risk manager, which is often the Chief Risk Officer (name, title, 
organizational rank, reporting line, approximate tenure, and if available, compensation details); 
(4) board-wide governance (board size, director independence, leadership structure, CEO tenure, 
                                                 
53 To simplify this process, I used the redline feature within Intelligize, a web-based tool for retrieving (directly from 
EDGAR) and analyzing SEC registrants’ public filings (www.intelligize.com). The feature quickly compares two or 
more selected filings and strikes out similarities and underlines differences, making it fairly simple to identify 




committee overlaps, refreshment, board members’ qualifications and areas of expertise, number 
of board meetings); and (5) Ownership structure and other (CEO ownership, Board and Executive 
ownership, founder or founder-family presence and ownership). 
Most BHCs file the annual proxy statement late in Q1, or early in Q2, and the proxy 
contains a mix of historical, current, and forward-looking information. For example, the number 
of board and committee meetings reported relate to the preceding fiscal year, but committee 
composition commonly reflects current appointments (i.e., as of the date that the proxy was 
issued). If the proxy ballot includes new director nominees, those individuals’ qualifications and 
skills are highlighted, but expected committee assignments are not usually stated. Moreover, some 
board members depart or are appointed outside of the annual meeting, and individual directors’ 
committee assignments can shift throughout the year (even without director turnover). In many 
cases, these changes are not disclosed until the filing of the subsequent proxy statement. As a 
result, the information disclosed in the proxy, even if current at the time of filing, is frequently 
incomplete or incorrect within the context of the entire fiscal year.  
Because I am interested in evaluating the effects of such changes, I went to great lengths 
to reduce any noise in the data by determining the approximate, if not exact, dates that risk 
committees were formed (or restructured) and specific committee members were appointed.54 In 
the case that change or implementation dates (or a reasonable range of dates) were not 
determinable, I assumed that the date of the first disclosure of a change coincided with the change, 
itself, unless the facts of the data or the patterns of a given BHCs’ disclosures suggested otherwise. 
                                                 
54 Committee restructuring refers to the practice of reassigning responsibilities among existing board committees. 
For the purposes of this paper, the most relevant (and most common) form of reorganization involves shifting risk 
oversight responsibilities from one or more committees (primarily from the Audit or Audit and Risk Committee) to a 
pre-existing committee (e.g., the Credit Risk Committee), with the result that one central committee emerges as the 




For all collected data, I performed both forward and backward validation tests (for existence, 
completeness, and accuracy) with each subsequently issued proxy statement or other information 
filing.55  When merging the hand-collected dataset with the financial data from the FR Y-9C 
filings, I matched on the fiscal year of the respective underlying information, rather than on the 
year of the filing. 
 
4.2.1. Risk Committees, Defined 
Under the EPS rules, a compliant risk committee is one that (i) is a standalone committee 
of the BHC’s board; (ii) is the primary committee with risk oversight responsibilities (and any 
other committee with oversight of specific risk types reports on those risks to the risk committee); 
and (iii) has oversight of the enterprise-wide risk-management policies of the company (12 C.F.R. 
§ 252, 2014). I set an indicator variable, RC, equal to one for all BHC-years with a board risk 
committee that meets all three of these criteria. I report the number of BHC-year observations that 
meet this definition, by concurrent average assets (Sizet), and by average assets as of year-end 2014 
(Size2014), in Table 1, Panels B and C, respectively. 
Because the committee classification process was not as straightforward as one might 
hope, I also collected information related to the scope and form of committees that met some, but 
not all, of the requirements. Without knowledge of the EPS guidelines, many of these might be 
considered “risk committees.” Beyond assisting in reconciling the results of this study to those 
                                                 
55 I maintained, and can provide upon reasonable request, a detailed log – along with underling support – of any 
collection or coding decisions I made, whenever information was in the least bit subject to interpretation. I also used 




within the extant literature, the data depict a non-trivial shift – discussed below – in banks’ risk 
oversight practices across the sample period.56 
 
4.2.2. Evolution of Risk Committee Structure & Responsibilities 
Table 2, Panel A illustrates the trends in banks’ risk oversight practices since 2004. Moving 
from left to right, the columns in this table contain the annual counts for different types of 
committees within the sample, by the scope of risks overseen by a committee of the board (none, 
some, and enterprise-wide), and by that committee’s form (audit, multi-purpose, or standalone). 
For ease of reference in the following discussion, each column in Panel A is assigned a different 
letter, or “Type,” found in the bottom row of the table. Examples of some specific committee 
names are given in Appendix Table A.2, and are grouped according to these same “Type” labels.57 
Bank-year observations for which it does not appear that any committee oversees risk are 
included within Type A. These boards usually have only three or four standard board committees 
(audit, nominating, compensation, and executive), and the audit committee duties are strictly 
                                                 
56 Reconciliations to prior studies are addressed in Section 6.2 and in Appendix F. 
57 At least one extant study has used word searches for committee names that include “risk” to identify banks’ risk 
committees. The list of the sample BHCs’ various risk committee names in Appendix A, Table A.2 highlights the 
potential for significant measurement error with a keyword search procedure: several “risk” committees are actually 




related to financial reporting matters (i.e., do not include any mention of risk).58 The second 
column (Type B) contains observations where the audit committee responsibilities include the 
discussion or oversight of risk management policies (or something relatively similar), with little-
to-no detail as to what this duty actually entails. It is worth noting that when this duty is listed 
within the audit committee charter, it is but one item among 20 to 40 other, more traditional 
responsibilities. Moreover, this role is usually listed either within the committee’s duties in relation 
to the Internal Audit function, or in a generic (“other”) category at the end of the charter. The third 
column (Type C) includes committees with some stated risk oversight duties, but also other, non-
risk responsibilities, and the latter appear more reflective of the committee’s primary purpose. 
Type D (column 4) refers to standalone (i.e., dedicated) silo-type risk committees, such as a Credit 
Committee or an Asset Quality Committee. 
The above risk oversight practices have steadily declined in prevalence. By the end of 
2009, 77 of the 84 BHC boards assigned at least some level of risk oversight to a committee (all 
columns except Type A). Nevertheless, roughly half of those committees continued to oversee only 
                                                 
58 From January 2000 through the 2006 proxy season, SEC Rule 34-42266 required that registrants attach the current 
charter of the audit committee to the proxy statement, triennially or subsequent to any substantial revision, 
whichever came first. I was therefore able to obtain historic charters for nearly all sample BHCs for at least one 
period before 2004, and for at least one of the three years from 2004 to 2006. Because charters contain far more 
information about a committee’s role, I used these historic charters – along with the proxy disclosures – to confirm, 
at least at that point in time, whether the audit committee was, or was not, tasked with any degree of risk oversight. 
In late 2006, SEC Rule 33-8732A amended this requirement, and permitted firms the option of posting the audit 
committee charter on their websites, instead. Unfortunately, there was no accompanying requirement that public 
access to historic charters be maintained or be furnished upon request. From 2007, forward, I therefore rely almost 
exclusively on the committee descriptions included within the proxy to evaluate risk scope. (Note: the last statement 




a subset of risks (Types B, C, and D). As of the end of 2016, 59 of the 80 remaining sample BHCs 
have a standalone committee with enterprise-wide risk oversight responsibilities (Type G).59 
Note that committee type G corresponds to the principal definition of a risk committee used 
within this study (i.e., RC equals one for Type G committees, and zero for all other types). The 
second-to-last column, or Type F, includes (i) committees with additional non-risk duties, but 
where risk oversight appears to be the primary charge of the committee, or (ii) joint committees of 
the BHC and subsidiary bank boards. These committees could possibly be in compliance with the 
EPS rules, but since it is not clear that these structures would meet either the scope or the form 
requirements, I set RC equal to zero for these observations. To the extent that this design choice 
fails to capture substantive compliance for this group, it should bias against finding an association 
between risk oversight and bank risk.60 
Finally, the data in Table 2, Panel A also highlights that enterprise risk oversight (Types E, 
F, and G), irrespective of the committee’s form, was not a prevalent practice until recent years: 
only eight (10%) of the sample banks have such a committee in 2004. In 2006, immediately before 
the financial crisis, just 19 (23%) of the BHC boards had an enterprise risk committee; among 
them, only eight had standalone committees that would likely meet today’s EPS requirements 
(Type G). It was not until the years surrounding the EPS proposed and final rules (2012 and 2014) 
that the scales tipped, and the required form become the majority. Taken together with the 
                                                 
59 Excluding the eight Type F committees, thirteen sample BHCs did not have a dedicated, enterprise-wide, board-
level risk committee by the end of 2016 (see Types C and E). Of those, six banks range in size from $11.2 to $25.7 
billion, where the standalone requirement does not apply, and seven had assets of less than $10 billion, and were not 
yet subject to Dodd Frank. At the time this manuscript was written, all but one of the latter group of banks have 
since crossed the $10 billion mark, and seven of the thirteen BHCs, including the one that had not yet surpassed $10 
billion in assets, have formed EPS-compliant (Type G) risk committees.  
60 I discuss results using an alternative risk committee definition that makes concessions for this group (Type F 




observation that many banks below the $50 billion, and even $10 billion, thresholds have also 
formed separate risk committees, this suggests that there may be some benefit – be it real or 
perceived – to having a dedicated risk oversight function.  
 
4.2.3. Other Changes in Corporate Governance, Risk Governance, and Risk Management 
The remaining panels of Table 2 show annual means for a number of the hand-collected 
variables for the period from 2004 to 2016. Each variable (or column header) is defined in the 
notes or legend immediately below the respective panel. While some of the variables in Table 2, 
Panels B, C and D, are not used within the present analysis, many are incorporated into an 
alternative proxy for risk oversight (i.e., an alternative to the RC indicator) in Section 7 of this 
manuscript. 
The figures in Panel B highlight some of the many changes that have taken place at the 
board-level over the sample period. While the average board has fewer members today than in 
2004 (Board Size), board independence (Board Indep) has increased, on average. To some extent, 
these trends can be explained by non-independent directors leaving the board during and after the 
crisis (departures are not tabulated); however, these spots have generally been filled with new, 
independent directors that generally have more relevant experience in the financial services 
industry and (or) in risk management (see columns 4 through 9 of Table 2, Panel B).61  
                                                 
61 Director independence is based on disclosures within the proxy, which pertain to whether or not the individual 
meets the requirements of the exchange on which the firm is listed. If independence is not disclosed (such as for the 
few sample BHCs that are controlled companies), I assume the individual members of the Audit, Compensation, 
and/or Nominating committees (each of which must meet the respective company’s exchange listing standards for 
independence) are independent, and any remaining directors are not. 
For details regarding the measurement of directors’ qualifications (i.e., financial services experience and risk 




If board meetings (# of Bd Mtgs) capture the extent of board oversight, then today’s board 
appears to be more involved in overseeing management’s activities than in the earlier years of the 
sample period. Finally, while there was a small decrease in the fraction of BHCs that combined 
the CEO and Chairman roles (Dual CEO) from 2009 to 2012, most sample BHCs that previously 
combined the roles have since returned to this practice. On the other side of the same coin, though, 
boards have increasingly instituted and formalized the role of the so-called “Lead Independent 
Director.” By 2016, 85% of the sample firms either have an independent board Chairperson or a 
Lead Independent Director (versus 22% in 2004).62 
Changes within the committee tasked with risk oversight are shown in Table 2, Panel C. 
Other than in the first column (Risk Resp Unclear), the statistics in Panel C were tabulated for any 
type (or form) of risk oversight committee (i.e., Audit, Risk, Audit & Risk, etc.), as long as (i) the 
primary committee tasked with risk oversight responsibility is clear, or is otherwise reasonable to 
assume; and (ii) all necessary details – such as the names of the committee members and the 
number of meetings for a given year – are disclosed for that particular committee.63 To simplify 
the discussion of the remaining information in this particular panel, I use “risk committee” in a 
                                                 
62 According to the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD; nacdonline.org), it is considered a 
corporate governance best practice to appoint a lead independent director (LID) when the Chairperson of the board 
is not independent. The LID is usually elected by the independent members of the board, and is assigned 
responsibilities such as organizing and leading the board’s evaluation of the CEO, having the authority to call 
meetings of the independent directors, approving board meeting agendas, and serving as a liaison between the other 
board members and the Chairman, and/or between major stockholders and the board. The role is usually formalized 
further with a significant increase in the LID’s compensation in exchange for his or her leadership service.  
Indep Bd Ldshp equals one if the board had an independent Chairperson, or if the board had a LID (or equivalent) 
that was elected by the board and whose duties were formalized (e.g., stated in the proxy; listed in the board’s 
governance documents). The variable is set to zero, otherwise. 
63 Despite the fact that some proxy disclosures do not clearly designate a primary risk committee, I assume that a 
committee overseeing enterprise risk (regardless of form) is the primary designee with respect to risk oversight, 
absent any evidence to the contrary. The majority of observations excluded from the statistics in columns 2 through 





more general sense (i.e., to refer to whichever committee oversees risk, irrespective of form or 
scope). 
In the first column (Risk Resp Unclear), I include the annual means for an indicator equal 
to one when disclosures did not clearly designate a particular committee as the primary responsible 
for risk oversight. Since 2012, disclosures in this area have been improving; however, a number 
of BHCs continue to state that the board, as a whole, retains this responsibility – and is assisted by 
various committees in carrying out this duty – but without naming a particular primary 
committee.64  
The size of the risk committee (Cmte Size) has increased slightly over the sample period, 
while the percent of committee members that are independent has stayed relatively constant (Cmte 
Indep). The current CEO sits on roughly one sixth of the sample BHCs’ risk oversight committees 
in the latter half of the sample period (CEO is Cmte Mbr, column 8).65 The average risk committee 
currently meets around 7.5 times per year (nearly double the minimum expectation within the final 
EPS rules). 
The number of independent risk committee members with recent and relevant financial 
services experience has increased from an average of roughly one member in 2004 (about 21% of 
                                                 
64 In earlier years of the sample period (especially before the 2010 implementation of the SEC’s Enhanced Proxy 
Disclosure rules), this created a fair amount of ambiguity concerning the specific committee (if any at all) for which 
data should be collected. In many, but not all, of these cases, subsequent disclosures related to committee 
restructuring (e.g., rearranging responsibilities, creating a new committee, etc.) would clarify the antecedent 
committees’ roles, and if necessary, I revised previously collected data accordingly. Because there is still room for 
error in my collection choices (and therefore noise in the data), I left the Risk Resp Unclear variable as originally 
coded, and I incorporate it within the risk governance measure that I introduce in Section 7. 
65 Because the means presented in this panel include several types of committees, the figures for earlier years are 
more heavily weighted with audit committee data. Because a CEO cannot be a member of his own firm’s audit 
committee, what may look like a trend of increasing CEO membership on the risk committee (CEO is Cmte Mbr) is 
not so. The apparent increase in the mean of this indicator over the sample period is merely a result of BHCs shifting 
risk oversight duties from the audit committee to some other committee of the board. It is worth noting, however, 




the average committee), to 2.4 members in 2016 (about 42% of the average committee). A similar 
trend can be observed for the number of committee members (both independent and not) that likely 
meet the EPS definition of a risk management expert, or RME (Cmte Indep RME and Cmte Tot 
RME). Very few of the sample BHCs identified the specific individual(s) satisfying the RME 
requirement. I describe my evaluation process for this designation in Section 7.1 and in the notes 
to Appendix Table E.1. I also note that in conjunction with the years in the proposed and final EPS 
rules were each issued (2012 and 2014, respectively), Table 2, Panel C shows that there is a notable 
increase from 2011 to 2013, and again from 2014 through 2016, in the frequency with which an 
independent risk management expert, who is new to the board (tenure is less than 2 years), is 
appointed to the risk committee (Cmte New Ind RME). These new RME appointment events are 
frequently followed by significant improvements in all disclosed risk management and oversight 
policies and practices (as well as enhancements in the disclosures, themselves), which provides 
some level of comfort around my RME classification process.  
Finally, risk management enhancements at the operational-level are tabulated in Panel D 
of Table 2. While roughly a third of the sample banks had a true Chief Risk Officer (CRO) in 2004, 
nearly all sample banks (96.3%) have a CRO by the end of 2016 (CRO with EW Remit). Moreover, 
the CRO role, itself, has become more refined (Dedicated EW CRO) and prominent (CRO is Exec), 
and 77.5% of the sample banks disclose that the CRO reports directly to the board or a committee 
of the board by 2016.  
Collectively, the data presented in Table 2 underscores the extent of changes among the 
sample BHCs’ corporate governance, risk governance, and operational-level risk management 








5.1. Empirical Approach 
The subsequent analysis begins by examining whether the risk committee’s form and scope 
of risk oversight is associated with bank risk. This preliminary focus on only the risk committee 
rule – rather than the sum of the EPS risk governance mandates – is motivated primarily by two 
considerations. First, in late 2009, the SEC issued enhanced proxy disclosure rules, effective 
during the first quarter of 2010, which required registrants to explain the board’s role in risk 
oversight, as well as expand upon directors’ qualifications and merits (SEC, 2009).66 There is a 
marked difference in the extent of information provided before and after this rule became effective. 
Details necessary for evaluating compliance with the remaining EPS requirements (i.e., those 
beyond the formation of a risk committee), such as information regarding board and committee 
members’ qualifications, the specific directors assigned to a particular committee, the number of 
committee meetings, and characteristics of the chief risk officer position, were not provided by 
most sample banks before 2010.67 At the same time, descriptions of committee structures and 
responsibilities are relatively consistent, both across time and in the cross-section. 
Second, Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act only clearly articulated that large financial 
institutions would be required (i) to have a board-level committee charged with oversight of the 
bank’s enterprise-wide risk management practices; (ii) one member of the committee should be a 
                                                 
66 The rule was effective for all proxy statements (Form DEF 14A) filed on or after February 28, 2010. The majority 
of the sample BHCs filed the 2010 proxy statement after this date, but before the passage of Dodd-Frank. 
67 Most frequently, the issue encountered in earlier years was the situations where a BHC disclosed having a risk 




risk management expert; (iii) the FRB would determine the appropriate number of independent 
risk committee members, and (iv) the rules should be more stringent for the largest financial 
institutions (12 U.S.C. 5365, §165(h)3; see also, Figure 1). It was not until the EPS rule-making 
process (which took place from late 2012 to early 2014), that the Federal Reserve clarified these, 
and added others, such as the CRO requirement. 
Taken together, these factors suggest that examining only the risk committee requirement, 
at least initially, yields the cleanest comparison across the whole sample period. The focus on just 
the committee also has some intuitive appeal, as the establishment of a new committee is also the 
most visible board-level change. A more ancillary reason to focus on the strict definition of a risk 
committee is that prior literature, as discussed in Section 2, has not consistently defined board risk 
oversight.  
Implicit in this approach is the assumption that a risk committee, or more precisely, the RC 
definition I employ in this study, is a satisfactory proxy for real risk oversight activities. Whether 
or not that appears to be the case, I incorporate the other mechanisms required by the EPS rules – 




I exploit three important features of this setting to examine whether risk committees are 
associated with bank risk after Dodd-Frank. First, the sample includes banks that have been subject 
to Dodd-Frank from its passage, and banks that become subject to the law at some point between 
2010 and 2015, and banks that are not yet subject to any of the provisions of Dodd-Frank. Because 




are not yet subject to any part of Dodd-Frank help to rule out concerns that tests will only pick up 
changes in risk attributable to changes economic conditions. Including this group of banks also 
helps to separate the effects of Dodd-Frank from those of time, alone. 
Second, the Section 165 (EPS) requirements are the only set of reforms that both apply at 
the individual BHC level, and also apply to all banks of a given size. All other Dodd-Frank reforms 
either apply to the entire industry, to all financial firms of a given type or size, or only to banks 
engaged in certain activities. Third, across all three of these groups, individual BHCs have formed 
enterprise risk committees at different times. 
This variation allows for the use of what is essentially a difference-in-difference 
specification that exploits both the staggered applicability of Dodd-Frank to individual BHCs, and 
BHCs’ staggered formation of standalone risk committees (or implementation of the EPS 
requirements, more generally), to separate the effect of risk governance – if any – from more 
general post-crisis changes in risk among all banks and from changes in risk among banks subject 
to Dodd-Frank. The method is similar to that of other studies that examine the effect of staggered 
policy enactment (e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003; Armstrong, Balakrishnan, & Cohen, 
2012). The design controls for time-invariant firm characteristics by using the same firm over time, 
and for time-related trends by using similar firms, in different stages of EPS implementation in the 
same time period, as controls.  
More formally, to evaluate the effect of board risk oversight on bank risk, I estimate the 
following OLS model for the full sample period: 




where the subscripts i and t represent BHCs and time, respectively. Following prior literature (e.g., 
E&Y, 2013), I estimate all regressions with lagged independent variables to rule out simultaneity 
concerns, and year fixed effects (YEAR FE) to control for common shocks to banks’ risk across 
time. In all regressions, standard errors are clustered by BHC. 
The dependent variable, Risk, represents one of several risk proxies, and the vector X 
represents control variables, all of which are defined below. Variable definitions and related data 
sources are also provided in Appendix B.  
As discussed previously, the variable RC equals one for all bank-years where there is a 
standalone board committee responsible for enterprise-wide risk oversight.68 The variable DF is 
both time- and bank-size-specific: the indicator equals one in the first year, and each year 
thereafter, that a bank must begin complying with the various provisions of Dodd-Frank. More 
specifically, for banks with year-end assets of at least $10 billion in 2010, I set DF equal to one 
for all years from 2011, forward.69 For all other BHCs, DF equals one from the first year after a 
bank surpasses $10 billion in average total assets, forward. For example, if a bank ends 2011 with 
assets of $9.5 billion, and has ending assets of $11 billion for 2012, DF equals one for this bank 
from 2013 through the end of the sample period.  
The EPS mandates were not effective until 2015, and the specific EPS rules were not 
drafted (finalized) until 2012 (2014). By defining DF in this way, I assume that whether or not the 
final rules or effective dates for any portion of Dodd-Frank (including the EPS standards) were 
                                                 
68 Refer to Section 4.2.1 for details. 
69 As discussed in a previous footnote, one BHC in the main sample (MB Financial) has average assets above the 
$10 billion threshold in 2009 and 2010, but then its assets fall below $10 billion until mid-2014. A review of MB 
Financial’s disclosures (in all 10-K’s for 2010 through 2014) confirmed that the BHC did not become subject to 




known with certainty, any BHC with at least $10 billion in assets would be aware of future 
regulatory expectations surrounding board-level risk oversight, and begin to prepare accordingly. 
Using the effective date, instead, would rely on the “highly unlikely assumption” that banks will 
not alter their practices in advance of the effective date (Beatty & Liao, 2014, p.341). At least 
anecdotally, there is sufficient support for this assumption. Beginning in 2011, the majority of the 
sample BHCs’ disclosures directly address the implications of various rules within Dodd-Frank, 
including Section 165, and any actions the company had undertaken (or had plans to undertake) in 
order to comply with the new regulations.70 
The main variable of interest, RCxDF, is the interaction between RC and DF. Recall that 
the sample contains banks subject to Dodd-Frank that (1) had risk committees in place prior to 
having to comply with Dodd-Frank, (2) formed risk committees after becoming subject to Dodd-
Frank, and (3) never form risk committees that meet the expectations set forth within the EPS 
rules. The sample also contains banks that are not yet subject to Dodd-Frank, some of which have 
formed EPS-compliant risk committees. In the presence of the RCxDF interaction, then, the 
estimated coefficient on RC measures the difference in bank risk associated with risk oversight 
relative to observations with both RC and DF equal to zero, all else equal. In other words, RC is 
identified by bank-years with voluntary, standalone, enterprise risk committees. 
The main effect for DF captures the difference in bank risk when BHCs subject to Dodd-
Frank have not yet formed an EPS-compliant risk committee. In the presence of year fixed effects, 
                                                 
70 In further support of the assumption behind the DF definition, the Federal Reserve (FRB) both (a) expected BHCs 
to be fully and actively compliant with EPS by the effective date; and (b) gave BHCs relatively little time (less than 
10 months) between issuing the final rules and the effective date to comply with the rules. It seems reasonable to 
expect that if BHCs had not already begun the implementation process, the time granted between the final rule 
issuance and the effective date may have been longer. Moreover, the full effect of risk committee formation is not 
likely realized for any individual BHC within a single year, so a more traditional two period difference-in-




the estimate on DF is incremental to changes in risk over time that are common to all sample BHCs 
where DF equals zero. A negative (positive) and significant coefficient on DF (β2) would indicate 
that BHCs have lower (higher) risk, on average, after becoming subject to Dodd-Frank but before 
forming a risk committee, relative to BHCs not yet subject to Dodd-Frank during the same time 
periods.  
Finally, RCxDF captures the incremental difference (i.e., the difference-in-differences) in 
risk, if any, when both RC and DF equal one, or when risk committees meet regulatory 
expectations and the BHC is simultaneously subject to complying with all other aspects of the Act.  
A significant coefficient on β3 (RCxDF) would result in the rejection of H1. 
It is important to note that the control group in this estimation is not restricted to banks that 
never have a risk committee in the post-Dodd-Frank period (e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003; 
Armstrong et al., 2012). The model only requires that the control group consist of similar BHCs 
(i.e., those that are or will also be subjected to the same regulations within Dodd-Frank), in the 
same time period, without enterprise risk oversight committees. As long as the composition of 
observations with and without risk committee varies, and the number of observations and BHCs 






                                                 
71 Because the reforms potentially targeted all BHCs, the model does not include a “treatment” or “control” group in 




5.3. Variable Definitions 
5.3.1. Market-based Risk Proxies & Related Control Variables 
Recall that regulators define bank risk as “the potential that events, expected or unexpected, 
will have an adverse effect on a bank’s earnings, capital, or franchise or enterprise value” (OCC, 
2013).72 As the focal point of this study is the board’s oversight of enterprise-wide risk, the only 
conceptually appropriate way to operationalize risk is with aggregate, or summary measures of 
risk that are consistent with the regulator’s definition. In this regard, market-based measures of 
bank risk have qualitative appeal, as prices impound the market’s expectations of multiple 
underlying components of risk (e.g., Bushman & Williams, 2015). 
The primary risk proxies used in this study are therefore two market-based variables: 
downside tail risk (TailRisk) and daily stock return volatility (RetVol). Following prior literature, 
TailRisk is the average of a BHC’s lowest 5 percent daily returns over the preceding year, 
multiplied by negative one so the variable is increasing in risk (E&Y, 2013). If stock returns are 
normally distributed, TailRisk captures the far left tail (i.e., downside) of the market reaction to 
negative (or bad news) events, which can be interpreted as the probability of a large loss.  
Return volatility (RetVol) is defined as the standard deviation of a BHC’s daily stock 
returns, measured over the preceding twelve months. Higher return volatility is consistent with 
greater uncertainty about future cash flows: in other words, higher risk (e.g., Laeven & Levine, 
2009; Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011). 
                                                 
72 In the wake of the financial crisis, regulators, politicians, academics, and the general public are also concerned 
with systemic risk, or the collective risk that financial institutions pose to the health of the greater economy. Because 
the EPS mandates are only one component of Dodd-Frank’s “multi-pronged approach” toward reducing systemic 
risk (12 C.F.R. § 252, 2012, p. 595), it is not possible to disentangle changes in systemic risk attributable to firm-
level changes in risk governance from those changes attributable to other Dodd-Frank reforms. Nevertheless, lower 




Control Variables for Market-based Risk Tests 
 In all regressions, I control for bank Size and SizeSq (the square of Size, which is first 
orthogonalized to Size to reduce collinearity). In regressions with TailRisk and RetVol as the 
dependent variable, Size is measured as the natural logarithm of ending total assets or of market 
value of equity, respectively. I control for bank performance with pretax earnings before 
extraordinary items, scaled by total risk-weighted assets (pretaxRoRWA). Scaling earnings by risk-
weighted assets, rather than by total assets, controls for inherent differences, in both earnings and 
risk, across similar-sized banks with very different balance sheet compositions. 
I include several additional variables to control for differences in risk attributable to banks’ 
underlying business models and balance sheet composition. To control for the diversity of banks’ 
activities, I include the ratio of non-interest income to total interest and non-interest income 
(NonInt_Ratio) and its square (NonInt_RatioSq).73 To the extent that a bank derives most of its 
income from lending activities (fee-based income-generating activities), the non-interest ratio is 
lower (higher), and therefore controls for differences in risk across bank business models.  
I also include a measure of loan portfolio quality that captures both portfolio health and the 
extent to which a bank is effectively managing and accruing for non-performing loans. The 
variable ALLL>NPL is the difference between the allowance for loan and lease losses and non-
performing loans, and is increasing to the extent that a bank has sufficient reserves to cover a total-
loss scenario in its portfolio of non-performing loans and leases. Because this measure takes on 
                                                 
73 Gambacorta and van Rixtel (2013) find a non-linear relation between income diversity and bank returns on equity. 





larger values (both positive and negative) for banks engaged in relatively more lending activities, 
ALLL>NPL also controls for differences in risk across various business models. 
Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, commonly referred to as the Volcker Rule, prohibits 
bank holding companies from engaging in proprietary trading activities and holding or sponsoring 
certain investments. Ideally, one would control for these types of activities directly; however, 
banks are not required to disclose earnings from proprietary and non-proprietary trading activities 
separately. Since aggregate net revenues from all types of trading activities are reflected in non-
interest income, NonInt_Ratio (and its square) already control, at least indirectly, for proprietary 
trading activities.74 In addition, I include HighTrdgDum, an indicator for observations with 
relatively high values (in the 95th percentile) of trading assets to total assets, in all tests.  
I also control for liability structure with the ratio of subordinated notes and debentures to 
total equity (SubordDebt/Eq). Certain components of subordinated debt, such as trust-preferred 
securities and other “illiquid” funds which involve commitments to invest, are now either limited 
or prohibited under the Volcker Rule, a highly contested, last-minute addendum to Dodd-Frank. 
To the extent that these securities and contractual obligations contributed to higher risk during and 
leading up to the crisis, this variable is an important control for subsequent changes in banks’ 
liability structures as a result of this rule. 
Because prior studies find that executives’ experience is associated with bank risk (e.g., 
Ahmed et al., 2015), I include CEO_Tenure (the log of one plus the current CEO’s tenure) in all 
tests. To control for differences in the sample BHCs’ underlying ownership structures, I include 
                                                 
74 An in-depth examination of the SEC filings and FR Y-9Cs for a handful of sample banks known to have had large 
proprietary trading divisions revealed little insight or direction insofar as collecting, or constructing, an objective 




FamFdrOwnshp, or the percent of common equity shares held by individuals or beneficial owners 
known to be founders (or relatives of founders) of the bank. Founder-family presence on the board 
of directors or management team, and/or ownership of at least 1% of the common shares 
outstanding, is present for just under 30% of the sample observations.75 High founder-family 
ownership may represent higher risk-aversion, or lower effectiveness of market discipline, with 
opposing effects on risk-taking (decreasing and increasing, respectively).76  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, both market-based measures of risk are highly correlated with the 
receipt of federal assistance (both the incidence and the magnitude) during and after the crisis (i.e., 
TARP “bailout” funds). I therefore include TARP Issuance, or the value of preferred stock issued 
by the BHC in 2008 or 2009 (and 0 for all other years), scaled by beginning equity, to control for 
subsequent stock transactions related to TARP issuance that may have affected stock returns. 
 
5.3.2. Non-market Risk Proxies & Related Control Variables 
In addition to the two market-based proxies of bank risk, I use several income statement 
and balance sheet proxies for bank risk. Beyond potentially triangulating the results for market-
assessed risk, these proxies also allow for a slightly larger sample size, since some sample BHCs 
are not listed on a national stock exchange in the earlier years of the sample period. The measures 
fall into three categories: earnings volatility, asset composition, and capital adequacy. 
                                                 
75 The number of shares held by directors and members of the executive management team are reported in either the 
proxy statement or the 10-K. The corresponding percentage of shares outstanding, however, is not provided – and 
therefore not included in this measure – unless holdings exceed 1%. Likewise, in the event that an individual (or a 
group that files a Schedule 13D with the SEC) is not a member of the board or executive team, and holds more than 
1% but less than 5% of the shares outstanding, share ownership is not reported anywhere, and is therefore omitted 
from this measure. 
76 Barry, Lepetit, and Tarazi (2011) find that higher family equity stakes are associated with lower risk among 
privately-held, but not publicly-traded, European banks. To my knowledge, no study examines this relation among 




Strong risk management practices should minimize variance in all outcomes, including 
earnings (e.g., Stulz, 1996; McShane et al., 2011; Edmonds, Edmonds, Leece, & Vermeer, 2015). 
To examine this conjecture within the context of this study, I use three alternate proxies for 
earnings volatility: the standard deviation of (1) after-tax earnings (ROAvol), (2) pretax earnings 
before loan loss provisions (EBLLPvol), and (3) net interest margin, (NIMvol), all scaled by 
average total assets. I require eight consecutive quarterly observations, including the quarter ended 
at the end of year t, to compute the standard deviations, and take the log of the resulting values for 
use in the regressions.77 Higher values of each of the earnings volatility proxies correspond to 
higher risk. 
To complement the earnings volatility tests, I use two balance sheet-based measures of 
risk. The first, RWA, is the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets. As a summary measure of 
overall asset composition, risk-weighted assets conceptually reflects the risk inherent within an 
individual bank’s business strategy. A higher ratio of risk-weighted assets total assets (i.e., 
higher RWA) reflects a more aggressive business strategy. 
The second, which is the so-called “Texas Ratio,” captures both asset quality and capital 
adequacy (TexasRatio), with a greater emphasis on the condition of the bank’s loan portfolio.78 
The ratio is calculated by taking the sum of non-performing loans (NPL) and other real estate 
owned, and dividing by the sum of Tier 1 capital and the balance of the allowance for loan and 
                                                 
77 The use of quarterly data for these measures was intended to minimize the influence of time-varying economic 
conditions that would be present if computing the standard deviation of annual earnings. The measures are logged 
because they are highly skewed. 
78 During an informal telephone interview, the current Chairman and CEO of a large, privately held BHC (which, if 
publicly traded, would be included in this study’s sample) suggested that I include this ratio as a measure of overall 




lease losses (ALLL).79 Essentially, the Texas Ratio captures the degree to which a bank is insulated 
against severe losses in its loan portfolio. One advantage of the measure is that it does have some 
predictive value: higher values are considered leading indicators of bank distress, and analysts 
often include banks with ratios above 40% on “troubled bank watch lists” (Jesswein, 2009).80 One 
downside of this measure, though, is that it has little-to-no meaning for business models that do 
not revolve around lending. I therefore set values of TexasRatio to missing if loans comprise 
slightly less than 34% of total assets (this value corresponds to the bottom 4% of the sample-wide 
distribution of the loans-to-assets ratio). This treatment reduces the sample size for these tests by 
44 bank-year observations. 
Finally, I explore whether risk committees are associated with regulatory capital ratios. 
Regulators monitor several measures of capital adequacy, and each is intended to capture different 
facets of bank soundness (e.g., Spong, 2000). Regulatory capital holdings should therefore capture, 
albeit indirectly, a bank’s risk tolerance. I therefore use four measures of bank capital: (1) Tier 1 
risk-based capital ratio (Tier1/RWA), (2) Tier 1 Leverage Ratio (T1Levg_Ratio), (3) Total risk-
based capital ratio (TotCap_Ratio), and (4) Tier 1 scaled by ending assets (Tier1/AT). Different 
from all other dependent variables used within this study, lower values of all four capital ratios are 
generally thought to be consistent with higher risk. That being said, there are sound reasons to 
expect that better risk management, through more effective capital deployment (i.e., laying off of 
bad risks and taking on good risks), may permit a bank to safely hold lower levels of capital, all 
else equal (e.g., Stulz, 2015). 
 
                                                 
79 Other real estate owned is generally comprised of foreclosed properties. 




Control Variables for non-Market Risk Tests 
 With three exceptions, the control variables for all measures of earnings risk are the same 
set of controls as for the market risk tests. First, because each earnings volatility proxy is a function 
of pretax earnings, I replace pretaxRoRWA with an indicator for negative net income (Loss). 
Second, because the receipt of TARP bailout funds could be considered a result of earnings risk, I 
omit TARP Issuance from the earnings volatility tests. Third, I augment the earnings volatility 
controls with MVE/RegCapital, or the firm’s market value of equity scaled by risk-weighted 
capital, to control for growth opportunities.81 
In the regulatory capital tests, the set of control variables is expanded to include  
LoanGrowth (total loans scaled by ending total assets in year t, divided by the same ratio in year 
t-1) and the ratio of deposits to loans (Depos/Loans). The latter captures the degree to which a 
bank can increase lending with readily available, low-cost funds. A lower deposits-to-loans ratio 
means that a bank is relatively constrained, or that it must use other (non-deposit) sources of 
financing for lending activities, while higher values of this ratio indicate increased lending 
capacity.82 To some extent, Depos/Loans also controls for differences in the sample BHCs’ 
business models. Finally, the Loss indicator is dropped and the variable pretaxRoRWA is added 
back to control for recent operating performance. 
The control variables in the TexasRatio regressions differ from the regulatory capital 
controls in a few ways. First, because the loan loss allowance is a component of the ratio, I replace 
the ALLL>NPL variable with an indicator equal to one if the provision for loan and lease losses 
                                                 
81 Results are not different with a more traditional measure of Market-to-Book (i.e., MVE scaled by the book value 
of equity). 
82 The capital ratio models also exclude CEO_Tenure. Inferences are unchanged when including this variable, and 




exceeds the amount of loan and lease charge-offs for the year (LLPvsCHO). Second, since the ratio 
is generally meaningful only for banks that engage in relatively more lending, I omit NonInt_Ratio 
(and its square) from these tests. 
An exploratory analysis reveals that the ratio of risk-weighted-assets to total assets (RWA) 
is remarkably constant within a bank (for example, a regression of RWA on firm i.d. dummies, 
untabulated, yields an adjusted-R2 of 0.756). I therefore estimate the RWA regressions with BHC-
fixed effects, and employ a smaller set of controls, which are discussed in Section 6 and defined 
in Appendix B.83  
 
 
5.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Broad summary statistics for all variables used in this study are included in Appendix D, 
in Table D.1. In Appendix C, Figure 2 displays plots of the actual sample banks’ values, by year, 
for four of the above-described Risk proxies: TailRisk (A), RetVol (B), ROAvol (C), and TexasRatio 
(D).84 The grey area behind the annual dot plots represents the 95% confidence interval around the 
mean annual values from a regression of Risk on year indicators. Across the full sample period, 
TailRisk ranges from around 1.5% to over 16% (1st and 99th percentile values, respectively), and 
peak values for this measure occur in 2009, followed by 2008. The highest values for stock return 
volatility (RetVol) occur in the same periods. Due to the measures’ use of eight quarters of data, 
values for all three earnings volatility measures (ROAvol, EBLLPvol, and NIMvol) peak slightly 
                                                 
83 The sample for the RWA tests is also restricted to BHCs with at least 11 years of complete data. 
84 The takeaways from graphs for the additional earnings volatility measures (i.e., EBLLPvol and NIMvol) would not 




earlier (in 2008) and remain higher for a few periods. Accordingly, in addition to the one-year lag 
used for all other Risk proxies, I also estimate the earnings volatility tests with independent 
variables lagged two years. 
The average sample BHC has a TexasRatio of 0.183 (see Table D.1), meaning that troubled 
assets currently represent 18.3% of the capital and loan loss allowance cushion. Figure 2 shows 
that values of the ratio peak in 2009 and 2010, suggesting that this variable is capturing risk as 
intended. The interquartile range of risk-weighted assets-to-assets (RWA) is 0.665 to 0.815 (see 
Table D.1). Since risk-weighted assets comprise the denominators for several regulatory capital 
ratios, the intentional pursuit of a business model that would cause the RWA ratio to be greater 
than unity seems counter-intuitive and cost-prohibitive. Nevertheless, I note that the sample 
includes 24 observations with RWA values in excess of 1.0, and several of those instances occur 
well outside the range of the crisis years  (untabulated). 
Means and tests of mean differences for the aforementioned risk proxies and control 
variables are presented in Table 3, by pre-2010 and post-2010, and by RC within each time 
period.85 Because all regression models use lagged independent variables, all values in this Table 
3, as well as in the supplemental tables in Appendix D, are tabulated so that risk variables are 
measured in year t + 1, and control variables are measured in year t. For example, Table 3 presents 
means for the dependent (independent) variables measured from 2005 to 2016 (2004 to 2015). 
In the pre-2010 period, the tests of differences in Table 3 show that bank-year observations 
where RC equals one are associated with higher average risk across both market-based risk proxies, 
two of the three earnings volatility measures, and the TexasRatio (p < 0.01 for all differences). 
                                                 




Risk committees do not appear to be associated with any meaningful difference in risk-weighted 
assets, nor in any of the regulatory capital ratios, during the pre-period. 
In contrast, in the post-period (2011-2016), the sign of the mean difference for all risk 
proxies other than RWA is opposite that of the pre-Dodd Frank period. Risk committees are now 
associated with significantly lower average values of TailRisk, RetVol, ROAvol and EBLLPvol. All 
sample BHCs appear to have increased the four capital ratios, on average, from the pre- to the 
post-period, although observations where RC equals one appear to have done so by less than BHCs 
where RC equals zero. Only the LevgRatio mean difference, however, is different from zero (p < 
0.05).86 Because U.S. Basel III became effective in the last two years of the sample period for 
some of the largest BHCs, referred to for capital purposes as Advanced Approaches banks (FRS, 
2013, p.62029), I perform all RWA and capital ratio tests both with, and without, this group.87 
With respect to the control variables, pre-2010 bank-year observations where RC equals 
one are larger (aSize, p < 0.01, and mSize, p < 0.05), are less profitable per dollar of risk-weighted 
assets and have more frequent losses (pretaxRoRWA and Loss, respectively; p < 0.01 for each), are 
under-reserved for the current level of non-performing loans (ALLL>NPL), and receive larger 
bailouts per dollar of pre-bailout equity (TARP Issuance). In addition, BHCs with risk committees 
                                                 
86 Table D.1 shows that the average sample bank has a ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets (Tier1Levg) of 
just over 9.0%, which is well over the current (i.e., under U.S. Basel III – see subsequent footnote for details) 
regulatory minimum of 6%. The same can be said for the mean values of each capital ratio. In fact, an exploratory 
analysis (untabulated) revealed that apart from the accompanying changes in the definitions calculations of the ratio 
components, all but a small handful of the sample BHCs would have met the U.S. Basel III capital requirements for 
a classification of adequately-capitalized not only when the rules were issued in 2013, but also for the majority of 
the sample period. Those that would have fallen short, hypothetically, of those standards would have only done so 
by a small percentage (0.5% to 1.0%), and were considered either adequately- or well-capitalized under the capital 
standards in effect at the time.    
87 Relative to the previous requirements, the U.S. Basel III regulatory capital standards are more stringent in terms of 
what counts (and what does not) as Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, the weightings applied to various asset categories for 





during this time period had greater levels of riskier debt as a percent of equity (SubordDebt/Eq) 
and engaged more in non-traditional banking activities (NonInt_Ratio). The shift in focus towards 
a non-interest revenue model likely explains the negative average value for LoanGrowth for this 
group. 
Finally, I note that in the post-period, several of the differences in the control variables are 
smaller in magnitude and in statistical significance, and many also change signs. In addition, the 
number of observations in each group (RC versus no RC) is relatively more balanced in the post-
2010 period. 
As supplements to Table 3, Appendix D contains Table D.1 (Overall summary statistics 
for the full sample), and two additional tables. Table D.2 contains tests of mean differences, 
estimated in the pre-Dodd-Frank period (2004-2010), for all dependent and independent variables, 
across two size groups. More specifically, the variable DF Bank equals one if the BHC ever 
becomes subject to Dodd-Frank within the sample period (i.e., assets are greater than $10 billion 
by year-end 2014), and zero otherwise. It can be reasonably argued that the Act arbitrarily singled 
out banks of a given size from others. In support of this conjecture, as well as of incorporating the 
group of smaller BHCs (i.e., those where DF Bank equals zero) in the subsequent analysis, Table 
D.2 shows that there are no differences across the two groups in the mean values TailRisk, RetVol, 
nor in any of the earnings volatility measures, in the period leading up to the passage of Dodd-
Frank. There is also no difference across the two groups, on average, in RWA.  
Table D.2 does show that irrespective of the particular regulatory capital definition, the 




risk-weighted assets.88 This may also explain the significant difference in the average TexasRatio 
across the two groups.  
Because there may still be concerns about the use of the smaller BHCs as a control group, 
I estimate and present regression results for all of the Risk variables using both the full sample and 
for only the sample BHCs where DF Bank equals one. Furthermore, I perform the same tests for 
all dependent variables after dropping various grouping of the largest BHCs (e.g., assets greater 
than $50 billion, global systemically important banks, or GSIBs, etc.), and comment on any 
changes in inferences where appropriate.  
Finally, Table D.3 presents the Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients for all Risk 
measures (in year t + 1) and all independent variables (in year t), for the full sample and full period. 





                                                 




6. BOARD RISK COMMITTEES & BHC RISK – REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
 
6.1. Primary Multivariate Results 
6.1.1. Market-based Risk 
The results for tests of the association between board-level risk committees (RC) on the 
market-based measures of bank risk across the entire sample period (2004 to 2016) are presented 
in Table 4 across the entire sample period (2004 to 2016). Panel A and Panel B display the 
regression results for TailRisk and RetVol, respectively. For each risk proxy, I first present 
estimates for stepwise regression models that first include only the RC indicator, and subsequently 
add DF and then RCxDF.  In each panel, columns (1) to (3) contain results for the full sample of 
BHCs, and columns (4) through (6) are for the DF Banks, only (under column heading DFB 
Sample). I caveat that because only a handful of these larger BHCs have both RC and DF equal to 
zero in the later years of the sample period, the year fixed effects are only weakly identified. 
The results for the control variables are consistent with expectations and with prior literature. 
For example, performance (PretaxRoRWA) is negatively associated with both downside tail risk 
and stock return volatility (p < 0.01 in all specifications). The coefficient on NonInt_Ratio is 
negative in all specifications, but is only significantly different from zero in the TailRisk tests for 
the DF Bank sample (Panel A, columns 3-6, p < 0.05). Consistent with the findings in Gambacorta 
and van Rixtel (2013), however, the relation appears to be non-linear within the full sample: both 
TailRisk and RetVol are increasing in NonInt_RatioSq (columns 1, 2, and 3 of Panels A and B). 
The indicator for high trading assets, HighTrdgDum, is positive in all specifications, and is 




Unsurprisingly, TARP Issuance has a strong and negative relation with future risk across both risk 
proxies, and larger loan and lease loss reserves relative to non-performing loans (ALLL>NPL) are 
associated with moderately lower risk across all specifications (p < 0.05). 
Longer CEO Tenure is related to lower future risk for both TailRisk and RetVol, consistent 
with prior literature documenting the accrued benefits of executive experience (e.g., Ahmed et al., 
2015). Founder-family ownership (FamFdrOwnshp) is negatively associated with downside tail 
risk and return volatility in all specifications, but only for the full sample. Given that the under $10 
billion group has a higher relative proportion of firms with founder-family presence, this is not 
surprising; yet, this result does highlight the importance of controlling for this characteristic within 
all full-sample models. 
Turning to the results for the risk committee indicator (RC), the results in Table 4 suggest 
that voluntary, standalone enterprise risk committees are not associated with any difference in 
either TailRisk or RetVol. The estimate for DF is positive in all specifications, but is never 
statistically different from zero. For both the TailRisk and the RetVol tests, the estimates on RCxDF 
are always negative, but never significant. Taken together, the results in Table 4 provide little 
support for the notion that board-level risk committees have any incremental association with 
changes in bank risk in the post-Dodd-Frank period.  
 
6.1.2. Earnings Risk 
I present the results for the earnings volatility (ROAvol, EBLLPvol, and NIMvol) tests in 
Table 5 (Panels A through C, respectively). As discussed in Section 5.4, because these measures 
incorporate eight quarters’ worth of information, I present results from the estimation of equation 




volatility in year t + 1. To conserve space, I omit the results for the middle step-wise column that 
includes both the RC and DF indicators, but without the RCxDF interaction, and because the 
coefficient estimates are similar across each of the three measures, I only present the estimates for 
the full set of controls for ROAvol (Panel A), and present abbreviated results for EBLLPvol (Panel 
B) and NIMvol (Panel C).89 
The results for the control variables are in line with expectations and with prior literature. 
For example, while higher income from non-traditional activities (NonInt_Ratio) has no 
statistically significant association with ROAvol (Panel A), the relation between income diversity 
and earnings risk is non-linear. All coefficient estimates for NonInt_RatioSq are positive and 
significant (p < 0.01). The estimates for HighTrdgDum are positive and significant in the ROAvol 
and EBLLPvol tests, supporting for the notion that higher levels of trading activities generate more 
variable income, ceteris paribus. Surprisingly, Size is not significantly associated with ROAvol, 
but the estimates for SizeSq are negative and significant (p < 0.01) for the full-sample tests with a 
one year lead of the dependent variable (Panel A, columns 1 and 2). While this may imply there 
are economies to scale with respect to earnings consistency, this relation is generally not present 
for the other two proxies (untabulated). 
Turning to the variables of interest, the only estimates that are significantly different from 
zero are for the large bank subsample (DF Banks) with two-year-ahead ROAvol. The estimate on 
RCxDF is negative and weakly significant in the two-year-ahead EBLLPvol tests (Panel A, column 
8; β3 = -0.351, p < 0.10). Overall, the evidence in Table 5 for the earnings volatility tests does not 
provide sufficient grounds to reject H1. 
                                                 
89 For the omitted specifications, the signs and significance of the estimates on DF and RC do not differ from those 




To examine whether more forward-looking earnings volatility measures would provide 
stronger tests of the benefits of risk committees, I performing three (separate) additional tests. 
First, I estimate regressions with all four earnings risk proxies measured in year t + 3. Second, 
because some firms enter the sample in later years, and are therefore missing values for the 
earnings risk measures until after Dodd-Frank, I restrict the sample to only those firms with at least 
11 observations (i.e., the “more balanced” sample). Third, using a constant sample of BHCs, I 
restrict the estimations to use only those firm-years from 2004 to 2007 and 2013 to 2016 to reduce 
the influence of crisis years on the earnings volatility estimates. Results for all three sets of tests, 
not tabulated, are similarly inconclusive. 
 
6.1.3. Balance Sheet Risk 
6.1.3.1. Risk-Weighted Assets 
As previously discussed (see Section 5.3.2), the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets 
(RWA) is relatively fixed across time within banks. I therefore augment the regression model with 
BHC fixed effects, and for transparency, I present estimates without and with BHC fixed effects 
in Panel A of Table 6.90 In all RWA tests, I use a more-balanced subset of the sample BHCs with 
at least 11 bank-year observations, each. This restriction drops two BHCs from the panel, for a 
total of 82 BHCs per year. 
                                                 
90 An initial concern in using a firm-fixed effects model with indicator explanatory variables is that relatively 
constant binary indicators will be absorbed by the respective firm’s intercepts. In the extreme scenario of a bank 
having RC equal to 1 for the entire sample period, the coefficient estimate for RC (β1) will exclude the effect of that 
bank having a risk committee entirely. In the same vein, most endogeneity concerns about the choice to form a risk 
committee prior to Dodd Frank are allayed, as formations that occur later in the sample period are more likely to be 
related to regulatory expectations. Further, shorter-term innovations in those variables, or changes, such as those 
identified by RCxDF, will be more strongly identified for those firms that had risk committees in place for longer 




I also employ a smaller set of control variables for the RWA tests, and strive to include only 
those variables that not only appear to explain common differences in RWA across banks, but that 
have relatively large within-subject variance relative to between, to better identify the effects of 
innovations in firm characteristics on changes in RWA. More specifically, the RWA tests include 
the following controls: Size (log of ending assets), NonInt_Ratio, the proportion of the loan 
portfolio that is made up of commercial and industrial loans and of real estate loans (C&I Loans 
and RealEst Loans, respectively), CEO_Tenure, the sum of cash and marketable securities over 
total assets (Slack), SubordDebt/Eq, and the fraction of loans that is currently classified as non-
performing (NPLoans/TotLoans).  
Depending on whether or not the model includes firm fixed effects, the estimates on the 
control variables, as shown in Panel A of Table 6, differ in several ways. For example, without 
BHC fixed effects, Size has a positive and significant association with risk-weighted assets. This 
effect disappears upon the inclusion of BHC fixed effects. The two variables representing 
proportions of loan categories in the BHC portfolios are both significant: BHCs with loan 
portfolios more heavily concentrated in commercial and industrial loans (C&I Loans) and in real 
estate-backed assets (RealEst Loans) have higher risk-weighted assets, on average. The ratio of 
non-performing loans to total loans (NPLoans/TotLoans) is negatively associated with future 
RWA, but only in the firm fixed effects model estimated for the full sample. 
Turning to the variables of interest, the coefficient on the RC indicator is not significant in 
any of the four tests for RWA; however, I note that the sign changes upon the addition of BHC 
fixed effects (from negative to positive) in the full sample and the DF Bank sub-sample. The 
coefficient on the DF indicator is negative in all models, and is significantly negative in the full 




respectively). The RCxDF interaction term is negative and significantly different from zero in both 
firm fixed effects models (columns 2 and 4). This suggests that after controlling for a given bank’s 
average asset mix (and by extension, business model), time, and all other aspects of Dodd-Frank, 
large BHCs with mandatory EPS-compliant risk committees have weakly lower values of risk-
weighted assets. Since several regulatory capital ratios use risk-weighted assets as the 
denominator, this finding suggests that perhaps some BHCs (or more specifically, BHCs with 
RCxDF equal to 1) are achieving compliance with new regulatory capital requirements by 
restructuring the bank’s underlying investments and activities (i.e., by de-risking the balance 
sheet), rather than by holding additional capital. 
 
6.1.3.2. Texas Ratio 
Panel B of Table 6 presents the results for tests of the association between board-level 
enterprise risk committees and the Texas Ratio, the joint proxy for loan portfolio health and 
adequacy of regulatory capital and the loan loss allowance.91 Recall that the values of this variable 
are increasing with risk of distress. The estimated coefficients on RC (DF and RCxDF) are positive 
(negative) in all specifications, but are never significantly different from zero. 
With respect to the control variables, for the full sample specifications (Panel B, columns 1 
and 2), bank Size, but not SizeSq, has a positive and significant relation with the Texas Ratio, and 
MVE/RegCapital, the proxy for growth opportunities, is negative and significantly associated with 
loan-related distress. These are both intuitive results, as larger banks tend to hold lower levels of 
capital per dollar of assets, and may engage in riskier lending to maintain already-large market 
                                                 
91 The use of balance sheet risk proxies permits a larger estimation sample, all else equal; however, as the sample 
includes a few BHCs with little-to-no lending activity, I drop observations with TexasRatio values in the bottom 4 




shares within lending activities. Likewise, banks with higher market-to-book capital values are 
likely able to more easily issue new equity to boost regulatory capital holdings as needed. 
In all four columns, LLPvsCHO has a strong association with higher future Texas Ratios (p 
< 0.01). This indicator variable equals one if the dollar amount of the loan loss provision exceeds 
the dollar amount of loans charged off in a given year, meaning that problem loans are accruing 
faster than they are being charged off. The estimates for the Depos/Loans control are negative and 
highly significant (p < 0.01) in all specifications. To some extent, this variable controls for banks 
different overall levels of lending and deposits; but for those banks with higher lending activities, 
it also captures the extent to which a BHC has “spent” relatively cheap deposits to fund lending 
activities. As this ratio decreases, banks must fund loans with more costly liabilities to maintain 
size (and growth) in the loan portfolio, resulting in a higher required rate of return on loans – or 
riskier lending activities. The inverse relation between this variable and TexasRatio is consistent 
with this line of thought. 
 
6.1.4. Regulatory Capital 
Table 7 presents the abbreviated results with the four regulatory capital ratios (Tier1Levg, 
LevgRatio, Tier1/AT, and TotCap) as dependent variables measured in t + 1. Recall that in these 
tests, the dependent variable is not strictly increasing or decreasing in risk. Positive coefficient 
estimates simply indicate higher capital ratios, all else equal.  
As with RWA, there is very little within-bank variation in capital ratios across time. Panels 
A and B of Table 7 show no differences in the sample banks’ regulatory capital ratios attributable 
to risk oversight, Dodd-Frank, nor their interaction (RCxDF). Similarly null results were obtained 




(untabulated). Since it is not clear whether regulatory capital should be considered a measure of 
risk, in the first place, I perform no other tests with these measures as dependent variables.  
 
 
6.2. Additional Analyses 
6.2.1. Sample-Based Sensitivity Tests 
 In Table 8, I present the abbreviated results from the estimation of equation (1) with both 
market risk proxies (TailRisk and RetVol), under different sample conditions. For each dependent 
variable, I present the estimates for RC, DF, and RCxDF after the following independent 
conditions: (i) requiring that all sample BHCs are in the sample for at least 11 years; (ii) dropping 
covered institutions (BHCs that ever have assets greater than $50 billion); and (iii) dropping GSIB 
BHCs, or the six sample BHCs that are designated by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision as Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIB BHCs).  
With one exception, the sign and significance of each coefficient estimate is similar to that 
reported within the respective panel of Table 4. The single exception is that for stock return 
volatility tests, the estimate on DF is positive and is now statistically significant (Column 5; β2 = 
0.020, p < 0.05) when the covered institutions are dropped from the regressions. This implies that 
relative to BHCs not yet subject to Dodd-Frank, the subset of BHCs with assets between $10 and 
$50 billion have higher stock return volatility in the post-Dodd-Frank period. 
 While not tabulated, similar tests were performed for all other dependent variables used in 
this study, and results were similar enough to the previously reported results that additional 





6.2.2. Reconciliation to Prior Literature 
 The null results documented in this Section do not shed light on the mixed results within 
prior literature, as summarized in Section 2.  I therefore re-estimate equation (1) for the pre-Dodd-
Frank period (2004-2010), and again for the crisis period (2006-2009), to examine whether the RC 
indicator yields similar results to extant studies. In particular, I am interested in understanding and 
explaining the differences in both sample composition and research design (including data 
collection choices) between this study and E&Y (2013), which is the only extant study to 
consistently find – for a similar sample of U.S. BHCs – that stronger risk controls are associated 
with lower future risk. 
For these tests, I only use the market-based proxies, since E&Y uses the same measures 
and this should enhance comparability. The results of the initial tests, which include only the RC 
indicator (because DF and RCxDF are both equal to zero for all BHCs during this time period), 
are presented in Table 9, Panel A. None of the coefficient estimates on RC are significantly 
different from zero, but I note that each estimate is positive, which runs counter to the E&Y results. 
In the absence of a dedicated risk committee, E&Y use other committees’ characteristics 
in constructing the study’s risk management index. I therefore re-estimate the pre-Dodd Frank tests 
using a broader definition of board risk oversight. More specifically, I set the indicator RC_AltDef 
equal to one for observations where any board committee has enterprise-wide risk oversight (i.e., 
committee types E, F, and G from Table 2, Panel A), or if the audit committee oversees any subset 
of risk (committee type B). The comparison group consists of BHC-years where either no 
committee of the board oversees risk (type A), or a multi-purpose or silo-type committee oversees 
only a subset of risks (types C and D). By default, RC_AltDef equals one if RC equals one (i.e., 




I first examine RC_AltDef alone, and then add the RC indicator back to the model. The 
latter specification is equivalent to having a main effect for more general board risk oversight 
(RC_AltDef), and a conditional term to evaluate the subset of RC_AltDef that also meets the more 
narrow EPS risk committee definition (RC). All control variables are the same as those included 
in the Table 4 estimations, but to conserve space, I present the abbreviated results (i.e., only the 
estimates for RC_AltDef, RC, the intercept, and related summary statistics) in Panels B and C of 
Table 9. Panel B contains the estimations for the entire pre-Dodd-Frank period (2004-2010), while 
Panel C presents the results for the crisis period (2006-2009). The latter set of results is most 
comparable to the results presented within E&Y’s Table IV. 
In contrast to the results for RC in Table 9, Panel A, the estimated coefficient on RC_AltDef 
is negative in all specifications. The coefficients are not significantly different from zero when 
RC_AltDef is included on its own, but upon the inclusion of RC, the effect for RC_AltDef becomes 
significantly different from zero in six out of eight models. The magnitude of the estimate is 
especially large during the crisis period (Panel C). This result is more in line with the E&Y results; 
i.e., a more general operationalization of board risk oversight appears to approximate the effect of 
E&Y’s RMI measure.  
Moreover, after controlling for that relation, EPS-compliant risk committees (i.e., where 
RC equals 1) are actually associated with higher risk during the crisis period (Panel C). These 
results suggest that banks that formed dedicated, enterprise-wide risk committees did so either to 
appease regulators (window dressing), or to engage in more risk-taking, both of which would be 
consistent with E&Y’s hypothesized hedging channel. Further, if less clearly delineated risk 
oversight responsibilities and structures, captured within RC_AltDef, are indicative of weaker risk 




with lower risk appetites may not have found strong risk controls to be necessary – also consistent 
with E&Y’s hedging story. 
The results in Panels B and C of Table 9 suggest that perhaps some other characteristic of 
the sample firms is captured by E&Y’s RMI. This analysis, however, represents only a cursory 
attempt to reconcile the differing results between this study and E&Y. For the curious reader, a 
more in-depth analysis of the E&Y study is provided in Appendix F. 
 
6.2.3. Relaxing the Risk Committee Definition 
The risk committee’s specific form (i.e., standalone) was not clarified until the first EPS 
rule proposal (in 2012), and does not apply to BHCs with assets below $50 billion. I therefore 
perform all tests with a more relaxed definition, RC2, that incorporates a size-based concession for 
the smaller sample banks, and allows for the possibility that a bank otherwise in compliance with 
the risk committee requirements (i.e., risk is the primary purpose, and remit is enterprise-wide) 
may not have made substantial changes to the risk committee’s functions in order to fully comply 
with the subsequently clarified definition of “standalone.” By default, RC2 equals one for all bank-
years where RC equals one. Then, for any bank-years where a risk committee has primary risk 
oversight responsibility and oversees all risks, but is not entirely standalone, I set RC2 equal to 
one if the committee meets any one of the following criteria: 
(1) For BHCs of any size: the risk committee has additional responsibilities, but those 
duties are conceivably risk-related (e.g., debt/equity issuance, dividend policy, etc., 
which are directly related to capital adequacy; many of these BHCs fall under the Type F 




(2) For BHCs with assets < $50 billion: the risk committee has additional responsibilities, 
but risk oversight is the primary responsibility of the committee (most of these are 
classified as Type F committees in Table 2, Panel A, although a few are Type E; note that 
the “primary” condition continues to exclude audit committees with enterprise-wide risk 
oversight); 
(3) For BHCs with assets < $50 billion, where the main subsidiary bank comprises at 
least 95% of the consolidated assets of the BHC, only: the risk committee otherwise 
meets the definition of RC but is either (a) at the Bank-Board level, and reports to the 
BHC board, or (b) a joint committee of the Bank and BHC Boards. The 95% threshold is 
consistent with the OCC’s view that the risk profiles of the bank and the BHC, in this 
scenario, are essentially the same (12 CFR § 30, 2014). 
With the RC2 indicator in place of RC, the results for the market-based risk measures, 
tabulated in Table 10, are quite different from those presented in Table 4. In the difference-in-
differences tests (columns 3 and 6), the estimates for RC2xDF appear larger in magnitude (relative 
to the RCxDF estimates reported in Table 4) for both TailRisk and RetVol. Furthermore, for the 
TailRisk tests (Panel A) the coefficients on DF are now significantly positive (full sample p < 0.05; 
DF Banks p < 0.10), and the estimate on RC2xDF is significantly negative (p < 0.05 for both 
groups). While the RetVol results in Panel B display similar patterns to TailRisk, the estimates are 
statistically weaker. Nevertheless, this small change in the RC designation yields notably different 
results, which may suggest that the specific form of the risk committee (i.e., standalone) is less 
important; instead, it may be more essential that the committee be dedicated to risk oversight (i.e., 
that risk oversight is the committee’s primary purpose). 
 
6.2.4. Other Sensitivity Analyses 
Gao, Liao, and Wang (2016) find that in the first six months 2010, the year in which Dodd-
Frank was passed, news of legislative activity related to Dodd-Frank negatively affected financial 




is measured in 2010). Further, to rule out concerns about the specific timing of a few BHCs’ risk 
committee formations during 2010, I re-estimate the Table 4 regressions after dropping 
observations for both 2009 and 2010 (risk measured in 2010 and 2011), and note that the 
previously reported inferences are not altered with these exclusions (results not tabulated). 
I also perform a variety of sensitivity checks to ensure that the difference-in-differences 
estimates are not sensitive to specific design choices. All previous results are unchanged upon (a) 
the exclusion of insignificant controls; and (b) the use of alternative controls for banks’ balance 
sheet composition and performance. The results are also not sensitive to the use of alternative 
definitions of the market-based risk proxies (e.g., tail risk, using the lowest 5% of abnormal 




7. RISK GOVERNANCE INDEX 
 
 
Beyond the form and scope of the committee, the EPS rules require that risk committees 
meet certain minimum standards for composition, member qualifications, and activities. More 
specifically, the minimum EPS standards require the BHC board’s enterprise risk committee to (1) 
have an independent chair; (2) have at least one member with “experience in identifying, assessing, 
and managing risk exposures of large, complex firms;” (3) adopt a formal, written charter that is 
approved by the whole board; and (4) meet “at least quarterly, and otherwise as needed” (12 CFR 
§ 252.31, 2014, pg. 373). In addition, covered institutions (BHCs with total assets ≥ $50 billion) 
must (5) appoint a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) responsible for implementing and overseeing the 
enterprise-wide risk management program; and (6) the CRO must have a dual-reporting line to 
both the risk committee and the CEO. 
In addition, within the preface to the final EPS rules, the FRB encourages certain best 
practices that exceed these minimum requirements. For example, while an independent chair and 
at least one risk management expert satisfy the minimum RC composition requirements, the FRB 
expects all RC members to have appropriate levels of understanding of risk management practices 
and of banking organizations, adding that presence of additional independent directors on the RC 
“is vital to robust oversight of risk management” (FRS, 2014, p.17249). Additional examples of 
similar statements are provided within in Figure 1. 
Regulators presumably included the full set of EPS requirements on the premise that each 
element is important for the effectiveness of risk management and oversight efforts, although this 




indicator may not adequately capture the variation (present both within and across banks) in these 
other, potentially important, qualitative aspects of risk governance.  
Defining a measure of compliance with all of these conditions, though, presents several 
empirical challenges. First, banks vary in the extent to which they disclose some of this information 
(e.g., committee members, committee meetings, board member qualifications, reporting lines of 
key executives, etc.), especially prior to the 2010 implementation of the SEC’s enhanced proxy 
disclosure rules.92 Second, committee composition varies from year-to-year, and so it is possible 
that a bank could appear to comply in one year and not comply in the next, even though the period 
of noncompliance was brief. Taken together, these two issues raise the concern that an “all or 
nothing” (i.e., binary) approach to measuring compliance could potentially result in intertemporal 
assignment of false negative classifications for risk governance strength. 
Third, while the FRB does not impose the standalone (or separate) committee nor CRO-
related requirements on banks with assets less than $50 billion, I observe that several banks within 
this group nevertheless meet the higher standards, and have for many years. It is not clear how to 
handle this if defining an indicator for full EPS compliance. For example, size-based concessions 
(for the smaller BHCs) related to the CRO requirement might be appropriate if smaller banks do 
not need a CRO, but this would treat similar banks without a CRO the same as banks with a CRO.  
Furthermore, during the data collection process, it became apparent that a good measure of 
the strength or quality of risk governance should be flexible enough to incorporate not only 
                                                 
92 Before 2010, Regulation S-K mandated the following board activity and committee-related disclosures: (1) the 
total number of board meetings; and (2) whether the company had an audit, nominating, or compensation committee 
(or committees with similar functions). Conditional upon having any of these committees, registrants were then 
required to disclose the function, number of meetings, and members of only these committees. Any disclosures 
about other types of committees were strictly voluntary. Beginning in 2010, Rule 33-9089 required additional 
disclosures, including discussion of the board’s leadership structure and role in risk oversight, and of each board 




compliance with the minimum EPS requirements, but also whether the BHC had embraced the 
Federal Reserve’s (FRB’s) supplementary expectations, or had adopted other best practices. 
Accordingly, I construct a novel proxy of risk governance quality for use in all tests (in 
place of the RC indicator). The measure, which I refer to as the Risk Governance Index (RGI), is 
a composite score of the overall quality of a bank’s risk management and oversight structures. The 
index incorporates characteristics of the Chief Risk Officer, and the composition, qualifications, 
and activities of the board committee tasked with responsibility for risk oversight, as well as 
variation in the form and scope of board-level risk oversight.93 
 
 
7.1. Risk Governance Index Construction & Descriptives 
Different from prior studies that use principal components analysis (PCA) to assess which 
risk governance attributes are more or less important (e.g., E&Y, 2013; L&S, 2012), RGI is the 
sum of several binary indicators that capture the degree to which a BHC complies with, or exceeds, 
all of the EPS requirements.94  
                                                 
93 With a large enough sample, one might include each element required by EPS within the same model and explore 
various interactions; however, sample size is generally not a luxury in banking studies, and all of the mechanisms 
are potentially important, at least at the margin. Even if possible to execute, this approach would not be informative 
as to whether the system (or combination) of all risk governance elements is more or less effective. 
94 PCA has appealing properties, but the procedure also has its limitations. Perhaps the most notable disadvantage, at 
least in the context of large financial institutions’ characteristics, is that PCA is less reliable for use in small sample 
sizes. The procedure is also intended for use with multivariate normal, and ideally continuous, data (e.g., Kolenikov 
& Angeles, 2009). Furthermore, from a practical standpoint, the estimated principal component weights are dataset-
specific. Because other researchers may be interested in using similar measures of risk governance quality, this issue 
can be especially problematic when using hand-collected variables: small differences in collection choices can 
potentially have a large impact on estimated weights and related inferences. In contrast, index measures are not 
sample dependent (at least with respect to either sample size or industry). Thus, beyond providing a more in-depth 
analysis of large banks’ implementation of the EPS requirements, this study contributes to the literature by 
introducing an independent measure of risk governance quality that can easily be used by other researchers for 
future studies. Certainly, indices are not without their critics; but in the context of this study, which examines a set 




I build the index by assigning one point for the presence of each of the required mechanisms 
in the EPS rules, and additional points for practices that exceed the minimum requirements. By 
design, RGI is increasing in more EPS-compliant forms of risk governance. The scoring criteria 
pertain to four categories. In the first three, points are awarded related to (1) risk oversight 
committee presence, form, and scope of responsibilities (extent of risks overseen); (2) committee 
composition and procedures; and (3) the presence, organizational stature, and reporting line of the 
primary risk manager. In the fourth category, I subtract points for unclear delegation or description 
of risk oversight responsibilities, and for qualities that otherwise undermine the credibility of the 
BHC’s risk oversight function. Some of the details for each category are discussed below, and the 
complete set of scoring criteria, along with related rationale and specific definitions, is provided 
in Appendix E.1.  
 
7.1.1. RGI – Baseline Construction 
I first create a baseline index (RGI) under the assumption that the presence of any risk 
oversight or risk management mechanism is likely better than having nothing in place at all. For 
example, in the first category (risk committee form and scope), a bank that does not appear to 
assign risk oversight to any committee of the board earns zero points. At the other end of the 
spectrum, a standalone risk committee with enterprise-wide risk oversight responsibilities receives 
three points (four if the committee has been in place for more than one year). In between, a multi-
purpose committee with EWRM oversight earns two points (three if in place for more than one 
year), and a non-audit, standalone, silo-type risk committee (e.g., a credit risk committee) would 




In forming the baseline RGI, as long as a given committee appears to be the primary 
committee tasked with risk oversight (regardless of scope or form), points can be accrued for 
committee composition and activities (category 2). I assign one point, each, if the risk committee 
has at least one risk management expert and the committee meets at least four times per year (i.e., 
minimum membership and procedural requirements are met).95 I then assign additional points for 
exceeding the minimum standards where encouraged by the FRB. If the BHC does not disclose 
the information necessary for evaluating a particular item in category (2), I assign zero points for 
the respective characteristic.96 
During the collection process, I observed several instances where, despite having a separate 
risk committee, substantially all of the committee members are also members of the Audit 
Committee. However, the FRB takes a strong stance on the separation of risk oversight from the 
Audit Committee’s duties, stressing that risk committee members must be able to devote the proper 
level of time and attention to risk oversight. The implication is that a risk committee comprised 
entirely, or nearly entirely, of Audit Committee members calls into question the board’s dedication 
and attention to risk oversight. I therefore add one point to the baseline RGI if there is no 
substantial overlap between the members of the risk committee and audit committee. Most sample 
risk committees have five members (average and median RC size is 5), and most audit committees 
have four members. I therefore define substantial overlap as the case where more than 60% (e.g., 
more than 3, if the RC has 5 members) of the risk committee members also serve on the audit 
                                                 
95 I do not award points for having an independent chair, as there is almost no variation in this indicator. See 
Appendix E (or more specifically, the notes to Table E.1) for details related to the risk management expert (RME) 
designation. 
96 For example, if a committee’s meetings are given, but its members are not disclosed, I am not able to determine 
the members’ qualifications, independence, etc. The observation could still earn one point, though, in Category 2, 




committee (for the average BHC, this equates to 75% of the audit committee members also sitting 
on the risk committee).97  
The items in category (3) use characteristics of the bank’s primary risk manager to capture 
the existence, strength, and independence of the company’s enterprise-wide risk management 
function. Banks often have other types of risk officers, such as Chief Credit Officers and Chief 
Compliance Officers. As individuals with these titles presumably only oversee a subset of risks 
(i.e., risk silos), and not enterprise-wide risks, I conjecture that these represent only the presence 
of components of risk management. Nevertheless, if there does not appear to be a CRO (or 
equivalent) for a given observation, I do include these types of risk managers in the baseline RGI 
calculation. As with committee the characteristics (category 1), a silo-type risk manager, such as 
a Chief Credit Officer, will contribute less to overall RGI than will a designated risk officer that 
oversees the entire risk management function, such as a Chief Risk Officer or VP of Risk 
Management. 
In 122 of the 992 sample observations, the CEO is a member of the risk committee. A 
bank’s CEO technically meets the FRB’s definition of a “risk management expert,” or RME, and 
since the EPS rules do not require that the designated RME is independent, RGI is higher by at 
least one point when the current CEO is a member of the risk committee. It is relatively 
straightforward to conceive, however, that having the CEO as a member of the risk committee may 
undermine the risk committee’s ability to provide “credible challenge” to management. 
Furthermore, the CEO’s membership on the risk committee most likely neutralizes any positive 
                                                 
97 The FRB acknowledges that some overlap may be necessary and is acceptable (12 CFR, § 252, 2014), and 
practitioners suggest that this may facilitate information sharing and coordination of the board’s oversight activities 
(e.g., Protiviti, 2011). Thus, a point is awarded here if the ratio of the number of RC members who also serve on the 




benefits of having a CRO with a dual reporting line to both the CEO and the risk committee. Thus, 
in category 3, a point is awarded if the risk manager has a direct reporting line to the board or risk 
committee, and the CEO is not a member of the committee. 
Finally, in category (4), I subtract points for characteristics create doubts with respect to 
the effectiveness or credibility of a bank’s risk governance framework. For example, regulators 
expect management and all board members to be able to clearly articulate the organization’s 
approach to risk management and risk oversight, and states that public disclosures of such practices 
are equally clear and transparent (FRB, 1997). Under the assumption that unclear disclosures are 
correlated with the underlying development (or lack thereof) of the firm’s risk governance 
framework and policies, I subtract one point from RGI when there is any doubt about which 
committee oversees risk, or which committee is the primary with this duty. 
EPS requires that all risk committees establish a charter, and that the charter is reviewed 
and approved by the full board at least annually. Charters establish the formal authorities and duties 
of the committee, and can also be used to articulate specific areas of responsibility to ensure that 
duties are not duplicated among committees, and that important areas are not overlooked. I 
therefore subtract a point from RGI if the committee does not appear to have a charter that is 
approved by the board. 
 
7.1.2. RGI Variants & Descriptives 
To use RGI in the multivariate models, I scale the final score for each BHC-year 
observation by the sample maximum score so that the variable (RGI1) ranges from zero to one. 
An alternative would be to scale by the annual maximum score, instead, which would give the 




given year. However, that definition would not inform as to whether or not subsequent 
improvements in risk governance, within a BHC, are more or less effective. For example, the 
maximum score in 2005 is 11 and the maximum score in 2014 is 16; scaling by the annual 
maximum would treat these scores equivalently within the regressions, despite the fact that a score 
of 16 is presumably better than a score of 11.  
I also define two alternatives to the baseline RGI. The first, RGI4, is a copy of the baseline 
RGI that I then set to zero unless there is a board-level committee (of any form) that oversees 
enterprise-wide risk management. The second, RGI5, is also a copy of RGI, but is set to zero for 
any observation without a dedicated, enterprise risk committee (equivalent to RC2, as defined in 
section 6.2.3). Like RGI1, the resulting scores are scaled by their own sample maximum score.   
In comparison to one another, RGI1 is the most general, and can be thought of as the presence of 
some (or many) risk controls, relative to the case where RGI1 equals zero (no risk controls present 
or apparent). Since there are observations with non-zero values of RGI that have values of zero for 
RGI4 and RGI5, the estimates for these two scores reflect differences in risk relative to any other 
combination of risk controls not meeting the minimum criteria for either score. Comparisons 
across the estimates for each RGI variant may shed light on whether the committee’s form is 
important (RGI5 vs RGI1 and RGI4). 
Annual and summary statistics for the baseline RGI measure are presented in Table 11. 
RGI has a maximum score of 16 (minimum of 0). The mean (median) RGI for the sample period 
is 8.89 (9.0), and consistent with my observations, risk governance quality is increasing over time. 
This trend is depicted in Figure 3, which graphs the distribution of RGI1 (the baseline RGI scaled 
by the maximum of 16) over the sample period. The graph depicts a wide range of risk governance 




BHCs’ risk governance practices from 2012 to 2015. The improvement trend is consistent with 
the timing of the proposed EPS rules, issued in January of 2012, and the final rules, issued late in 
2014.  
Together, the values for the baseline RGI (shown in Table 11) and the trend in RGI1 
(depicted in Figure 3) indicate that banks are making substantive changes to risk governance 
practices that not only exceed the FRB’s minimum expectations, but also seem to converge upon 
a target level of risk governance quality. One initial concern with the RGI measure is that more 
extensive disclosures in 2010 (as a result of the SEC’s enhanced proxy disclosure rule) may explain 
the post-2010 trend in RGI. If banks were withholding disclosure about risk oversight and 
management activities that were implemented and active well before 2010, then the increase in 
information available to me as the outside user of the enhanced 2010 (and subsequent) disclosures 
would not reflect real changes in firm-wide risk management and oversight. Instead, any 
documented results would be completely spurious.  
To examine this possibility, I regress the annual change in RGI (∆RGIt-1 to t) on the full set 
of year indicators. If enhanced disclosures explain the increase in the RGI measure, I should expect 
to see a significant coefficient on the 2010 indicator (representing ∆RGI from 2009 to 2010), and 
perhaps again on the 2011 indicator, since new disclosure requirements are typically accompanied 
by a learning curve. Furthermore, if the new disclosures explain the increase in RGI, I would not 
expect to observe significant changes in RGI around times of the EPS rule proposal (2012) and 
final rule issuance (2014). 
Of the estimated coefficients on the year indicators for ∆RGI1 (untabulated) the only year 
with a significant year-over-year change in RGI1 is 2014 (𝛽𝛽 = 0.0406, p < 0.05). For both ∆RGI4 




also for 2009, 2011, 2013, 2014, and 2015. Altogether, this analysis does not suggest that the 
SEC’s enhanced proxy disclosure rules caused any potentially confounding discontinuity in 
measuring observed risk governance practices across the 2010 proxy period. 
 
 
7.2. Results for the Relation between RGI and Risk 
Table 12 contains the abbreviated OLS regression results for most of the tests in Section 6, 
but using a variant of RGI in place of RC. All tabulated results are for the full sample period, and 
as before, all explanatory variables, including RGI and its interaction with the time-and-size-
specific DF indicator, are lagged one period, and all standard errors are clustered by BHC. Further, 
as in all previous tests, all RGI tests are reported for the full sample as well as the sample of DF 
Banks, only. 
Panel A (Panel B) of Table 12 presents the regression results for tests where TailRisk 
(RetVol) is the dependent variable. The comparable results with RC are in Table 4.  Panel C 
contains the abbreviated results with TexasRatio as the dependent variable, and Panel D presents 
estimates with risk-weighted assets (RWA) as the dependent variable. As before, the RWA 
regressions include BHC fixed effects. Comparable results for TexasRatio and RWA with the RC 
indicator are in Table 6. Similar to the results using the RC indicator, regression results using the 
RGI measures with the regulatory capital ratios were null, and are therefore not presented for 
brevity. Aside from some weak evidence that all three RGI measures are associated with lower net 
interest margin volatility (NIMvol) in the post-Dodd-Frank period, the overall results for the 




For the full sample, there is no evidence that stronger risk governance is associated with 
any difference in TailRisk, RetVol, nor TexasRatio (Table 12, Panels A, B, and C, respectively), 
whether voluntary (RGI) or mandatory (RGIxDF). The picture changes when restricting to the 
sample of banks subject to Dodd-Frank. First, while not different from zero, it is notable that the 
coefficient estimates on the RGI main effect, for all three variants of RGI, are positive in both the 
TailRisk and RetVol tests. In contrast, the coefficients on the RGIxDF interaction are all negative, 
and are significantly different from zero when using RGI5 for TailRisk (β3 = -0.750, p < 0.05; 
Panel A, column 6) and RetVol (β3 = -0.033, p < 0.10; Panel B, column 6). 
In the TexasRatio tests, the full sample results are similarly null, but among the subset of 
DF Banks, there is some evidence that voluntary risk governance practices are associated with 
higher balance sheet risk when using the more general RGI1 measure (β1 = 0.174, p < 0.05; Panel 
C, column 4). For all three definitions of the index, mandatory risk governance (RGIxDF) is 
associated with significantly lower TexasRatio values (p < 0.01, p < 0.10, and p < 0.05 for RGI1, 
RGI4, and RGI5, respectively). 
Finally, there is also some evidence that even among the full sample, voluntary 
(mandatory) risk governance is associated with higher-risk (lower-risk) asset composition (Table 
12, Panel D). The estimate on the RGI main effect is positive in all specifications, and is 
significantly different from zero (p < 0.05) for RGI1 within the full sample and the subset of DF 
Banks. Aside from the coefficient on RGI5xDF within the subset of DF Banks, all estimates for 
the RGIxDF interaction are negative and significant. Taken together, the RWA results in Panel D, 
which control for BHC and year fixed effects, bank-specific but time-variant characteristics, and 
whether or not a bank is subject to Dodd-Frank, suggest that stronger risk governance – irrespective 




composition to achieve a lower ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets. As suggested before, 
this result may indicate that BHCs with stronger risk oversight are achieving compliance with new 
regulatory capital requirements by restructuring the bank’s underlying investments and activities 
(i.e., by de-risking the balance sheet), rather than by holding additional capital. 
 
 
7.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
7.3.1. Few Degrees of Freedom in Final Sample Year 
Among the sample of DF Banks, there is not one BHC with a score of zero for any of the 
RGI definitions after 2014. To address potential specification concerns with respect to the results 
for tests using only this group, I run the same regressions for the 2004-2015 period, only (i.e., 
where the final year in which RGI and all control variables are measured, for all sample firms, is 
in 2014). The results reported in Table 12 generally hold, but are in some cases statistically weaker 
(untabulated). For example, for the TailRisk tests, the coefficient on RGI5xDF continues to be 
negative but is less significant (β3 = -0.858, p < 0.10), and the coefficient on RGI5xDF for the 
RetVol tests is virtually unchanged (β3 = -0.037, p < 0.05). 
 
 
7.3.2. U.S. Basel III 
As discussed previously, U.S. Basel III became effective in the last two years of the sample 
period for some of the largest BHCs, referred to as Advanced Approaches banks. The new capital 
requirements eventually changed the weighting scheme for risk-weighted assets for all banks, but 




BHCs. To rule out concerns that the results in Table 12, Panel D are driven by the changes within 
this group of BHCs, I re-estimate the RWA tests after dropping the values of RWA for Advanced 
Approaches BHCs for 2014, 2015, and 2016. Aside from the full sample estimates on DF and 
RGI5xDF becoming insignificant, inferences do not change: stronger risk governance practices in 
the post-Dodd-Frank period continue to be associated with moderately lower-risk asset 
composition (results untabulated). 
 
 
7.4. Summary of RGI Analysis 
Comparing the results in Table 12 across the three different RGI variants, the evidence in 
support of any risk oversight or risk management mechanism (RGI1) is relatively weak, whether 
or not mandatory. Recall that RGI4 only takes non-zero values if a committee of the board oversees 
enterprise-wide risks. The tests using RGI4 suggest that enterprise-wide risk oversight by any 
board committee (which includes the audit committee) is only occasionally associated with lower 
risk in the post-Dodd-Frank period. In contrast, the results using RGI5 (which only takes a non-
zero value if the board has a dedicated enterprise risk oversight committee) provide some 
consistent support of the notion that mandatory risk governance, when implemented with dedicated 
board committee oversight, is associated with lower risk.  
Though not entirely conclusive, I stress that the effects documented in Table 12 are 
incremental to both changes in risk levels for all sample BHCs over time, as well as changes in 
risk as a result of the non-EPS-related provisions within Dodd-Frank. I interpret the RGI results to 
suggest that the sum of the EPS requirements are functioning to limit bank risk, and that the 




with enterprise-wide remit, is a critical aspect of the EPS rules. Further, because the measure is 
increasing in the extent of best practices implemented, the results in this Section – relative to those 
for the RC indicator (in Section 6) – imply that simply forming a risk committee is not enough to 
reduce risk. To my knowledge, these results provide the first empirical evidence of the 







Signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010, Dodd-Frank represents “the most 
sweeping financial reform since the Great Depression.”98 The Enhanced Prudential Standards 
(EPS) subset of the Act requires large financial institutions to adopt comprehensive risk 
governance reforms, such as adopting a board-level enterprise risk oversight committee and 
ensuring a qualified and capable risk management function is in place. Whether board-level risk 
oversight, and in particular, mandatory risk governance and risk management, can affect bank risk 
is an important question yet unresolved by prior literature. 
Using a difference-in-differences design that exploits the passage of Dodd-Frank as a 
regulatory shock, and the staggered adoption of the EPS requirements across the post-Dodd Frank 
period, I find no meaningful difference in bank risk associated with the standalone risk committee 
requirement. Tests with a novel measure of risk governance quality that incorporates the remaining 
EPS rules, however, indicate that greater conformance with the EPS mandates and expectations is 
associated with subsequently lower bank risk, but only in the Dodd-Frank era (i.e., when these 
practices are mandatory). The latter results provide the first empirical support for the effectiveness 
of the sum of the EPS mandates. Further, the values for the RGI measure, itself, indicate that banks 
are making substantive changes to risk governance practices that not only exceed the FRB’s 
minimum expectations, but seem to converge upon a target level of risk governance quality. This 
trend, and others documented in this study, may have several implications for future research.  
                                                 




The EPS rules represent the first legal requirement for large financial institutions to 
implement and comply with specific risk governance mandates (Mayer Brown, 2014). Evaluating 
the effect of the EPS requirements is important for several reasons.  First, despite the costs of 
complying with these standards, prior literature provides very little evidence to support the 
prescribed requirements. This study provides initial evidence on the effectiveness of mandatory 
board risk oversight as a tool of bank corporate governance (e.g., Kaplan, 2011). Second, the 
evidence in this study suggests that mandatory risk governance constrains bank risk. In light of 
recent proposals to repeal many parts of Dodd Frank, this finding is timely, and the results in this 
study should be of interest to regulators and lawmakers, as well as to board directors, investors, 
and others in the financial services industry. Finally, to the extent that the takeaways are 
generalizable, the results of this study may have important implications for mandated risk 
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Tot Assets X Year 1 Y Year 1 X Year N Y Year N
1073757 BANK OF AMERICA 2,249.9$    2,105.9$    2004 2005 2015 2016
1039502 JPMORGAN CHASE 2,074.8      2,494.2      2004 2005 2015 2016
1951350 CITIGROUP 1,888.1      1,861.1      2004 2005 2015 2016
1120754 WELLS FARGO 1,250.9      1,607.1      2004 2005 2015 2016
1119794 U.S. BANCORP 294.5        383.3        2004 2005 2015 2016
1069778 PNC FIN SVCS GRP 267.2        332.9        2004 2005 2015 2016
3587146 BNY MELLON 229.7        379.8        2006 2007 2015 2016
2277860 CAPITAL ONE FINL 183.5        303.2        2004 2005 2015 2016
1131787 SUNTRUST BANKS 173.5        182.9        2004 2005 2015 2016
1074156 BB&T CORP 161.4        184.9        2004 2005 2015 2016
1111435 STATE STREET 157.8        258.6        2004 2005 2015 2016
3242838 REGIONS FINL 137.4        118.8        2004 2005 2015 2016
1070345 FIFTH THIRD BNCRP 112.2        134.2        2004 2005 2015 2016
1068025 KEYCORP 92.6          93.4          2004 2005 2015 2016
1199611 NORTHERN TRUST 83.0          106.4        2004 2005 2015 2016
1037003 M&T BANK 68.5          90.9          2004 2005 2015 2016
3846375 DISCOVER FS 66.2          81.2          2009 2010 2015 2016
1199844 COMERICA INC 56.7          67.4          2004 2005 2015 2016
1068191 HUNTINGTON 52.7          62.9          2004 2005 2015 2016
1027004 ZIONS 51.1          56.6          2004 2005 2015 2016
2132932 NYCB 41.7          47.6          2004 2005 2015 2016
1129382 POPULAR 36.7          34.4          2004 2005 2015 2016
1078846 SYNOVUS 31.5          26.6          2004 2005 2015 2016
1094640 FIRST HORIZON NATL 25.4          24.7          2004 2005 2015 2016
1883693 BOK FINL CORP 23.7          28.1          2004 2005 2015 2016
1199563 ASSOCIATED B-C 22.3          25.5          2004 2005 2015 2016
1027518 CITY NATL CORP 21.2          31.2          2004 2005 2013 2014
2734233 EAST WEST BNCRP 20.7          26.7          2004 2005 2015 2016
1075612 FIRST CITIZENS 19.6          25.6          2004 2005 2015 2016












Tot Assets X Year 1 Y,Mkt Year 1 X Year N Y Year N
2389941 TCF FINL CORP 18.2$        18.9$        2004 2005 2015 2016
1145476 WEBSTER FINL 17.9          21.7          2004 2005 2015 2016
2744894 FIRST BANCORP 17.6          12.7          2004 2005 2015 2016
1102367 CULLEN/FROST 17.0          26.4          2004 2005 2015 2016
1117129 FULTON FINL 16.5          17.0          2004 2005 2015 2016
1031449 SVB FINL GRP 15.2          32.9          2004 2005 2015 2016
1048773 VALLEY NATL 14.2          17.5          2004 2005 2015 2016
1117156 SUSQUEHANNA 13.8          18.6          2004 2005 2013 2014
1097614 BANCORPSOUTH 13.4          13.2          2004 2005 2015 2016
2260406 WINTRUST FINL 13.1          19.1          2004 2005 2015 2016
1025309 BANK OF HAWAII 12.8          14.5          2004 2005 2015 2016
1070804 FIRSTMERIT 12.3          24.4          2004 2005 2014 2015
1839319 PRIVATEBANCORP 12.3          14.8          2004 2005 2015 2016
1049828 UMB FINL 12.0          17.2          2004 2005 2015 2016
1104231 INTL BANCSH CORP 11.9          12.1          2004 2005 2015 2016
1843080 CATHAY GENERAL 11.2          11.3          2004 2005 2015 2016
1090987 MB FINANCIAL 10.6          12.1          2004 2005 2015 2016
2747644 UMPQUA 10.5          17.1          2004 2005 2015 2016
2291914 IBERIABANK 9.9            14.6          2004 2005 2015 2016
1079562 TRUSTMARK CORP 9.5            12.0          2004 2005 2015 2016
1109599 PROSPERITY BANCSH 9.2            20.1          2004 2005 2015 2016
1117026 NATL PENN 9.2            9.2            2004 2005 2014 2015
2477754 INVESTORS BNCRP 9.0            17.2          2004 2007 2015 2016
3005332 F.N.B. CORP 8.8            14.8          2004 2005 2015 2016
1086533 HANCOCK HOLDCO 8.4            19.9          2004 2005 2015 2016
1208184 FIRST MIDWEST BNCRP 7.9            8.8            2004 2005 2015 2016
1249347 UCBI 7.6            7.5            2004 2005 2015 2016
1098303 OLD NATL BNCRP 7.6            10.6          2004 2005 2015 2016
1076217 UNITED BANKSH 7.5            10.5          2004 2005 2015 2016











Tot Assets X Year 1 Y,Mkt Year 1 X Year N Y Year N
3133637 PROV FNCL SV 6.8$          8.0$          2004 2005 2015 2016
1029222 CVB 6.6            7.0            2004 2005 2015 2016
2003975 GLACIER 6.5            8.1            2004 2005 2015 2016
1071276 FIRST FNCL 6.5            6.8            2004 2005 2015 2016
2706735 TEXAS CAP BANCSH 6.1            13.8          2004 2005 2015 2016
2349815 WESTERN ALLIANCE 6.0            10.0          2004 2007 2015 2016
2875332 PACWEST BNCRP 5.4            11.4          2004 2005 2015 2016
1048867 COMMUNITY BS 5.4            7.3            2004 2005 2015 2016
1139279 NBTB 5.4            7.7            2004 2005 2015 2016
1070448 WESBANCO 5.4            6.2            2004 2005 2015 2016
2925657 PINNACLE 5.0            5.8            2004 2005 2015 2016
1201934 CHEM FC 4.7            6.8            2004 2005 2015 2016
2126977 BANNER 4.6            4.6            2004 2005 2015 2016
1208559 FIRST MERCH 4.3            5.6            2004 2005 2015 2016
1206546 HEARTLAND 4.0            6.0            2004 2005 2015 2016
1098844 RENASANT 4.0            5.8            2004 2005 2015 2016
2078816 COLUMBIA BS 3.7            7.9            2004 2005 2015 2016
3063622 STIFEL FINL 3.7            9.3            2007 2008 2015 2016
1491409 HOME 3.2            7.1            2004 2008 2015 2016
1971693 UNION BC 3.2            5.8            2004 2005 2015 2016
1094828 SIMMONS FIRST 3.2            4.5            2004 2005 2015 2016
1133437 SOUTH STATE 3.1            7.9            2004 2005 2015 2016
2961879 NARA HOPE 3.1            6.8            2004 2005 2015 2016




Table A.2 Example Names of Sample BHCs’ Risk Committees, by Scope of Risk Oversight 




B - Audit Committee D -Standalone, not EWRM
Audit Credit Review
Audit & Risk Credit & Finance
Audit & Examination Risk Policy
Audit & Compliance Business Risk
Audit & Finance Risk & Compliance
Asset & Liability (ALCO)
C - Multi-purpose Risk Management
Finance, Credit, and Operations Risk & Credit
Risk Mgmt/Corp Governance Finance
Executive Asset Quality
Governance Credit Risk
E (1) - Audit Committee G - Standalone RC
Audit Risk
Audit & Finance Enterprise Risk
Audit & Risk Directors' Risk Policy
Risk & Credit Policy
E (2) - Multi-purpose, Risk not Primary Enterprise Risk & Credit
Executive & Risk Management Risk Management
Risk & Governance Risk Assessment
Risk Oversight
F - Multi-purpose, Risk is Primary Board Risk
Executive & Risk Management
Risk & Capital
Risk Management & Finance
Risk & Investor Relations
Scope = All Risks (Enterprise-wide)
Scope = Some Risks







Variable Name Definition Data Source 
Risk Proxies 
TailRisk = - 1 * (average of BHC’s lowest 5% daily returns over the 
preceding 12 months); I use the actual value multiplied by 
100 for all regressions. 
CRSP 
RetVol Standard deviation of a BHC’s daily returns over the 
preceding 12 months; I use the actual value multiplied by 
10 for all regressions. 
CRSP 
TexasRatio = (all non-performing loans + other real estate owned) / 
(Tier 1 capital + allowance for loan losses); For use in 
regressions, variable is truncated at the bottom 4 percentile 
of the sample distribution for the ratio of total loans to 
assets. Higher values (i.e., close to or above 1) correspond 
with poor bank health. 
FR Y-9C 
ROAvol Log of the standard deviation, over preceding 8 quarters 
(inclusive of current quarter), of quarterly net 
income/average assets. (Net income is BHCK4340.) 
FR Y-9C 
EBLLPvol Log of the standard deviation, over preceding 8 quarters 
(inclusive of current quarter), of quarterly EBLLP/average 
assets. EBLLP is earnings before taxes and the loan loss 
provision (BHCK4301 + BHCK4230). 
FR Y-9C 
NIMvol Log of the standard deviation, over preceding 8 quarters 
(inclusive of current quarter), of the quarterly net interest 
margin (net interest income/average assets). Net interest 
income is total interest income minus total interest expense, 
or BHCK4074. 
FR Y-9C 
RWA Ratio of risk-weighted assets (BHCKA223 for 12/31/2014 
and prior, or BHCKG641 after) to total assets; both 
measured at year-end. 
FR Y-9C 
Capital Ratios 
Tier1Levg Tier 1 Regulatory Capital divided by average assets for 
leverage ratio 
FR Y-9C 
LevgRatio Tier 1 Regulatory Capital divided by total risk-weighted 
assets (at year-end) 
FR Y-9C 
Tier1/AT Tier 1 Regulatory Capital divided by ending total assets FR Y-9C 
TotCap Sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 Regulatory Capital divided by 





Variable Name Definition Data Source 
Risk Oversight Proxies & Dodd-Frank Indicator (DF) 
RC Indicator equal to 1 if BHC board has a standalone risk 
committee with enterprise-wide risk oversight during that 
year (equal to zero otherwise). Hand-
collected99 RC_AltDef Indicator equal to 1 if any type of board committee oversees 
enterprise-wide risk management. 
DF Beginning with 2011, indicator equal to 1 if BHC has 
average (trailing four quarters) assets ≥ $10 billion. 
FR Y-9C 
RGI1 RGIi,t, scaled by the sample maximum RGI value.  




RGI4 RGIi,t, but first set to zero if a committee of the board 
committee does not oversee all areas of risk (i.e., does not 
have enterprise-wide risk oversight duties).  
RGI5 RGIi,t, but first set to zero if a committee of the board (i) 
does not oversee all areas of risk (i.e., does not have 
enterprise-wide risk oversight duties), and (ii) is not a 
dedicated, standalone risk committee.  
BHC Characteristics 
Size For all dependent variables other than RetVol, equals the 
natural log of ending total assets (BHCK2170.) When 
RetVol is the dependent variable, Size is equal to the natural 
log of one plus the market value of equity (CSHO * prc) 




SizeSq Orthogonalized square of Size (whichever definition is used 
for the respective test). 
n/a 
MVE/RegCapital Market value of equity (divided by one million), scaled by 
ending total regulatory (risk-weighted) capital (BHCK3792 
for 12/31/2014 and prior, and BHCA3792 thereafter). 
FR Y-9C and 
CRSP 
Loss Equals one if net income (BHCK4340) is less than zero. FR Y-9C 
PretaxRORWA Pretax income before extr. items / ending risk-weighted 
assets (BHCK4301/RWA). 
FR Y-9C 
Deposits/Loans Ratio of ending total deposits to ending total loans. FR Y-9C 
Slack Ratio of cash and marketable securities to total ending 
assets. 
FR Y-9C 
C&I Loans Ratio of ending commercial and industrial loans to ending 
total assets. 
FR Y-9C 
                                                 
99 The primary source of information for this data was the annual proxy statement (Form DEF 14A, and occasionally 
Form DEFM14A or Form DEFA14A, if applicable). Other sources consulted include the 10-K, Annual Letter (or 
Report) to Shareholders (ARS), 8-K (Current Report), and corporate investor relations websites (investor 
presentations, board committee assignments, leadership biographies, board and committee charters, etc.). I 




Variable Name Definition Data Source 
RealEst Loans Ratio of ending loans backed by real estate to ending total 
assets. 
FR Y-9C 
NonInt_Ratio The ratio of non-interest income to total income. FR Y-9C 
NonInt_RatioSq The square of NonInt_Ratio, orthogonalized to 
NonInt_Ratio before inclusion in regressions. 
n/a 
HighTrdgDum Indicator equal to one if a BHC’s ratio of trading assets to 
assets is in the top 5 percentile of the annual distribution 
sample values. 
FR Y-9C 
SubordDebt/Eq Ratio of subordinated notes and debentures to ending 
equity. 
FR Y-9C 
LLPvsCHO Indicator equal to 1 if the current (YTD) loan loss provision 
exceeds the current (YTD) loan charge-offs. 
FR Y-9C 
ALLL>NPL Allowance for losses on loans and leases less the value of 
non-performing loans, scaled by ending assets. 
FR Y-9C 
NPLoans/TotLoans Ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. FR Y-9C 
TARP Issuance Value of preferred stock issued in 2008 or 2009, scaled by 
beginning equity; variable is set to 0 for all other years. I 
confirm that the values for 2008 and 2009 correspond to 
TARP assistance by cross-checking with information 
obtained from Propublica.org.100 
FR Y-9C & 
ProPublica.org 
CEOTenure Natural log of one plus the CEO’s tenure (in years). 
Hand-
collected101 
∆CEO Indicator equal to 1 if the CEO has been in office for one 
year or less. 
FamFdrOwnshp Fraction of common shares outstanding held or controlled 
by BHC founder(s) or family members of founder(s). 
 
 
                                                 
100 See https://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list. 
101 The primary source of information for this data was the annual proxy statement (Form DEF 14A, and 
occasionally Form DEFM14A or Form DEFA14A, if applicable). Other sources consulted include the 10-K, Annual 
Letter (or Report) to Shareholders (ARS), 8-K (Current Report), and corporate investor relations websites (investor 
presentations, board committee assignments, leadership biographies, board and committee charters, etc.). I 














Mechanism Rule Mandate, Addition, or Clarification Examples, Explanations, & Additional Expectations
Dodd Frank
All publicly traded BHCs with assets ≥ $10 billion, and all BHCs 
with assets ≥ $50 billion, must establish a risk committee
The FRB has authority to impose the same RC requirement upon 
public BHCs with total assets < $10 billion
EPS - Proposed RC is of the board of directors; No other changes
EPS - Final
No changes to the above; initial date for determining applicability 
(size, in terms of average assets over the preceding 4 quarters) is 
June 30, 2014
Dodd Frank RC oversees BHC's enterprise-wide risk management practices n/a
EPS - Proposed RC must document and oversee enterprise-wide risk management 
policies and practices of the BHC's worldwide operations
RC must review and approve an appropriate (i.e., commensurate 
with size, complexity, etc.) RM framework
EPS - Final Removed the word "practices" The RC does not have management-related duties
Dodd Frank n/a n/a
EPS - Proposed For BHCs with assets ≥ $50 billion: the RC must be a stand-alone 
committee of the board of directors
The RC may not be "housed within another committee or be part of 
a joint committee"
EPS - Final
Assets ≥ $50 billion: RC must be a separate committee, dedicated 
to RM oversight ; RC must be distinct from other board 
committees, but some overlap across committees acceptable
"A stand-alone risk committee, rather than a joint risk/audit or 
risk/finance committee, enables appropriate board-level 
attention to risk management. […This prevents the RC] from 
having other substantive responsibilities" at the BHC
Dodd Frank Number of independent directors left to determination by the FRB n/a
EPS - Proposed RC must be chaired by an independent director; independence 
defined in accordance with the SEC's Regulation S-K
Independent directors' active involvement is "vital to robust 
oversight" of RM; the FRB encourages additional independent 
directors on RC
EPS - Final
No changes (the minimum requirement of an independent 
chairperson was not revised)
The FRB continues to encourages additional independent directors 
on the RC, but notes that affiliated directors may complement the 
involvement of independent directors
The rules only apply to public BHCs with assets ≥ $10 billion (and 












Figure 1 Continued 
 
Mechanism Rule Mandate, Addition, or Clarification Examples, Explanations, & Additional Expectations
Dodd Frank
RC must have at least one "risk management expert" with 




At least one RC member must have "risk management expertise 
that is commensurate with the company's capital structure, risk 
profile, complexity, size, and other appropriate risk-related 
factors."
FRB expects all RC members to understand RM principles and 
practices relevant to the company; depth of knowledge and 
expertise should match BHC riskiness and complexity
EPS - Final
"Expertise " replaced with "experience in identifying, assessing, 
and managing risk exposures of large, complex financial* firms."
*For assets < $50 billion, nonbanking or nonfinanancial 
experience may fulfill the requirements
Larger/more complex companies should have more qualified RC 
members (quantitatively and qualitatively); For some BHCs, indirect 
RM experience may be sufficient. In all cases, the BHC "should be 
able to demonstrate that an individual's experience is relevant to the 
particular risks facing the company."
Dodd Frank n/a n/a
EPS - Proposed RC must have a formal, written charter that is approved by the 
company's board of directors
n/a
EPS - Final No changes n/a
Dodd Frank n/a n/a
EPS - Proposed
RC must "meet with an appropriate frequency and as needed, and 
fully document and maintain records of such proceedings, including 
risk management decisions"
Although a minimum number of meetings was not specified in the 
proposed EPS rules, the RC would be required to review various 
reports (e.g., cash flow projections, liquidity stress test results) at 
least quarterly.
EPS - Final RC must "meet at least quarterly and otherwise as needed"; 
documentation requirement remained unchanged
Added the following clarification: documenting RM decisions does 









Figure 1 Continued 
Mechanism Rule Mandate, Addition, or Clarification Examples, Explanations, & Additional Expectations
Dodd Frank n/a
EPS - Proposed
CRO with appropriate levels of independence, expertise, and 
stature (i.e., executive rank); must directly oversee EWRM 
practices/function and provide regular reports to RC & Board
CRO requirement applies only if total assets ≥$50 billion; Risk 
oversight should be the sole responsibility of the CRO; CRO should 
be appropriately compensated and incentivized
EPS - Final "Expertise " replaced with "experience " (similar to RME)
Dodd Frank n/a
EPS - Proposed CRO to report directly to both the risk committee and to the CEO
EPS - Final
"Dual reporting by the [CRO] to both the [RC] and the [CEO] will 
help the board of directors to oversee the [RM] function" and "may 
help disseminate information relevant to [RM] throughout the 
organization."
Guidance issued by the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) supports dual reporting by the CRO to the RC and the 
CEO
Title/Descr. Legislation or Code Relevant Dates
Dodd-Frank 12 U.S.C. § 5365, Section 165 July 7, 2010 - Signed into law (public print: May 27, 2010)
EPS - Proposed Enhanced Prudential Standards (Regulation YY), 12 CFR §252 (2012) January 5, 2012 - Issued for public comment
EPS - Final Enhanced Prudential Standards (Regulation YY), 12 CFR §252 (2014) February 18, 2014 - Finalized/published
Acronymns/abbreviations:
BHC Bank Holding Company
CRO Chief Risk Officer
EWRM Enterprise-wide Risk Management

































































































































































Note: See Appendix E for the definition of RGI1.






Year < $10B $10↔50B ≥ $50B
2004 47 19 15 81
2005 45 21 15 81
2006 44 21 16 81
2007 43 23 17 83
2008 40 24 19 83
2009 38 26 20 84
2010 36 28 20 84
2011 33 31 20 84
2012 32 32 20 84
2013 30 34 20 84
2014 26 38 20 84
2015 24 38 20 82
2016 18 42 20 80
Year < $10B $10↔50B ≥ $50B
2004 0 1 0 1 80
2005 1 2 1 4 77
2006 2 3 3 8 73
2007 1 5 4 10 73
2008 2 4 6 12 71
2009 4 6 8 18 66
2010 8 6 10 24 60
2011 7 9 12 28 56
2012 9 12 12 33 51
2013 12 16 15 43 41
2014 12 25 18 55 29
2015 12 27 20 59 23
2016 10 29 20 59 21
Panel A: Sample BHCs - N. by year, by regulatory size group in year t (i.e., Size t )




Panel B: N. BHCs with RC = 1 by year, by regul. size group in year t (i.e., Size t )
n. BHCs
per year
Table 1 Sample Distribution: Number of Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) by Size, 








Year < $10B $10↔50B ≥ $50B
2004 0 1 0 1 80
2005 1 1 2 4 77
2006 1 3 4 8 73
2007 1 4 5 10 73
2008 1 5 6 12 71
2009 3 7 8 18 66
2010 6 8 10 24 60
2011 6 10 12 28 56
2012 7 14 12 33 51
2013 9 19 15 43 41
2014 12 25 18 55 29
2015 13 26 20 59 23
2016 14 25 20 59 21
RC  = 1 for a given bank-year observation if the BHC has a standalone risk committee with 
responsibility for overseeing the enterprise-wide risk management function of the entire organization. 
Size  refers to average total consolidated assets, in billions, as of a given year-end in Panels A and B 
(and held constant, measured as of year-end 2014, in Panel C). See Table A.1 for a complete listing of 
each BHC included in the sample, along with the respective years where complete data is available for 
a given BHC.










 † Committee forms and scope of risk oversight were determined by reading disclosures/descriptions of the committee's substantive responsibilities. See 
Appendix Table A.2 for a examples of the various committee names within these categories.
Panel A: Risk Committee  Scope & Form †
Scope: None
Form: Standalone Standalone





2004 14 39 6 11 7 - 1
2005 13 36 6 13 8 - 4
2006 11 35 5 12 9 2 8
2007 9 36 5 11 10 2 10
2008 9 32 5 11 13 1 12
2009 7 20 6 12 19 2 18
2010 2 8 12 10 21 7 24
2011 2 5 11 9 21 8 28
2012 2 3 10 6 21 9 33
2013 1 2 8 3 16 11 43
2014 - 1 7 - 11 10 55
2015 - - 6 - 9 8 59
2016 - - 5 - 8 8 59
Type A B C D E F G
Multi-Function Multi-Function
Some Risk Oversight Enterprise-wide
Table 2 Evolution of Large U.S. Bank Holding Companies’ Board Risk Oversight Practices, Risk Management, 








∆CEO = 1 if the current CEO's tenure is < 1 year
Dual CEO = 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the Board
Indep Bd Ldrshp = 1 if the Chairman of the Board is an independent director, or  if the board has a credible Lead Independent Director
Board Size (n. Tot) = Weighted average total number of board members serving during the current fiscal year
Board Indep (% ) = Weighted average total number of independent directors divided by Board Size
n. New Ind Dir, ≤ 1 yr = the number of independent directors with directorship tenure of 1 year or less
n. New Ind Dir, ≤ 2 yrs = the number of independent directors with directorship tenure of 1 year or less
n. Ind Bd, FS Exper = the number of independent directors with recent, relevant financial services experience
n. Ind Bd, RM Exper = the number of independent directors with risk management experience (but not necessarily expertise )
# of Bd Mtgs = # of Board meetings, regular and special, held during the current fiscal year
Panel B:  Board-level Governance Changes







n. New Ind 
Dir, ≤ 1 yr
n. New Ind 
Dir, ≤ 2 yrs
n. Ind Bd, 
FS Exper
n. Ind Bd, 
RM Exper
# of Bd 
Mtgs
2004 7.7% 56.4% 22.0% 13.77 77.3% 0.94 1.67 2.14 1.49 8.60
2005 7.5% 55.0% 26.8% 13.28 77.8% 0.78 1.73 2.16 1.69 9.63
2006 11.1% 59.3% 25.6% 12.93 77.2% 0.54 1.33 2.20 1.74 8.80
2007 12.0% 55.4% 31.3% 13.19 78.2% 0.89 1.45 2.43 1.93 8.89
2008 10.8% 55.4% 36.1% 13.12 78.7% 0.70 1.52 2.57 2.01 10.50
2009 6.0% 54.8% 48.8% 12.86 80.0% 0.63 1.35 2.85 2.37 11.39
2010 10.7% 52.4% 63.1% 12.74 80.7% 0.69 1.32 3.01 2.70 10.32
2011 6.0% 51.2% 71.4% 12.55 81.8% 0.70 1.36 3.19 2.99 9.94
2012 2.4% 53.6% 76.2% 12.55 81.9% 0.79 1.46 3.25 3.23 9.74
2013 4.8% 57.1% 82.1% 12.52 81.8% 0.82 1.56 3.23 3.48 9.79
2014 4.8% 58.3% 83.3% 12.65 82.6% 0.76 1.51 3.40 3.75 9.87
2015 2.4% 58.5% 86.6% 12.79 83.5% 0.90 1.68 3.77 4.07 9.16




Table 2 Continued 
 
Panel C Legend:
Cmte refers to the primary committee that oversees risk.
Cmte Size (n. Tot) = Weighted average total number of board members serving on Cmte during the current fiscal year
Cmte Indep (% ) = Weighted average total number of independent directors serving on Cmte during the current fiscal year, divided by Cmte Size
n. Cmte, Ind FS Exper = the number of independent Cmte members with recent, relevant financial services experience
n. Cmte, Indep RME =  the number of independent directors on the Cmte that qualify as risk management experts (RME)
n. Cmte, Tot RME = the number of directors on the Cmte, whether or not independent, that qualify as risk management experts (RME)
n. Cmte, New Ind RME = the number of "new" indep. directors on the Cmte that qualify as risk management experts (RME); "new" = board tenure < 2 years
CEO is Cmte Mbr = 1 if the current CEO is a member of Cmte
Cmte has Charter = 1 if the Cmte charter - and its availablility/accessibility to the public - is discussed within disclosures
# Cmte Mtgs = # of Cmte meetings, regular and special, held during the current fiscal year
Risk Resp Unclear = 1 if the primary committee responsible for risk oversight is not apparent (i.e., ≥ 1 other committee could be the "risk" committee)
‡ Information in Panel C is reported for the primary committee with risk oversight responsibilities ("Cmte"), as long as the members, meetings, and other 
information for that particular committee are discloed/available. In other words, the figures are not conditioned upon the type of committee that oversees risk. 






















2004 31.8% 4.79 93.9% 0.97 0.13 0.27 0.06 9.7% 93.6% 8.84
2005 34.9% 4.70 93.1% 0.97 0.13 0.27 0.06 9.4% 93.8% 8.97
2006 33.3% 4.60 92.8% 1.12 0.18 0.35 0.04 10.1% 94.1% 8.79
2007 26.8% 4.76 93.9% 1.28 0.24 0.42 0.14 9.9% 93.0% 9.04
2008 26.4% 4.86 93.7% 1.38 0.29 0.53 0.14 12.5% 90.3% 8.46
2009 24.7% 4.95 93.2% 1.45 0.42 0.69 0.18 14.3% 83.1% 8.29
2010 29.5% 4.96 93.3% 1.58 0.49 0.74 0.21 15.4% 83.3% 8.40
2011 30.4% 5.09 92.3% 1.73 0.58 0.84 0.18 16.5% 82.3% 7.81
2012 27.9% 5.03 92.1% 1.65 0.67 0.92 0.23 16.5% 84.8% 7.56
2013 19.0% 5.10 93.0% 1.76 0.85 1.10 0.29 15.2% 84.8% 7.67
2014 11.3% 5.20 93.4% 2.03 0.98 1.28 0.33 15.0% 90.0% 7.61
2015 10.0% 5.53 93.7% 2.26 1.18 1.49 0.26 17.5% 91.3% 7.59
























2004 7.7% 34.6% 30.5% 25.6% 5.1% 47.4% 17.1%
2005 16.3% 46.3% 41.5% 35.0% 6.3% 40.0% 13.4%
2006 13.4% 51.2% 47.6% 39.0% 8.5% 39.0% 9.8%
2007 24.1% 57.8% 53.0% 45.8% 8.4% 33.7% 8.4%
2008 14.5% 63.9% 59.0% 51.8% 15.7% 30.1% 6.0%
2009 19.0% 70.2% 65.5% 56.0% 23.8% 25.0% 4.8%
2010 15.5% 76.2% 71.4% 59.5% 39.3% 21.4% 2.4%
2011 14.3% 81.0% 78.6% 69.0% 46.4% 17.9% 1.2%
2012 14.3% 85.7% 82.1% 71.4% 51.2% 13.1% 1.2%
2013 17.9% 89.3% 82.1% 79.8% 56.0% 9.5% 1.2%
2014 17.9% 92.9% 90.5% 85.7% 67.9% 7.1% 0.0%
2015 17.1% 95.1% 92.7% 90.2% 72.0% 4.9% 0.0%
2016 25.0% 96.3% 92.5% 90.0% 77.5% 3.8% 0.0%
Panel D Legend:
EW = Enterprise-wide, and is included here to delineate between a "true" CRO and a "silo-type" risk manager
New EW CRO (∆) = 1 if the current CRO's tenure is < 1 year
CRO with EW Remit = if the current CRO oversees all risks/the entire risk management function
Dedicated EW CRO = 1 if CRO with EW Remit equals 1 and  risk management is the individual's sole job function
CRO is Exec = 1 if CRO with EW Remit  equals 1 and  the person is listed as a member of the executive team
CRO repts to Bd/RC = 1 if CRO with EW Remit  equals 1 and  the CRO reports directly to either the Cmte or the full board
Silo-type Risk Mgr = 1 if CRO with EW Remit=0 , but there is a risk manager with a more narrow scope of responsibility (e.g., Chief Credit Officer)






(1) (2) (3) (4)
Risk Proxy N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean
TailRisk 434 0.058 53 0.078 (0.020) *** 259 0.038 239 0.036 0.002 *
RetVol 434 0.028 53 0.037 (0.009) *** 259 0.018 239 0.017 0.001 **
ROAvol 439 (7.282) 53 (6.367) (0.915) *** 259 (7.629) 239 (7.874) 0.244 ***
EBLLPvol 439 (7.093) 53 (6.502) (0.592) *** 259 (7.366) 239 (7.607) 0.241 ***
NIMvol 439 (8.006) 53 (7.889) (0.117) 259 (8.278) 239 (8.384) 0.106
RWA 443 0.746 53 0.768 (0.022) 259 0.716 239 0.741 (0.025) **
Texas Ratio 430 0.194 48 0.328 (0.134) *** 251 0.160 221 0.156 0.004
Tier1Levg 443 9.103 53 9.325 (0.222) 259 9.930 239 9.825 0.104
LevgRatio 443 11.875 53 11.878 (0.004) 259 13.506 239 12.927 0.578 **
Tier1/AT 443 8.656 53 8.811 (0.156) 259 9.474 239 9.415 0.059
TotCap 443 13.943 53 14.331 (0.388) 259 15.089 239 14.784 0.305
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Controls N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean
Assets ($ bn) 443 100.321 53 77.844 22.477 259 130.690 239 144.687 (13.997)
aSize 443 16.398 53 17.450 (1.052) *** 259 16.597 239 17.379 (0.781) ***
mSize 433 1.329 53 1.755 (0.426) ** 259 1.263 239 1.852 (0.588) ***
pretaxRORWA 443 0.017 53 0.006 0.011 *** 259 0.018 239 0.018 0.000
Loss 443 0.079 53 0.302 (0.223) *** 259 0.062 239 0.029 0.032 *
NonInt_Ratio 443 0.236 53 0.282 (0.047) ** 259 0.260 239 0.292 (0.032) **
ALLL>NPL 443 (0.007) 53 (0.023) 0.016 *** 259 (0.014) 239 (0.014) 0.000
HighTrdgDum 443 0.054 53 0.038 0.016 259 0.073 239 0.033 0.040 **
SubordDebt/Eq 443 0.212 53 0.277 (0.065) *** 259 0.146 239 0.128 0.018 **
FamFdrOwnshp 437 0.066 53 0.009 0.057 *** 259 0.067 239 0.014 0.053 ***
CEO_Tenure 436 8.716 53 8.717 (0.001) 259 10.734 239 10.615 0.119
TARP Issuance 443 0.029 53 0.078 (0.049) *** - - - - -
Deposits/Loans 443 1.197 53 1.278 (0.080) 259 1.277 239 1.566 (0.289) **
LLPvsCHO 443 0.765 53 0.830 (0.065) 259 0.421 239 0.351 0.069
MVE/RegCap 433 1.755 53 1.198 0.558 *** 259 1.347 239 1.304 0.042
LoanGrowth 443 0.015 53 (0.019) 0.034 ** 259 0.003 239 0.008 (0.006)
C&I Loans 443 0.123 53 0.150 (0.028) *** 259 0.116 239 0.141 (0.025) ***
RealEst Loans 443 0.434 53 0.405 0.029 259 0.403 239 0.384 0.020
Slack 443 0.215 53 0.220 (0.004) 259 0.232 239 0.226 0.006






(1) - (2) (3) - (4)
0 vs. 1
The variable aSize  refers to the log of total assets, and mSize  refers to the log of the market value of equity. All other variables are defined in Appendix B.
Notes:  This table presents, for the full sample of BHCs, the means and for all dependent and control variables used in this study. Tests of mean differences 
across the pre- and post-2010 periods, by RC presence, are also presented . RC  equals 1 if the BHC has a standalone, enterprise risk committee at the 
board-level in year t , and zero otherwise. Asterisks indicate statistical significance of tests of the difference in means (*** p  < 0.01, ** p  < 0.05, * p  < 
0.01). Unconditional summary statistics can be found in Appendix D (see Table D.1).
Difference Difference
RC = 0 RC = 1 RC = 0 RC = 1
Difference Difference
RC = 1RC = 0 RC = 0 RC = 1
(5) - (6)






Panel A: TailRisk t+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RC it 0.013 0.008 0.054 0.071 0.071 0.228
[0.123] [0.123] [0.167] [0.154] [0.155] [0.243]
DF it 0.118 0.182 0.039 0.189
[0.136] [0.169] [0.139] [0.183]
RCxDF it -0.124 -0.312
[0.179] [0.233]
Control Variables (a)
Size (b) 0.025 0.012 0.013 0.102 0.100 0.101
[0.063] [0.071] [0.070] [0.089] [0.093] [0.093]
SizeSq (b) -0.028 -0.024 -0.019 -0.164 -0.163 -0.149
[0.088] [0.088] [0.088] [0.109] [0.109] [0.110]
pretaxRoRWA -28.962*** -28.859*** -28.820*** -27.933*** -27.901*** -27.873***
[4.185] [4.206] [4.229] [5.391] [5.426] [5.488]
NonInt_Ratio -0.707 -0.705 -0.704 -1.281** -1.281** -1.306**
[0.511] [0.512] [0.514] [0.592] [0.592] [0.593]
NonInt_RatioSq 0.163*** 0.161** 0.165*** 0.104 0.104 0.109
[0.061] [0.061] [0.060] [0.080] [0.080] [0.080]
ALLL>NPL -11.031** -11.094** -11.089** -11.169** -11.188** -10.908**
[4.250] [4.216] [4.230] [5.005] [5.011] [5.146]
HighTrdgDum 0.266 0.288 0.268 0.368 0.369 0.322
[0.364] [0.365] [0.360] [0.388] [0.389] [0.379]
SubordDebt/Eq 0.602 0.628 0.635 0.451 0.455 0.455
[0.587] [0.588] [0.592] [0.732] [0.735] [0.738]
FamFdrOwnshp -0.841** -0.850** -0.846** -0.750 -0.753 -0.750
[0.332] [0.340] [0.346] [0.465] [0.465] [0.474]
CEO_Tenure -0.137* -0.138* -0.137* -0.218** -0.218** -0.218**
[0.070] [0.070] [0.070] [0.091] [0.091] [0.093]
TARP Issuance 9.363*** 9.396*** 9.367*** 10.223*** 10.227*** 10.138***
[1.536] [1.545] [1.540] [1.846] [1.848] [1.848]
Constant 3.572*** 3.776*** 3.757*** 2.287 2.320 2.307
[0.976] [1.103] [1.100] [1.376] [1.438] [1.448]
Observations 982 982 982 693 693 693
R 2 0.8351 0.8352 0.8352 0.8457 0.8457 0.8461
Adj. R 2 0.8311 0.8311 0.8309 0.8404 0.8402 0.8403
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Full Sample DFBanks, Only




Table 4 Continued 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RC it 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.010
[0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.013]
DF it 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.010
[0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.009]
RCxDF it -0.004 -0.012
[0.009] [0.012]
Size (b) -0.006* -0.007* -0.007* -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
SizeSq (b) -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
pretaxRoRWA -1.336*** -1.323*** -1.322*** -1.198*** -1.193*** -1.193***
[0.239] [0.243] [0.244] [0.313] [0.316] [0.317]
NonInt_Ratio -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.047 -0.048 -0.049
[0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030]
NonInt_RatioSq 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.005 0.005 0.006
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
ALLL>NPL -0.601** -0.600** -0.599** -0.655** -0.656** -0.644**
[0.239] [0.235] [0.236] [0.297] [0.296] [0.301]
HighTrdgDum 0.029** 0.030** 0.029** 0.031** 0.031** 0.029**
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
SubordDebt/Eq 0.041 0.042 0.042 0.038 0.038 0.038
[0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.034] [0.034] [0.035]
FamFdrOwnshp -0.036** -0.037** -0.036** -0.028 -0.029 -0.029
[0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
CEO_Tenure -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005]
TARP Issuance 0.484*** 0.485*** 0.484*** 0.518*** 0.518*** 0.515***
[0.067] [0.067] [0.066] [0.079] [0.079] [0.078]
Constant 0.200*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.194*** 0.194*** 0.194***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
Observations 981 981 981 693 693 693
R 2 0.8499 0.8500 0.8500 0.8551 0.8552 0.8554
Adj. R 2 0.8463 0.8462 0.8461 0.8502 0.8500 0.8500
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes:  All control variables are measured in year t , subscripts omitted. Robust standard errors, clustered by BHC, are presented in 
brackets. All regressions include year fixed effects; coefficients not reported. Asterisks indicate statistical significance (*** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1); all tests are two-tailed. TailRisk  is the average of the lowest 5% of the bank's daily returns over the 
preceding 12 months, times negative one. RetVol  is the standard deviation of the bank's daily returns over the preceding 12 
months. In order to present more discernible coefficients, I multiply TailRisk  by 100, and RetVol  by 10, for all tests. In the 
TailRisk  regressions, Size  (SizeSq ) is measured as the natural log of total ending assets (orthogonalized square of Size ). In the 
RetVol  regressions, I instead use mSize  (mSizeSq ), measured as the natural log of market value of equity (orthogonalized square 
of mSize ). All other variables are defined in Appendix B.
Panel B: RetVol i,t+1
Control Variables (a)








Panel A : Earnings Volatility = ROAvol
Risk Proxy:
RC it -0.095 -0.026 -0.161 -0.064 -0.098 0.035 -0.194 -0.036
[0.110] [0.120] [0.124] [0.135] [0.121] [0.131] [0.120] [0.130]
DF it -0.125 -0.029 -0.024 0.022
[0.161] [0.156] [0.268] [0.242]
RCxDF it -0.175 -0.281 -0.269 -0.351*
[0.208] [0.194] [0.217] [0.199]
Size (b) -0.007 0.018 0.037 0.055 0.030 0.037 0.088 0.097
[0.039] [0.043] [0.040] [0.045] [0.069] [0.069] [0.070] [0.070]
SizeSq (b) -0.133*** -0.134*** -0.113* -0.108* -0.133 -0.125 -0.169 -0.159
[0.050] [0.048] [0.059] [0.057] [0.091] [0.087] [0.104] [0.101]
Loss 1.330*** 1.315*** 0.810*** 0.796*** 1.337*** 1.330*** 0.790*** 0.780***
[0.139] [0.142] [0.165] [0.166] [0.162] [0.166] [0.176] [0.178]
NonInt_Ratio 0.543 0.550 0.324 0.340 0.384 0.372 0.270 0.259
[0.364] [0.356] [0.359] [0.348] [0.474] [0.463] [0.463] [0.447]
NonInt_RatioSq 0.137*** 0.146*** 0.180*** 0.191*** 0.104 0.109 0.128* 0.136*
[0.047] [0.047] [0.052] [0.052] [0.067] [0.066] [0.073] [0.072]
ALLL>NPL -7.897*** -7.671*** -5.998* -5.817* -7.987*** -7.617** -8.436** -8.017**
[2.365] [2.428] [3.150] [3.267] [2.824] [2.974] [3.640] [3.867]
SubordDebt/Eq -0.071 -0.145 0.003 -0.042 -0.139 -0.171 -0.057 -0.092
[0.348] [0.360] [0.380] [0.395] [0.448] [0.442] [0.499] [0.503]
HighTrdgDum 0.641*** 0.564** 0.376 0.295 0.489* 0.442 0.291 0.228
[0.229] [0.238] [0.253] [0.262] [0.273] [0.275] [0.303] [0.307]
CEO_Tenure -0.039 -0.035 -0.008 -0.006 -0.030 -0.031 -0.020 -0.022
[0.050] [0.049] [0.058] [0.058] [0.061] [0.061] [0.067] [0.068]
FamFdrOwnshp -0.350* -0.341 -0.262 -0.252 -0.276 -0.266 -0.248 -0.237
[0.206] [0.214] [0.226] [0.227] [0.224] [0.222] [0.294] [0.291]
MVE/Reg.Capital -0.325*** -0.347*** -0.315*** -0.330*** -0.351*** -0.362*** -0.307*** -0.320***
[0.102] [0.103] [0.097] [0.098] [0.108] [0.104] [0.111] [0.111]
Constant -7.278*** -7.629*** -7.843*** -8.104*** -7.755*** -7.848*** -8.641*** -8.736***
[0.658] [0.696] [0.669] [0.715] [1.118] [1.110] [1.128] [1.110]
Observations 977 977 897 897 690 690 634 634
R 2 0.4760 0.4796 0.3977 0.4012 0.4975 0.5005 0.4234 0.4279
Adj. R 2 0.4634 0.4659 0.3826 0.3847 0.4802 0.4817 0.4027 0.4053
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Full Sample DF Banks, Only
ROAvol, it+1 ROAvol, it+2 ROAvol, it+1 ROAvol, it+2
Control Variables (a)




Table 5 Continued 
 
 
Panel B:  Earnings Volatility = EBLLPvol
Risk Proxy:
RC it -0.099 -0.047 -0.090 -0.007 -0.142 -0.093 -0.185 -0.109
[0.102] [0.111] [0.116] [0.124] [0.123] [0.135] [0.126] [0.138]
DF it -0.107 -0.046 -0.173 -0.136
[0.156] [0.165] [0.246] [0.238]
RCxDF it -0.129 -0.240 -0.101 -0.171
[0.188] [0.182] [0.198] [0.187]
Constant -7.380*** -7.662*** -7.743*** -7.994*** -7.699*** -7.833*** -8.216*** -8.355***
[0.658] [0.689] [0.711] [0.771] [1.018] [1.018] [1.127] [1.134]
Observations 977 977 897 897 690 690 634 634
R 2 0.3465 0.3494 0.2753 0.2791 0.3745 0.3768 0.3021 0.3052
Adj. R 2 0.3307 0.3323 0.2571 0.2592 0.3529 0.3533 0.2770 0.2778
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Panel C:  Earnings Volatility = NIMvol
Risk Proxy:
RC it 0.013 0.053 0.002 0.036 0.035 0.121 0.002 0.057
[0.085] [0.102] [0.094] [0.114] [0.098] [0.128] [0.103] [0.137]
DF it 0.024 0.072 -0.022 -0.070
[0.121] [0.131] [0.178] [0.176]
RCxDF it -0.106 -0.103 -0.172 -0.123
[0.136] [0.144] [0.151] [0.163]
Constant -8.483*** -8.544*** -8.348*** -8.331*** -8.907*** -8.970*** -9.093*** -9.175***
[0.555] [0.572] [0.525] [0.549] [1.029] [1.016] [0.960] [0.951]
Observations 977 977 897 897 690 690 634 634
R 2 0.1784 0.1794 0.1930 0.1938 0.1812 0.1842 0.1912 0.1936
Adj. R 2 0.1586 0.1578 0.1727 0.1716 0.1529 0.1535 0.1621 0.1618
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
NIMvol, it+2
EBLLPvol, it+1 EBLLPvol, it+2
Full Sample DF Banks, Only
EBLLPvol, it+1 EBLLPvol, it+2
Size  (SizeSq ) is measured as the natural log of total ending assets (orthogonalized square of Size ). ROAvol  (EBLLPvol ) [NimVol ] is the 
standard deviation of 8 rolling quarters, ended in the last quarter of year t + 1, of return on assets (earnings before taxes and loan loss 
provisions) [net interest margin]. All earnings volatility proxies are logged before inclusion in the regressions. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix B.
Full Sample DF Banks, Only
NIMvol, it+1 NIMvol, it+2
Notes:  All explanatory variables are measured in year t , subscripts omitted. All regressions include year fixed effects; coefficients not reported 
for brevity. The regressions in Panels B and C were estimated with the full set of control variables shown in Panel A; coefficient estimates 
omitted for brevity. Robust standard errors, clustered by BHC, are presented in brackets. Asterisks indicate statistical significance






Panel A:  Risk-weighted Assets (RWA i,t+1 )
RC it -0.008 0.005 -0.001 0.006
[0.012] [0.008] [0.015] [0.009]
DF it -0.046*** -0.021** -0.035 -0.020
[0.016] [0.010] [0.026] [0.014]
RCxDF it 0.006 -0.014* -0.002 -0.015*
[0.014] [0.008] [0.015] [0.009]
Size (b) 0.016*** 0.012 0.017** 0.007
[0.006] [0.014] [0.007] [0.017]
NonInt_Ratio 0.039 -0.046 0.063 -0.042
[0.047] [0.043] [0.053] [0.053]
C&I Loans 1.093*** 0.760*** 1.162*** 0.776***
[0.112] [0.148] [0.127] [0.169]
RealEst Loans 0.438*** 0.365*** 0.411*** 0.341***
[0.103] [0.115] [0.116] [0.126]
CEO_Tenure 0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.001
[0.006] [0.003] [0.007] [0.004]
Slack -0.093 -0.196** -0.136 -0.202*
[0.096] [0.090] [0.110] [0.103]
SubordDebt/Eq 0.177*** 0.072** 0.163** 0.093**
[0.055] [0.035] [0.065] [0.041]
NPLoans/TotLoans 0.050 -0.329** 0.074 -0.205
[0.214] [0.139] [0.260] [0.174]
Constant 0.174 0.384 0.150 0.473
[0.146] [0.256] [0.183] [0.309]
Observations 971 971 686 686
Number of BHCs 82 82 58 58
R 2 0.6992 0.5137 0.7353 0.5133
Adj. R 2 0.6922 0.5024 0.7265 0.4972
Year FE YES YES YES YES
BHC FE NO YES NO YES
Full Sample DF Banks, Only
Year FE
Year & 








Table 6 Continued 
Panel B:  Texas Ratio i,t+1
RC it 0.018 0.021 0.041 0.068
[0.025] [0.033] [0.031] [0.046]
DF it -0.022 -0.015
[0.014] [0.024]
RCxDF it -0.006 -0.055
[0.026] [0.035]
Size (b) 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.012 0.013*
[0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008]
SizeSq (b) 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.008
[0.010] [0.010] [0.012] [0.011]
pretaxRORWA -0.012 0.001 -0.554 -0.536
[0.513] [0.517] [0.584] [0.586]
Deposits/Loans -0.099*** -0.097*** -0.089*** -0.091***
[0.022] [0.021] [0.022] [0.021]
LLPvsCHO 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.032***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010]
SubordDebt/Eq -0.091 -0.099 -0.112 -0.119
[0.074] [0.074] [0.103] [0.102]
CEO_Tenure 0.000 0.001 -0.003 -0.004
[0.011] [0.011] [0.014] [0.014]
FamFdrOwnshp -0.033 -0.034 -0.064 -0.061
[0.037] [0.037] [0.052] [0.052]
TARP Issuance 0.217** 0.206** 0.113 0.091
[0.098] [0.098] [0.084] [0.082]
MVE/Reg.Capital -0.046* -0.049* -0.058 -0.059
[0.026] [0.026] [0.038] [0.038]
Constant 0.064 0.030 0.170 0.157
[0.107] [0.110] [0.207] [0.208]
Observations 941 941 660 660
R 2 0.3918 0.3939 0.4066 0.4138
Adj. R 2 0.3772 0.3780 0.3861 0.3916
Year FE YES YES YES YES
The dependent variable in Panel A is RWA,  or the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets. The dependent variable in 
Panel B is the TexasRatio, as defined in Appendix B but set to missing if a BHC's ratio of loans to assets is in the bottom 4% 
of the sample. Size  (SizeSq ) is measured as the natural log of total ending assets (orthogonalized square of Size ). All other 
variables are defined in Appendix B.
Notes:  All explanatory variables are measured in year t , subscripts omitted for brevity. Robust standard errors, clustered by 
BHC, are presented in brackets.  Asterisks indicate statistical significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1); all tests are two-
tailed. 
Control Variables (a)






Panel A:  Leverage Ratio (LevgRatio) and Tier 1 Leverage Ratio (Tier1Levg)
Full Sample DF Banks, Only Full Sample DF Banks, Only
RC it 0.098 -0.238 0.177 0.027
[0.329] [0.317] [0.277] [0.313]
DF it 0.476 0.709 -0.088 -0.289
[0.516] [0.529] [0.415] [0.375]
RCxDF it -0.117 0.089 0.188 0.246
[0.413] [0.414] [0.331] [0.364]
Size (b) -0.761*** -0.429** -0.508*** -0.173
[0.165] [0.164] [0.164] [0.120]
SizeSq (b) 0.208 0.285 0.121 0.123
[0.164] [0.195] [0.169] [0.141]
pretaxRORWA 38.522** 14.410 25.034** 8.031
[15.187] [13.514] [10.935] [8.589]
LoanGrowth 5.752* 4.962 2.435** 1.853
[3.278] [3.965] [1.170] [1.312]
NonInt_Ratio 5.190*** 1.029 3.370* -0.854
[1.659] [0.927] [1.697] [1.188]
NonInt_RatioSq 0.896*** 0.219 0.705*** 0.037
[0.218] [0.197] [0.231] [0.171]
Deposits/Loans 0.137 0.505*** -0.600*** -0.206*
[0.113] [0.082] [0.214] [0.103]
ALLL>NPL -16.208** -18.898** -3.583 -2.176
[6.696] [7.523] [4.293] [3.528]
HighTrdgDum 2.093** 0.077 -0.223 -2.052***
[0.819] [0.512] [0.991] [0.435]
SubordDebt/Eq -3.909*** -4.966*** 0.914 -0.074
[1.302] [1.614] [1.092] [1.079]
FamFdrOwnshp 0.369 0.143 -0.476 -0.599
[0.881] [1.042] [0.443] [0.364]
MVE/RegCapital -0.866*** -0.767** -0.911*** -1.133***
[0.255] [0.349] [0.279] [0.242]
Constant 22.742*** 18.560*** 17.904*** 14.171***
[2.455] [2.956] [2.511] [1.959]
Observations 982 694 982 694
R 2 0.5161 0.4104 0.4014 0.3680
Adj. R 2 0.5029 0.3875 0.3851 0.3433
Year FE YES YES YES YES
LevgRatio i,t+1 Tier1Levg i,t+1
Control Variables (a)




Table 7 Continued 
Panel B: Tier 1 Ratio (Tier1/AT) and Total Capital Ratio (TotCap)
Full Sample DF Banks, Only Full Sample DF Banks, Only
RC it 0.177 0.027 0.029 -0.401
[0.277] [0.313] [0.350] [0.395]
DF it -0.088 -0.289 0.134 0.393
[0.415] [0.375] [0.517] [0.573]
RCxDF it 0.188 0.246 0.132 0.421
[0.331] [0.364] [0.445] [0.502]
Size (b) -0.508*** -0.173 -0.421** -0.046
[0.164] [0.120] [0.171] [0.179]
SizeSq (b) 0.121 0.123 0.074 0.086
[0.169] [0.141] [0.159] [0.199]
pretaxRORWA 25.034** 8.031 36.317** 10.915
[10.935] [8.589] [14.649] [12.646]
LoanGrowth 2.435** 1.853 4.905 3.995
[1.170] [1.312] [3.299] [4.007]
NonInt_Ratio 3.370* -0.854 5.142*** 0.745
[1.697] [1.188] [1.703] [1.024]
NonInt_RatioSq 0.705*** 0.037 0.801*** 0.114
[0.231] [0.171] [0.221] [0.195]
Deposits/Loans -0.600*** -0.206* 0.065 0.443***
[0.214] [0.103] [0.121] [0.075]
ALLL>NPL -3.583 -2.176 -13.327** -14.904**
[4.293] [3.528] [5.519] [6.388]
HighTrdgDum -0.223 -2.052*** 2.127** 0.179
[0.991] [0.435] [0.819] [0.540]
SubordDebt/Eq 0.914 -0.074 -1.046 -1.862
[1.092] [1.079] [1.417] [1.752]
FamFdrOwnshp -0.476 -0.599 0.380 0.238
[0.443] [0.364] [0.706] [0.799]
MVE/RegCapital -0.911*** -1.133*** -1.018*** -0.865**
[0.279] [0.242] [0.257] [0.359]
Constant 17.904*** 14.171*** 19.529*** 14.496***
[2.511] [1.959] [2.517] [3.147]
Observations 982 694 982 694
R 2 0.4014 0.3680 0.4327 0.3045
Adj. R 2 0.3851 0.3433 0.4172 0.2774
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Notes:  All explanatory variables are measured in year t , subscripts omitted for brevity. Robust standard errors, clustered by BHC, are 
presented in brackets.  Asterisks indicate statistical significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1); all tests are two-tailed. Size 
(SizeSq ) is measured as the natural log of total ending assets (orthogonalized square of Size ). All other variables are defined in 
Appendix B.







RC it 0.075 0.048 0.057 0.003 0.004 0.003
[0.166] [0.181] [0.178] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009]
DF it 0.196 0.169 0.249 0.007 0.020** 0.011
[0.167] [0.171] [0.173] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
RCxDF it -0.111 -0.114 -0.176 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004
[0.177] [0.222] [0.185] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009]
Constant 3.610*** -4.294 3.217* 0.202*** 0.173*** 0.205***
[1.227] [5.102] [1.676] [0.014] [0.032] [0.015]
Observations 966 738 913 965 737 912
R 2 0.8360 0.8432 0.8326 0.8505 0.8605 0.8472
Adj. R 2 0.8278 0.8278 0.8278 0.8429 0.8429 0.8429
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes:  Robust standard errors, clustered by BHC, are presented in brackets.  All explanatory variables are measured in year t , subscripts omitted for 
revity. Coefficients on control variables and year fixed effects (Year FE) are omitted for brevity. Asterisks indicate statistical significance (*** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1); all tests are two-tailed. TailRisk  is the average of the lowest 5% of the bank's daily returns over the preceding 12 months, 
multiplied by negative one. RetVol  is the standard deviation of the bank's daily returns over the preceding 12 months. In order to present more 
discernible coefficients, I multiply TailRisk  by 100, and RetVol  by 10, for all tests. All other variables are defined in Appendix B.















Balanced Sample  refers to sample BHCs with at least 11 observations (out of 13 possible bank-year observations).
Ever $50bn  = 1 if a BHC ever crosses $50 billion in total assets.
GSIB  stands for Global Systemically Important Bank. This designation is assigned by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and it applies 
to 8 of the largest U.S. financial institutions, 6 of which are in my sample: Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, 
State Street, and Wells Fargo. In this restriction, all sample years are dropped for these 6 BHCs.








Panel A: Risk Committees & Market Risk, pre-Dodd-Frank (2004-2010) & Crisis (2006-2009)
Risk Proxy:
2004-2010 2006-2009 2004-2010 2006-2009 2004-2010 2006-2009 2004-2010 2006-2009
RC it 0.206 0.573 0.235 0.533 0.007 0.025 0.006 0.026
[0.297] [0.497] [0.335] [0.576] [0.015] [0.024] [0.018] [0.029]
Control Variables (a)
Size (b) 0.072 0.315* 0.197 0.538** -0.007 0.000 -0.001 0.006
[0.115] [0.173] [0.125] [0.213] [0.006] [0.009] [0.007] [0.010]
SizeSq (b) 0.140 0.074 -0.096 -0.340 -0.002 -0.010 -0.009 -0.018*
[0.126] [0.203] [0.158] [0.296] [0.005] [0.008] [0.006] [0.010]
pretaxRoRWA -31.419*** -40.701*** -29.112*** -37.869*** -1.486*** -1.686** -1.326*** -1.437**
[6.802] [14.356] [7.065] [12.670] [0.372] [0.701] [0.414] [0.660]
NonInt_Ratio -0.989 -0.595 -2.131** -2.578 -0.027 -0.014 -0.074 -0.064
[0.879] [1.489] [1.055] [2.230] [0.047] [0.077] [0.059] [0.121]
NonInt_RatioSq 0.186 0.305 0.082 0.111 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.004
[0.129] [0.197] [0.186] [0.381] [0.006] [0.009] [0.009] [0.019]
ALLL>NPL -20.682*** -28.190** -17.552** -20.842 -1.243*** -2.129*** -1.226** -2.230***
[7.483] [11.059] [7.227] [12.898] [0.471] [0.447] [0.528] [0.508]
HighTrdgDum -0.325 -0.345 -0.128 0.020 0.020 0.036 0.022 0.038
[0.677] [0.944] [0.639] [0.937] [0.022] [0.037] [0.019] [0.036]
SubordDebt/Eq 0.470 1.242 0.395 1.282 0.036 0.068 0.036 0.078
[0.778] [1.203] [0.905] [1.375] [0.034] [0.050] [0.040] [0.059]
FamFdrOwnshp -1.171** -1.915** -0.788 -1.234 -0.051* -0.068 -0.023 -0.033
[0.474] [0.856] [0.646] [1.242] [0.026] [0.044] [0.031] [0.058]
CEO_Tenure -0.167 -0.357** -0.281** -0.517** -0.009* -0.017** -0.013** -0.020**
[0.106] [0.167] [0.129] [0.220] [0.005] [0.008] [0.006] [0.010]
TARP Issuance 8.624*** 8.057*** 9.537*** 8.390*** 0.459*** 0.441*** 0.493*** 0.441***
[1.557] [1.664] [1.868] [1.917] [0.067] [0.080] [0.079] [0.096]
Constant 3.046* 0.957 1.155 -2.656 0.210*** 0.257*** 0.203*** 0.233***
[1.774] [2.648] [1.958] [3.404] [0.018] [0.025] [0.025] [0.040]
Observations 484 244 344 173 483 244 344 173
R 2 0.8166 0.7328 0.8357 0.7602 0.8339 0.7641 0.8460 0.7758
Adj. R 2 0.8099 0.7165 0.8271 0.7389 0.8279 0.7497 0.8380 0.7559
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
TailRisk i,t+1 RetVol i,t+1
Full Sample DF Banks, Only Full Sample DF Banks, Only










Panel B: RC_AltDef versus RC, 2004-2010
Risk Proxy:
RC_AltDef it -0.126 -0.316* -0.141 -0.399 -0.013 -0.023** -0.017 -0.031**
[0.196] [0.187] [0.254] [0.272] [0.010] [0.009] [0.013] [0.013]
RC it 0.457 0.544 0.025* 0.030
[0.301] [0.360] [0.015] [0.018]
Constant 3.032* 3.283* 1.009 1.345 0.211*** 0.213*** 0.200*** 0.202***
[1.725] [1.772] [1.875] [1.942] [0.018] [0.018] [0.025] [0.025]
Observations 484 484 344 344 483 483 344 344
R 2 0.8165 0.8173 0.8356 0.8366 0.8346 0.8357 0.8471 0.8485
Adj. R 2 0.8098 0.8102 0.8270 0.8276 0.8286 0.8294 0.8391 0.8401
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Panel C:  RC_AltDef versus RC, 2006-2009
Risk Proxy:
RC_AltDef it -0.128 -0.639** -0.013 -0.522 -0.014 -0.043*** -0.010 -0.043**
[0.337] [0.298] [0.407] [0.410] [0.017] [0.013] [0.022] [0.018]
RC it 1.093** 0.957 0.061*** 0.061**
[0.506] [0.644] [0.023] [0.029]
Constant 0.776 1.678 -3.137 -2.170 0.260*** 0.265*** 0.228*** 0.235***
[2.520] [2.610] [3.244] [3.386] [0.025] [0.024] [0.038] [0.038]
Observations 244 244 173 173 244 244 173 173
R 2 0.7308 0.7358 0.7583 0.7618 0.7632 0.7699 0.7743 0.7805
Adj. R 2 0.7144 0.7184 0.7369 0.7390 0.7487 0.7548 0.7543 0.7596
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
TailRisk i,t+1 RetVol i,t+1
Full Sample DF Banks, Only
Notes:  Robust standard errors, clustered by BHC, are presented in brackets. All explanatory variables are measured in year t,  subscripts omitted. All 
regressions include year fixed effects; coefficients not reported. Asterisks indicate statistical significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1); all tests are 
two-tailed. RC_AltDef  is equal to one if any committee of the board oversees enterprise-wide risk (this corresponds to committees that meet criteria for 
types E, F, and G in Table 2, Panel A, and equals one if any committee oversees enterprise-wide risk). All other variables are defined in Appendix B.
Full Sample DF Banks, Only
TailRisk i,t+1 RetVol i,t+1
Full Sample DF Banks, Only





Panel A: TailRisk t+1
Risk Proxy:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RC2 it -0.052 -0.064 0.040 -0.039 -0.039 0.183
[0.127] [0.128] [0.156] [0.163] [0.163] [0.218]
DF it 0.129 0.368** 0.037 0.391*
[0.134] [0.177] [0.140] [0.203]
RC2xDF it -0.366** -0.559**
[0.174] [0.218]
Constant 3.504*** 3.722*** 3.705*** 2.158 2.189 2.144
[0.965] [1.086] [1.085] [1.316] [1.381] [1.387]
Observations 982 982 982 693 693 693
R 2 0.8351 0.8352 0.8357 0.8457 0.8457 0.8467
Adj. R 2 0.8311 0.8311 0.8314 0.8404 0.8401 0.8410
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Panel B: RetVol t+1
Risk Proxy:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RC2 it -0.003 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.005
[0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.012]
DF it 0.007 0.015* 0.005 0.018*
[0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.010]
RC2xDF it -0.013 -0.020*
[0.008] [0.011]
Constant 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.193*** 0.193*** 0.194***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
Observations 981 981 981 693 693 693
R 2 0.8499 0.8501 0.8503 0.8551 0.8551 0.8557
Adj. R 2 YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE 0.8463 0.8463 0.8464 0.8501 0.8499 0.8503
Notes:  Robust standard errors, clustered by BHC, are presented in brackets. All regressions include control variables & year 
fixed effects; coefficients not reported. Asterisks indicate statistical significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1); all tests are 
two-tailed. TailRisk  is the average of the lowest 5% of the bank's daily returns over the preceding 12 months, multiplied by 
negative one. RetVol  is the standard deviation of the bank's daily returns over the preceding 12 months. In order to present more 
discernible coefficients, I multiply TailRisk  by 100, and RetVol  by 10, for all tests. All other variables are defined in Appendix B.
TailRisk i,t+1
Full Sample DF Banks, Only
RetVol i,t+1
Full Sample DFB Sample












Year N Mean Std.Dev. Min Median Max
2004 78 4.795 2.392 0 5 10
2005 79 5.316 2.570 0 6 11
2006 81 5.938 2.790 0 6 13
2007 83 6.518 2.965 0 6 14
2008 83 7.012 2.957 0 7 14
2009 84 7.940 3.148 0 8 14
2010 84 8.821 3.231 0 9 14
2011 84 9.595 3.478 0 10 15
2012 84 10.119 3.385 0 10 16
2013 84 10.917 3.129 0 11 16
2014 84 12.131 2.750 4 13 16
2015 82 12.793 2.438 7 13 16
2016 80 13.250 2.286 7 14 16
Full Period 1,070 8.885 3.990 0 9 16
2004-2010 572 6.654 3.160 0 7 14
2011-2016 498 11.448 3.234 0 12 16
Baseline RGI, by Year (Full Sample)
Note:  The RGI  statistics presented above are for the baseline RGI  (i.e., prior to scaling by the sample 
maximum score to form RGI1 ), as defined in Appendix E.1.








Panel A:  Dependent Variable = TailRisk i,t+1
RGI = RGI1 RGI4 RGI5 RGI1 RGI4 RGI5
RGI i,t -0.100 -0.071 0.061 0.323 0.193 0.377
[0.363] [0.273] [0.258] [0.577] [0.428] [0.380]
DF i,t 0.375 0.143 0.298* 0.646 0.219 0.354*
[0.359] [0.208] [0.175] [0.424] [0.262] [0.205]
RGIxDF i,t -0.344 -0.023 -0.376 -0.884 -0.361 -0.750**
[0.462] [0.305] [0.259] [0.554] [0.423] [0.353]
Constant 3.661*** 3.715*** 3.665*** 2.124 2.232 2.180
[1.081] [1.084] [1.093] [1.379] [1.395] [1.406]
Observations 981 981 981 692 692 692
R 2 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.846 0.846 0.847
Adj. R 2 0.831 0.831 0.832 0.841 0.840 0.841
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Panel B:  Dependent Variable = RetVol i,t+1
RGI = RGI1 RGI4 RGI5 RGI1 RGI4 RGI5
RGI i,t -0.001 -0.004 0.002 0.020 0.006 0.016
[0.017] [0.013] [0.012] [0.027] [0.021] [0.019]
DF i,t 0.015 0.003 0.010 0.029 0.006 0.013
[0.017] [0.010] [0.008] [0.020] [0.013] [0.010]
RGIxDF i,t -0.017 -0.001 -0.017 -0.043 -0.014 -0.033*
[0.022] [0.014] [0.012] [0.027] [0.021] [0.018]
Constant 0.204*** 0.206*** 0.203*** 0.120* 0.123* 0.121*
[0.049] [0.049] [0.050] [0.066] [0.067] [0.067]
Observations 981 981 981 692 692 692
R 2 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.856 0.855 0.856
Adj. R 2 0.845 0.845 0.845 0.850 0.850 0.851
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Full Sample DF Banks, Only
Full Sample DF Banks, Only




Table 12 Continued 
Panel C:  Dependent Variable = TexasRatio i,t+1
RGI = RGI1 RGI4 RGI5 RGI1 RGI4 RGI5
RGI i,t 0.023 -0.011 0.026 0.174** 0.065 0.107
[0.052] [0.051] [0.050] [0.078] [0.073] [0.072]
DF i,t -0.036 -0.031 -0.024 0.052 -0.009 -0.003
[0.034] [0.021] [0.017] [0.036] [0.026] [0.025]
RGIxDF i,t 0.014 0.014 -0.009 -0.142*** -0.073* -0.100**
[0.043] [0.033] [0.035] [0.044] [0.040] [0.047]
Constant 0.008 0.002 0.010 0.112 0.116 0.130
[0.112] [0.109] [0.111] [0.215] [0.208] [0.211]
Observations 937 937 937 656 656 656
R 2 0.395 0.394 0.395 0.420 0.408 0.417
Adj. R 2 0.379 0.378 0.379 0.398 0.386 0.395
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Panel D:  Dependent Variable = RWA i,t+1
RGI1 RGI4 RGI5 RGI1 RGI4 RGI5
RGI 0.042** 0.008 0.010 0.060** 0.007 0.008
[0.016] [0.013] [0.011] [0.026] [0.014] [0.014]
DF 0.014 -0.013 -0.019* 0.024 -0.012 -0.018
[0.019] [0.013] [0.011] [0.019] [0.014] [0.015]
RGIxDF -0.061** -0.030** -0.022* -0.072** -0.028* -0.020
[0.025] [0.015] [0.012] [0.027] [0.015] [0.013]
Constant 0.440* 0.431* 0.424* 0.577* 0.535* 0.531*
[0.248] [0.251] [0.250] [0.292] [0.294] [0.297]
Observations 970 970 970 685 685 685
N. BHCs 82 82 82 58 58 58
R 2 0.517 0.513 0.512 0.520 0.513 0.511
Adj. R 2 0.506 0.501 0.501 0.504 0.496 0.495
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
BHC FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes:  Standard errors, clustered by BHC, in brackets. All regressions include the control variables used in the 
respective dependent variable's RC  tests, as well as year fixed effects; coefficients have been omitted for brevity. All 
regressions in Panel D include BHC fixed effects. Asterisks indicate significance (*** p  < 0.01, ** p  < 0.05, * p  < 0.1); 
All tests are two-tailed. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
Full Sample DF Banks, Only









Table D.1 General Descriptive Statistics, Full Sample (2004-2016) 
 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev p25 p75 N
TailRisk 0.049 0.037 0.031 0.029 0.058 985
RetVol 0.023 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.026 985
ROAvol (7.467) (7.623) 1.142 (8.311) (6.835) 990
EBLLPvol (7.257) (7.418) 0.990 (7.959) (6.762) 990
NIMvol (8.162) (8.187) 0.704 (8.640) (7.731) 990
RWA 0.738 0.745 0.128 0.665 0.815 994
TexasRatio 0.183 0.137 0.152 0.084 0.236 950
Tier1Levg 9.504 9.280 2.205 8.230 10.450 994
LevgRatio 12.553 12.065 3.403 10.640 13.620 994
Tier1/AT 9.060 8.886 2.029 7.844 9.972 994
TotCap 14.464 13.985 3.160 12.510 15.560 994
Variable Mean Median Std Dev p25 p75 N
RC 0.294 0.000 0.456 0.000 1.000 994
Assets ($ bn) 117.703 12.437 380.417 6.363 37.017 994
aSize 16.742 16.336 1.582 15.666 17.427 994
mSize 1.462 1.038 1.196 0.665 1.768 984
pretaxRoRWA 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.012 0.024 994
Loss 0.074 0.000 0.263 0.000 0.000 994
NonInt_Ratio 0.258 0.234 0.155 0.158 0.321 994
ALLL>NPL (0.011) (0.005) 0.021 (0.016) 0.001 994
HighTrdgDum 0.053 0.000 0.225 0.000 0.000 994
SurbordDebt/Eq 0.178 0.160 0.134 0.083 0.249 994
FamFdrOwnshp 0.051 0.000 0.145 0.000 0.017 988
CEO_Tenure 9.705 7.000 8.380 3.000 14.000 987
TARP Issuance 0.017 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.000 994
Deposits/Loans 1.311 1.107 1.155 1.002 1.267 994
LLPvsCHO 0.579 1.000 0.494 0.000 1.000 994
MVE/RegCap 1.508 1.431 0.681 1.023 1.944 984
LoanGrowth 0.008 0.007 0.079 (0.023) 0.036 994
C&I Loans 0.127 0.114 0.076 0.076 0.164 994
RealEst Loans 0.412 0.437 0.161 0.323 0.519 994
Slack 0.223 0.197 0.120 0.150 0.261 994
Notes:  This table presents the summary statistics for all variables used in the main study, for all sample BHC-years. 
The variable aSize  refers to the log of total assets, and mSize refers to the log of the market value of equity. All other 






Table D.2 Means and Tests of Mean Differences across DF Bank, 2004-2010 
Risk Proxies N Mean N Mean N Mean
TailRisk 487 0.060 140 0.062 347 0.060 0.000
RetVol 487 0.029 140 0.029 347 0.028 0.001
ROAvol 492 (7.183) 146 (7.393) 346 (7.095) (0.081)
EBLLPvol 492 (7.030) 146 (7.223) 346 (6.948) (0.089)
NIMvol 492 (7.993) 146 (7.963) 346 (8.006) 0.051
RWA 496 0.749 147 0.736 349 0.754 (0.010)
TexasRatio 478 0.207 144 0.183 334 0.218 (0.028) ***
Tier1Levg 496 9.127 147 9.860 349 8.818 1.049 ***
LevgRatio 496 11.875 147 13.009 349 11.397 1.469 ***
Tier1/AT 496 8.672 147 9.436 349 8.351 0.983 ***
TotCap 496 13.984 147 14.405 349 13.807 0.659 ***
Controls N Mean N Mean N Mean
aSize 496 16.511 147 15.122 349 17.095 (1.930) ***
mSize 486 1.376 139 0.481 347 1.734 (1.237) ***
pretaxRoRWA 496 0.016 147 0.017 349 0.016 0.000
Loss 496 0.103 147 0.075 349 0.115 (0.019)
NonInt_Ratio 496 0.241 147 0.188 349 0.263 (0.063) ***
ALLL>NPL 496 (0.008) 147 (0.005) 349 (0.010) 0.003 **
HighTrdgDum 496 0.052 147 0.020 349 0.066 (0.033) **
SubordDebt/Eq 496 0.219 147 0.163 349 0.242 (0.060) ***
FamFdrOwnshp 490 0.060 145 0.074 345 0.055 0.018 *
CEO_Tenure 489 8.716 145 6.966 344 9.453 (1.934) ***
TARP Issuance 496 0.034 147 0.028 349 0.037 (0.005)
Deposits/Loans 496 1.206 147 1.072 349 1.262 (0.225) ***
LLPvsCHO 496 0.772 147 0.844 349 0.742 0.079 **
MVE/RegCap 486 1.695 139 1.673 347 1.703 0.063
LoanGrowth 496 0.012 147 0.012 349 0.011 0.000
C&I Loans 496 0.126 147 0.102 349 0.136 (0.039) ***
RealEst Loans 496 0.431 147 0.507 349 0.398 0.114 ***
Slack 496 0.216 147 0.212 349 0.217 (0.011)
2005-2010
Notes:  This table presents the overall means for all variables used in this study for the pre-2010 period, and the means and 
tests of mean differences for the same period, by DFBank . DFBank  equals 1 for all sample years if the BHC has average 
assets greater than $10 billion by Q4 of 2014, and zero otherwise. Asterisks indicate statistical significance of tests of the 
difference in means (*** p  < 0.01, ** p  < 0.05, * p  < 0.01).
The variable aSize  refers to the log of total assets, and mSize  refers to the log of the market value of equity. All other 




DFBank = 0 DFBank = 1 0 - 1Full Sample




Table D.3 Pearson Pairwise Correlations, Full Sample (2004 - 2016) 
 
X t
RC (0.106) * (0.116) * (0.076) * (0.098) * (0.121) * 0.038 0.016 0.068 * 0.035 0.078 * 0.048
RGI1 (0.136) * (0.144) * (0.058) * (0.065) * (0.195) * (0.038) 0.014 0.019 0.050 0.034 0.099 *
RGI4 (0.192) * (0.202) * (0.119) * (0.123) * (0.233) * (0.025) * (0.068) * 0.033 0.056 * 0.051 0.077 *
RGI5 (0.156) * (0.166) * (0.082) * (0.102) * (0.199) * 0.029 * (0.015) 0.059 * 0.037 0.075 * 0.062 *
DF (0.302) * (0.311) * (0.208) * (0.188) * (0.210) * (0.026) * (0.157) * 0.012 0.034 0.037 0.037
aSize 0.012 (0.006) 0.080 * 0.084 * (0.082) * (0.062) * 0.176 * (0.256) * (0.174) * (0.262) * (0.001)
mSize (0.074) * (0.096) * (0.001) 0.032 (0.078) * (0.055) 0.071 * (0.245) * (0.180) * (0.271) * (0.013)
pretaxRoRWA (0.360) * (0.366) * (0.434) * (0.328) * (0.082) * (0.152) * (0.298) * (0.006) 0.078 * (0.074) * 0.037
Loss 0.322 * 0.330 * 0.479 * 0.370 * 0.171 * (0.014) * 0.280 * 0.114 * 0.128 * 0.152 * 0.174 *
NonInt_Ratio (0.151) * (0.161) * 0.006 0.084 * (0.148) * (0.302) * (0.016) (0.003) 0.193 * (0.066) * 0.265 *
ALLL>NPL (0.178) * (0.182) * (0.301) * (0.249) * (0.174) * 0.112 * (0.741) * (0.090) * (0.166) * (0.131) * (0.201) *
HighTrdgDum 0.033 0.024 0.117 * 0.170 * (0.018) (0.228) 0.063 * (0.002) 0.146 * (0.032) 0.220 *
SubordDebt/Eq 0.292 * 0.287 * 0.221 * 0.170 * 0.038 0.335 * 0.216 * (0.089) * (0.281) * (0.081) * (0.108) *
FamFdrOwnshp (0.055) * (0.046) (0.051) (0.018) 0.034 (0.043) (0.056) * (0.031) 0.011 (0.007) (0.006)
CEO_Tenure (0.104) * (0.104) * (0.109) * (0.062) * 0.004 0.060 (0.066) * 0.137 * 0.076 * 0.138 * 0.048
TARP Issuance 0.519 * 0.536 * 0.283 * 0.270 * 0.175 * 0.017 * 0.309 * 0.015 0.008 0.036 0.062 *
Deposts/Loans (0.063) * (0.066) * (0.018) (0.019) (0.054) * (0.469) (0.283) * (0.196) * 0.185 * (0.220) * 0.176 *
LLPvsCHO 0.362 * 0.358 * 0.156 * 0.169 * 0.185 * 0.012 * 0.202 * 0.022 0.021 0.017 0.021
MVE/RegCap (0.272) * (0.288) * (0.329) * (0.218) * (0.024) (0.123) * (0.389) * (0.202) * (0.125) * (0.275) * (0.207) *
LoanGrowth (0.098) * (0.098) * (0.106) * (0.062) * (0.025) 0.058 * (0.187) * 0.090 * 0.112 * 0.112 * 0.074 *
C&I Loans 0.042 0.036 (0.054) * (0.076) * (0.033) 0.578 * (0.095) * 0.058 * (0.323) * 0.070 * (0.271) *
RealEst Loans 0.098 * 0.109 * 0.026 (0.004) 0.027 0.316 0.140 * 0.101 * (0.130) * 0.146 * (0.203) *
Slack (0.123) * (0.124) * (0.074) * (0.050) (0.020) (0.509) (0.183) * (0.156) * 0.215 * (0.171) * 0.201 *
Tier1/AT TotCap
Notes:  * indicates correlation is significant at p < 0.10; The variables aSize  and mSize  refer to the log of total assets, and the log of market value of equity, respectively. All other variables are 
defined in Appendix B.
Risk t+1









Table E.1 RGI Construction (Scoring Criteria) 
 
Positive Values Points Description Notes
Non-Audit Risk Committee 1 Any committee of the board, other than the Audit committee, oversees industry-relevant risks or the 
risk management function (regardless of scope of oversight or committee form).
[1]
Standalone Risk Committee 1
Risk oversight (regardless of scope) is the sole purpose  of the committee; Committee is not a sub-
committee of another committee; Bank-board and joint BHC-bank board risk committees that 
report to the BHC board are included within this definition.
[2]
Committee oversees enterprise-
wide risk management 1
The committee with risk oversight responsibility has enterprise-wide scope; Any dual- or multi-
purpose committees (including Audit committees), in addition to standalone risk committees, with 
enterprise-wide risk oversight duties, are assigned one point for this item.
[3]
Is not first year of RC with 
EWRM
1 Risk committee with EWRM oversight has been in place for more than one year; Only applies to 
non-audit risk committees with EWRM responsibility.
[4]
Committee has at least one “risk 
management expert” (RME) 1-2
EPS requires at least one RME, but encourages more. A risk oversight committee meeting the 
minimum standard is awarded one point; having more than one RME earns two points (the 
maximum points assigned for this item = 2). Points are not conditional upon director independence.
[5]
[6]
Committee has at least one 
independent  RME 1
Independent, “effective challenge” is a key component in a strong risk framework and culture (e.g., 
COSO, 2016; Evans, 2015). I therefore award additional points (i.e., beyond the preceding two 
categories) for independent members’ qualifications/expertise in this and the following criteria.
At least one independent 
member has banking or financial 
services experience
1
Experience must be functional and recent. If the independent RME is the only independent member 
of the risk committee with financial services experience, no additional point is awarded for this item. [7]
No substantial overlap between 
RC and Audit Committee 1
I define “substantial overlap” as any situation where > 60% of the RC members also serve on the 
AC. By default, Audit committees earn 0 points for this item (because overlap is always 100%).
Majority of committee members 
are independent
1 “Majority” is defined as > 50%; Independence is met if the director meets the respective stock 
exchange’s independence requirements.
[8]
Committee meets ≥ 4 times per 
year
1 EPS requires the RC to meet at least quarterly. Because committee meeting dates are not 







































Table E.1 Continued 
 
 
Positive Values Points Description Notes
CRO Score 1-3
The CRO Score ranges from 0 to 3, with points assigned as follows:
0 = No risk officer (of any type) appears to be present; 1 = Silo-type risk officer is present, but 
position also encompasses other duties not directly related to risk oversight (i.e., the risk officer is 
"busy"); 2 = Silo-type risk officer is dedicated (not busy), or CRO (enterprise-wide risk manager) 
is busy; 3 = Bank has a dedicated (i.e., not "busy"), enterprise-wide CRO.
[10]
Risk Officer is an Executive 1
Risk officer is an executive that reports directly to the CEO, the full board, and/or a committee of 
the board. [11]
Independent RM Function 1 CRO (whether or not the CRO is an executive) reports to Board and/or a Committee of the Board, 
and  the CEO is not a member of the committee to which the CRO reports.
[12]
Negative Values Explanation
Committee does not have a 
charter
-1 EPS requires that all risk oversight committees establish a committee charter, and that the charter is 
reviewed and approved by the board at least annually.
[13]
Multiple committees oversee 
risk; “primary” is not clear -1
I assume that unclear disclosure of the board's delegation of risk oversight responsibility is 
correlated with the underlying clarity and development of a BHC’s risk governance framework.
The “standalone” nature of the 
committee is questionable -1
Standalone is "questionable" if the committee has functional duties that are conceivably related to 
risk (e.g., reputational risk/public relations, finance, corporate governance), but are nevertheless 

























Table E.1 Continued 
Notes  
[1] Industry-relevant risk types include credit risk, market risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, etc. Example 
committee names include Credit Risk, Asset and Liability, Risk and Governance, Risk and Finance, Enterprise Risk, 
and Risk Committee. 
[2] Audit Committees, by default, earn zero points in this category. 
[3] Disclosures need not include the words "enterprise" or "enterprise-wide." For example, if a committee has 
oversight either of the risk management function, or of a list of all potential risk types (as defined by the OCC), I 
consider this equivalent to “enterprise-wide” risk oversight. If other committees of the board are assigned oversight 
for functionally appropriate risk types (e.g., the AC oversees financial reporting risk), and it is clear that those 
committees report on their respective areas to the RC, I continue to classify the RC as having oversight of all risk.  
Often, key identifying characteristics for enterprise-wide risk oversight include, but are not limited to: (1) an 
exclusive designation of the committee as the primary vehicle for board risk oversight; (2) use of ERM/risk 
governance terminology, such as risk framework, risk appetite, risk tolerance, or risk culture; and/or (3) discussion 
of the committee's responsibilities with respect to the CRO. 
[4] Most committee formations do not coincide with the beginning of the fiscal year. Furthermore, as committee 
formation likely corresponds with the implementation or revision of the company’s risk governance framework, the 
committee may face a steep learning curve, and may not be as effective in its first year relative to subsequent years. 
[5] The committee's designated risk management experts are usually not named within BHCs' disclosures. 
Practitioners and regulators suggest that individuals with high level, functional experience overseeing risk in similar 
financial institutions, or in other highly regulated industries, are likely to meet this requirement. This includes 
current and former CEOs, CFOs, CROs, COOs, etc. of the BHC or of other, similarly sized institutions or from 
complex/high risk industries (i.e. chemicals, oil and gas, utilities), large cap asset managers and private equity 
investors, former regulators/former bank examiners, and the like. I also consider certain experience from public 
accounting - such as being the partner in charge of a large public accounting firm's financial services or risk 
management consulting practice - to fulfill this requirement. 
While this procedure was probably the most subjective of the entire process, I note that in almost every case where a 
RME (per my classification) was elected to the board, it followed that there were large changes over the next year in 
the other risk governance and management structures. I interpret this as evidence that the indicator does a decent job 
of capturing this concept. Furthermore, a few BHCs have disclosed the name(s) of the RME(s) on the risk 
committee (this is becoming more commonplace, but it is certainly not the norm). When this is the case, my RME 
designations generally agree with the disclosed information; if not, it is usually because my choices were more 
conservative (or skeptical). 
[6] Non-independent directors that meet this criterion are most often current or former bank executives (e.g., the 
CEO, COO, CRO, or CFO). I adjust for a current CEO’s membership in a later step. 
[7] I follow Minton et al. (2014) in defining financial expertise, but with two exceptions. First, I require functional 
experience in the industry - which rules out Minton et al. (2014)'s categories of academics and executives from other 
industries whose experience is more accounting-related (i.e. CFO, CAO, Treasurer), unless, of course, those 
individuals have prior experience in the banking industry. Second, because I am concerned with these individuals' 
ability to comprehend the complexity of the BHCs' activities, and of the processes and systems for effective risk 
management, I require the individual's functional experience to be recent. I define "recent" on a rolling basis, and 






Table E.1 Continued 
Notes  
[8] EPS requires that the chair of the RC is independent. However, if the AC has risk oversight, this is always the 
case, and in the post-2010 period, almost all RCs have an independent chair. To allow for more variation in this 
category (and in the spirit of “effective challenge,” discussed above), this condition treats the extent of independence 
of the committee with risk oversight as a positive characteristic. Nevertheless, a tradeoff involved in this choice is 
that an Audit Committee that oversees risk will always earn a point here, and thus may be over-weighted in the 
index. However, characteristics of the Audit Committee are not weighted in several of the other components. 
[9] If a risk committee is formed in the middle of the year, the number of meetings of the new committee is often 
less than four; however, the committee formerly overseeing some (or all) risk presumably met to discuss risk prior to 
the new committee's formation. Accordingly, if it is the first year of a new risk oversight committee, and meetings 
for that year are less than four, but are at least four the following year, then I still award a point for this category. 
[10] Silo-type risk managers have titles (or job descriptions) that imply the individual only oversees a subset of risks 
(e.g., Chief Credit Officer, Chief Loan Officer, and Chief Compliance Officer). The CRO designation includes 
employees that oversee the entire RM function that may have a title other than "CRO" (e.g., VP of Risk 
Management). A risk officer (silo-type or CRO) is considered "busy" if the individual's job title (or job description, 
if available) implies that risk oversight is not the individual’s only responsibility. Example titles of “busy” risk 
managers include the following: General Counsel, Secretary, and Chief Risk Officer; Chief Auditor/Risk Manager; a 
CFO or a Chief Operating Officer that also serves as the CRO; and Chief Credit and Compliance Officer. 
[11] Unless it is disclosed that the executive reports directly to the board or a committee of the board, an individual 
included on the company-disclosed list of executives does not meet this condition if that person is a subordinate – 
for reporting purposes – to any executive other than the CEO. 
Within the extant literature, there does not appear to be a cleanly defined or accepted method for identifying 
"executive" status. In comparing my data to that of similar studies, I appear to have been somewhat more liberal 
when coding this designation. Without the reporting line condition, above, nearly all sample BHCs would receive a 
point for this item for all years. 
[12] A bank’s current CEO technically qualifies as a “Risk Management Expert,” and is counted as a RME above 
(in Category 2) if he/she is a member of the risk committee. When a CEO sits on the risk committee, the 
independence of the risk management function is likely compromised: this arrangement may undermine the 
objectivity of the RC and negate the purpose of the CRO's dual reporting line. 
[13] All audit committees have charters, and while many other types of committees have charters, only the charters 
of the Audit, Nominating, and Corporate Governance committees are required to be made public. If disclosures do 
not discuss the availability of a risk committee (or similar) charter (e.g., it is stated that the charter is available on the 
website, or can be furnished upon written request), I assume there was no charter at that time. I searched investor 







Table E.2 Definitions of Variations of RGI 
 





No changes to the composition of/assumptions behind RGI. RGI1  = RGI, scaled by the sample max score of RGI (16).
=RGI, with one restriction: I set RGI4  = 0 for all bank-years where no board committee has enterprise-wide risk oversight 
responsibility (by default, then, RGI4 equals zero for bank-years where no committee has any level of risk oversight, and for bank-
years where there is some degree of board-level risk oversight, even if the BHC has a Chief Risk Officer). Under this definition, I 
consider ACs with enterprise-wide risk oversight to be a potentially legitimate component of risk governance; however, the score 
continues to be higher (as in RGI) for risk oversight by a committee other than the AC. 
=RGI, with one restriction: I set RGI5 equal to zero for any bank-year where the RC  indicator (as defined in the main analysis and in 
Appendix A) equals zero. RGI5  therefore provides a measure of heterogeneity in the extent of compliance with the final risk committee 
rule among banks that have a dedicated risk committee with EWRM oversight responsibilities. 
Note:  even if there is no committee of the board designated with risk oversight, a BHC's RGI1 score can take a value of up to 0.31
(5 out of 16), if the bank has a CRO that earns the maximum points in Category 3 (see Appendix Table D1, Category 3).
Requiring EWRM oversight causes some degree of discontinuity at the lower end of RGI4; to correct this, I set all values less than or 
equal to 5 to zero, and subtract 5 from all remaining non-zero values (this forces the minimum non-zero score to equal 1, and the 
resulting distribution of non-zero scores is approximately normal). I then scale the resulting score by the resulting sample max for RGI4 
(value of 11).
Similar to RGI4, this restriction imposes a discontinuity from the resulting minimum RGI5 score (0) to the next highest RGI5 score (6).  











In the pre-Dodd-Frank period, I find that observations with dedicated enterprise risk 
committees have no different risk (measured as TailRisk or RetVol) relative to observations without 
risk committees (see Table 9, Panel A). I also find that a more general definition of board-level 
risk oversight (RC_AltDef) is associated with lower TailRisk and RetVol, while the specific risk 
committee definition used throughout this study (RC) is associated with higher TailRisk and RetVol 
(see Table 9, Panels B and C). These results differ from the finding that stronger risk controls are 
associated with lower tail risk and stock return volatility, documented by Ellul and Yerramilli 
(2013; henceforth, E&Y), for a similar sample and across a similar period. The purpose of this 
appendix is to reconcile the findings presented in Section 6 to those documented within E&Y.  
The E&Y sample is comprised of public, U.S. financial institutions, and spans the period 
from 1994 to 2010. The study’s variable of interest is the risk management index, or RMI. The 
measure is the predicted score from the first principal component, or the eigenvector with the 
highest eigenvalue, from annual estimation of principal component analysis (PCA) with four 
measures related to Chief Risk Officer (CRO) presence and organizational status, and two 
measures of board-level risk oversight.  
Replicating any study that uses hand-collected data comes with challenges, and the E&Y 
study is no exception. For example, in the absence of a clearly designated risk committee, it is not 
clear how the authors determined which board-level committee should be used for collection of 
the risk oversight data.102  In addition, E&Y employ a broad definition of “Chief Risk Officer” 
that includes, for example, Chief Credit Officers, Chief Lending Officers, and Chief Compliance 
Officers. While the authors imply that this is the exception, rather than the rule, my data shows a 
lower incidence of CRO presence than that reported by E&Y, despite employing a broad definition 
as the rule, rather than the exception. In the sections that follow, I discuss these and other 
challenges in more detail. I then present my replication findings along with my reconciliation 
results. 
                                                 
102 The authors used “the characteristics of the board committee designated with overseeing and managing risk, 
which is usually either the Risk Management Committee or the Audit and Risk Management Committee” (Ellul & 
Yerramilli, 2013, p.1766). This is the only direction given throughout the study; it is not clear how the authors 
proceeded when neither type of committee was present, nor whether risk committees were identified based on the 




F.2. Sample Reconciliation & Descriptive Statistics 
E&Y provide, in the study’s appendix, the name and size of each BHCs included in the 
study’s main analysis. The list includes 19 BHCs that I do not utilize in my primary tests.103 After 
adding these 19 BHCs, and removing any BHCs included in my study, but not in E&Y, the 
resulting sample (“replication sample”) is comprised of a maximum of 72 unique BHCs with total 
assets in 2007 ranging from $6.5 billion to $2.2 trillion.104 
The E&Y study uses data from 1994 to 2010; however, because the risk governance data I 
collected for my primary sample begins in 2004, I restrict the collection process for the 19 
additional BHCs to data for the years from 2004 to 2010. E&Y estimate the RMI measure on a 
year-by-year basis, so pre-2004 data should not be necessary for replication purposes. Data for the 
2004 to 2010 time period is also sufficient for replicating E&Y’s Table IV tests, which use data 
from 2006 to 2008. The disadvantage of this choice, however, is that my replication results for any 
other tests are not directly comparable to those reported within E&Y. 
Univariate statistics for the replication sample for the 2004 to 2010 period are presented in 
Table F.1.105 In comparison to E&Y’s Table I, Panel A, time trends likely explain many of the 
apparent differences in the sample BHCs’ financial and risk and return characteristics. For 
example, E&Y report mean total assets (Assets) of $84.615 billion for the 1994 to 2009 time 
period, and I report mean Assets of $134.757 billion for the 2004 to 2009 time period. I report 
mean (median) future tail risk (Tail Riskt+1) of 0.061 (0.043), whereas E&Y report mean (median) 
Tail Risk of 0.047 (0.038). As my sample period includes more crisis years as a percentage of all 
sample period years, these differences appear reasonable. Similar differences are also apparent for 
                                                 
103 E&Y list all BHCs in their sample in their Appendix A. E&Y’s sample period ends in 2010, and 12 of the 72 
BHCs in their sample either failed, delisted, or were acquired by the end of 2010. Another four were acquired by 
mid-2011, with deals announced during 2010. As I am primarily interested in evaluating the outcomes of post-2010 
changes in risk oversight, these 16 BHCs, along with one acquired in 2012, two institutions with minimal-to-no 
traditional banking activities (e.g., Metlife), and two smaller banks that, as of March 31, 2018, have yet to pass the 
$10 billion threshold, were excluded from the primary sample used in my study. 
104 Following E&Y (2013), I obtain the replication sample’s financial information from the FR Y-9Cs, and stock 
return data from CRSP. I hand-collect all risk management and board-level attributes from the BHCs’ public filings 
(e.g., annual proxy statements, 10-Ks, and annual reports to shareholders), press releases, and websites (when 
available). 
105 Data for explanatory/control variables are presented for 2004-2009; Tail Risk and Annual Return are presented 




annual buy-and-hold stock returns (Annual Returnt+1), profitability (ROA), and non-performing 
loans (Bad Loans/Assets). 
A few financial characteristics do appear to be somewhat constant, consistent with banks’ 
business models remaining relatively fixed over time. For example, the ratios of deposits to assets 
(Deposits/Assets), Tier-1 Capital to assets (Tier 1 Cap/Assets), loans to assets (Loans/Assets), and 
non-interest income to total income (Nonint Inc/Income) presented in Table F.1 are comparable 
those presented in E&Y (2013) Table I, despite the differences in time period. 
In contrast, the statistics for the hand-collected risk governance data diverge to a greater 
extent from those reported within E&Y (2013). E&Y’s RMI is the first principal component from 
a PCA of the following six hand-collected variables: CRO Present, CRO Exec, CRO Top5, CRO 
Centrality, Active RC, and RC members’ financial services experience (RC Exper). I discuss the 
definitions of these variables, along with any notable differences in the replication data as 
compared to E&Y, in detail, below. 
 
F.2.1. Presence and Status of a Chief Risk Officer: CRO Present and CRO Exec 
E&Y set the indicator CRO Present equal to one if the BHC reports having a Chief Risk 
Officer, or similar officer with risk oversight, for a given year. I follow E&Y, and include Chief 
Risk Officer, Chief Credit Officer, Chief Lending Officer, Chief Compliance Officer, and other 
similar titles, in the designation of CRO Present.106 Again, time trends likely explain some of the 
inconsistencies between my data and E&Y. For example, as more BHCs appoint CROs over time, 
higher overall averages in my sample for CRO Present and CRO Executive (0.867 and 0.749, 
versus 0.806 and 0.402 in E&Y, respectively) seem reasonable. Upon further inspection, however, 
the differences likely also reflect divergent definitions and classification choices during the 
collection process.  
This conjecture is supported by a comparison of the annual means presented in Table F.2 
with those for the same years in E&Y’s Table I, Panel C. For example, E&Y report that 100% of 
the sample BHCs have a CRO present in both 2008 and 2009. Despite including a wide range of 
                                                 
106 I also include officers whose titles do not imply any degree of risk oversight, but whose job descriptions include 




titles in my classification process (and not conditioning their use on size or activities, as described 
by E&Y), I appear to have been more conservative than E&Y in coding the CRO Present variable. 
One potential explanation for this discrepancy is that during this time period, many BHCs, albeit 
with decreasing frequency, described having a risk manager of the bank, but not of the company. 
Most of these positions were later (i.e., after 2010) given company-wide risk oversight. As I began 
my original data collection process with the Dodd-Frank EPS rules in mind (i.e., enterprise-wide 
risk oversight), I coded CRO Present equal to zero in instances where it did not appear that the 
risk manager had company-wide risk oversight responsibility and authority. 
CRO Exec is an indicator variable equal to one if the chief risk officer (or similar) is an 
executive of the company. As E&Y do not specify the conditions under which an individual 
qualifies as an “executive,” I relied primarily upon whether or not an individual was listed as an 
executive officer in public filings for this designation.107 Similar to my procedure for CRO Present, 
if an executive was listed as an officer of the bank, rather than of the bank holding company 
(usually referred to as “the Company” in SEC filings), I did not consider the individual to be an 
executive (i.e., CRO Exec was set to zero). Nevertheless, I appear to have been more liberal than 
E&Y for this classification: The average of CRO Exec in my replication sample ranges from 0.667 
in 2004 to 0.800 in 2009 (see Table F.2), and is are notably higher than the annual means reported 
by E&Y for 2005 and each year thereafter. 
The difference could be due to E&Y distinguishing among ranks of executives (per the 
executive’s title), but I did not make such distinctions because seniority in titles likely means 
different things across different banks, and may also simply reflect tenure in a given position. 
Aside from the difference in CRO Exec frequency during the replication sample period, my data 
indicates that executive-level status among CROs exhibits a monotonic, increasing trend across 
the replication period. In contrast, E&Y’s data depicts a drop in the frequency with which a risk 
officer is an executive across 2005 to 2007, with some recovery in 2008 and 2009. This suggests 
                                                 
107 This listing appears in either the 10-K or the annual proxy (Form DEF 14A), and is a mandatory disclosure. I also 
searched the annual report (or letter) to shareholders for this information (if included in this type of filing, the list of 
executive positions and individuals’ names is most often found on the last page of the report). In practice, the 
decision as to which officers should be listed as executives is, perhaps unsurprisingly, highly subjective. See 
http://www.meridiancp.com/insights/thought-leadership/proxy-named-executive-officers-should-business-unit-





at least one potentially significant hurdle for my replication of E&Y’s PCA procedure, as 
differences in collection choices and/or definitions do not appear to be consistent across time. 
 
F.2.2. CRO Status, as Implied by Compensation: CRO Top5 and CRO Centrality 
The variable CRO Top5 indicates whether the risk manager (CRO or equivalent title) 
appears among the highest paid executives, as disclosed in the Summary Compensation Table of 
the annual proxy statement (form DEF-14A), for a given year. The sample-wide average of CRO 
Top5 in my replication sample appears to be comparable to that of E&Y (21.9% of the replication 
sample has a CRO among the top five highest paid, versus 20.5% in E&Y). A comparison of the 
annual averages between those in Table F.2 and E&Y’s Table I, Panel C, however, reveals 
potentially significant differences across our studies. The most notable differences are in 2006 and 
2009, where E&Y report that 30% and 43.5% of the sample, respectively, have CRO Top5 equal 
to one (I report 14.1% for 2006, and 26.7% for 2009). 
Such a large discrepancy is somewhat surprising, as the issue of whether or not an 
individual’s compensation is disclosed is perhaps the least subjective of any of the CRO measures. 
Further, when an officer’s compensation is disclosed, the related Compensation Discussion and 
Analysis section of the annual proxy statement usually provides far more detail and context to aid 
in the determination of whether any of the named officers oversees the risk management function. 
There are, however, at least two possible explanations for the discord between my data and E&Y. 
First, I observed several instances where companies voluntarily disclosed compensation 
for more than five individuals each year. For example, in the summary compensation tables 
included in Bank of America’s 2008 and 2007 proxy statement filings (within which, executive 
compensation is disclosed for 2007 and 2006, respectively), the company reports compensation 
for seven executives. Although included in this list, the Global Risk Manager is not in the “top 
five” based on total compensation (total compensation for the risk manager is the lowest of the 
seven for 2006, and the second lowest for 2007). In this situation, I did not code CRO Top5 equal 
to one, but it is possible that E&Y did not make the “top five” classification choice so literally. 
Second, in defining CRO Centrality (discussed in more detail below), E&Y use the CFO’s 




stating that if there is not a designated risk manager, the CFO most likely has risk oversight 
responsibility.108 By extension, it is possible that E&Y coded CRO Top5 equal to one in the case 
where CRO Present equals zero but CFO compensation is disclosed. I concede that this conjecture 
is, at best, speculation; nevertheless, this explanation would be consistent with the patterns in both 
CRO presence and in CRO Top5 frequency reported in E&Y’s Table I, Panel C. 
I turn next to CRO Centrality. Conceptually, the measure is intended to reflect the relative 
organizational status of the risk officer, and in its simplest form, is measured as the CRO’s total 
cash compensation divided by the CEO’s compensation. As E&Y explain, however, current 
disclosure rules preclude such a straightforward computation. Under Rule 402 of Regulation S-K, 
SEC registrants must only report compensation for the CEO, CFO, and three most highly 
compensated executive officers other than the CEO and CFO (17 CFR, §229.402(a)(3)).109 Thus, 
if the CRO is not one of these named executive officers (i.e., if CRO Top5 equals zero), his or her 
pay is unknown. As shown in Table F.1, the average for CRO Top5 in my replication sample is 
23.1% (it is 20.5% in E&Y), meaning that actual CRO compensation is unknown for roughly 75% 
of the sample observations.110  
In cases where CRO Top5 equals zero, E&Y measure CRO Centrality as follows: If there 
does not appear to be a CRO present, and if CFO pay is known, E&Y assume that the CFO has 
risk oversight responsibility, and CRO Centrality is the ratio of the CFO’s compensation to the 
CEO’s compensation. Because CFO compensation was not a required disclosure until 2006, if  
CFO pay is unknown, or if the BHC does have a CRO but his or her compensation is not disclosed, 
                                                 
108 Within the replication sample, I observe this to be explicitly the case for only 15 bank-year observations between 
2004 and 2009. 
109 The determination of “most highly compensated” is based on the list of executive officers employed as of the end 
of the most recent fiscal year, and ranked by the “total compensation” figure reported in the Summary 
Compensation Table (required under Item 7 of the annual proxy statement), excluding changes in pension value and 
non-qualified deferred compensation earnings. (Thus, “total compensation” for the purposes of ranking the most 
highly compensated executives includes salary, cash bonus, stock and option awards, non-equity incentive plan 
compensation, and all other compensation (e.g., perquisites)). Registrants must provide compensation information 
for any individual who served in the CEO and/or CFO role during the most recent fiscal year, whether or not that 
individual remained in that role at year-end. Finally, registrants are also required to provide compensation 
information for up to two additional officers that would have been considered the three (non-CEO/non-CFO) most 
highly compensated executives had they remained in office through year-end, but that no longer serve as executives 
at year-end. (See 17 CFR, §229.402(a)(3) and §229.402(c) for more details.) 
110 I obtained actual CRO compensation data for an additional 12 observations where CRO Top5 equals zero, 




CRO Centrality is the ratio of the lowest of the named executive officers’ pay, divided by the 
CEO’s pay, less one percent.111 In Table F.1, I also report descriptive statistics for Alt CRO 
Centrality, which is equal to CRO Centrality, but is set to zero if the BHC does not appear to have 
a risk manager (i.e., if CRO Present equals zero). 
In defining CRO Centrality, E&Y state that the centrality ratio is the ratio of the CRO’s (or 
whichever officer’s compensation has been used in the numerator) “total compensation, excluding 
stock and option awards, to the CEO’s total compensation” (E&Y, 2013; p.1766). Specific 
components of pay that are included or excluded from the CRO’s compensation are not given, and 
E&Y do not clarify whether or not the same adjustment is also applied to the CEO’s compensation. 
The data I report uses the sum of the CRO’s salary, bonus, and non-equity incentive plan 
compensation (“cash compensation”) in the numerator, and the CEO’s total compensation in the 
denominator.112 I did not collect the equivalent of the CEO’s cash compensation; however, I did 
collect the CRO’s total compensation.113 Results with this measure (CRO total compensation 
                                                 
111 The authors acknowledge that this procedure results in measurement error, but that to the extent that actual CRO 
pay is much lower, this biases against their findings. Within my replication data, untabulated analysis suggests that 
the extent of measurement error in CRO Centrality is cause for concern. In four out of the six years from 2004 to 
2009, average CRO Centrality is higher for BHCs where the CRO is not actually a named executive officer (i.e., 
CRO Top5 is equal to zero). Moreover, across all six years, CRO Centrality is higher among BHCs in which the 
CRO is not even an executive (i.e., CRO Exec is equal to zero). The two largest values of CRO Centrality are 0.804 
and 0.831 for 2006 and 2004, respectively. One of these BHCs does not have a CRO of any type; and while the 
other has an executive-level CRO, that individual is not among the highest paid officers (i.e., CRO Top5 is equal to 
zero). Similarly, among the 21 bank-year observations in the top 5% of the sample distribution, only five actually 
have a CRO in the top five, and six of these do not even have a CRO present. On the other end of the distribution, 
three of the 21 bank-year observations in the bottom 5% of CRO Centrality actually have CROs in the top five. 
112 I note a few other complications, not addressed by E&Y, in calculating CRO Centrality. In instances where CRO 
Centrality would otherwise be greater than one (e.g., the CEO foregoes some or all of his or her compensation for a 
period; the CEO was appointed mid-year; etc.), I used in the denominator the highest paid executive’s 
compensation, rather than the CEO’s. Further, there is a large amount of executive-level turnover during the end of 
the E&Y sample period (i.e., during the crisis), and I frequently observe cases where more than one executive holds 
the same position in a given year. If both individuals are named executive officers (i.e., each of their compensation 
details are disclosed), and the sum of the two individuals’ pay appears to be a reasonable proxy for annualized pay 
(i.e., is in line with prior and future years), I use the sum in the CRO Centrality calculation. If two individuals hold 
the position, but only one is a named executive officer, I use the figures as disclosed if they represent more than two 
thirds of the year. If compensation reported is for less than two thirds of the year, I instead use the compensation of 
the next closest executive, where “closest” is determined by comparing annualized base salaries. 
113 Note: total compensation comes from the “total compensation” column of the Summary Compensation Table 
(which is provided in the annual proxy statement). It is this figure that is used for ranking compensation and 




divided by CEO total compensation) do not qualitatively change any of the following results or 
discussion, and are therefore not tabulated. 
In Table F.1, I report average CRO Centrality of 21.9% (E&Y report a mean of 31.3%). 
The annual averages for this variable (presented in Table F.2) depict a concave pattern (peak of 
0.283 in 2004, trough of 0.185 in 2006, and slight recovery to 0.209 by 2009). If it is reasonable 
to (i) disregard 2004 and 2005, as FAS 123R and Regulation S-K changed the compensation 
disclosure and reporting regime for fiscal years ending in December 2005, forward; and (ii) 
consider this measure as simply the inverse of the CEO-to-lowest of the top 5 pay ratio, then the 
pattern documented here is consistent with higher pay-for-performance sensitivity for CEOs. In 
non-crisis periods, total CEO compensation is higher, driving Centrality down. In crisis periods, 
total CEO compensation is lower, and while other officers’ pay is also lower, it is generally hit to 
a lesser degree (compared to the CEO), driving Centrality upward. 
 
F.2.3. Risk Committee Qualifications and Activities: RC Exper & ActiveRC 
E&Y’s RMI incorporates a measure of risk committee members’ banking and finance 
experience, but how experience is defined is not stated in the study. To measure relevant board 
and committee member expertise, I therefore rely on prior literature and the Dodd-Frank EPS rules. 
Minton et al. (2014) define financial expertise as the case where an independent director is, or has 
been, (1) a bank executive; (2) an executive of a non-bank financial firm; (3) a finance or 
accounting officer (e.g., CFO, treasurer, VP finance, accountant) of a non-financial firm; (4) a 
professional investor (e.g., hedge funds, private equity, venture capital); or (5) an academic in a 
related field, such as finance, accounting, or economics. Among a sample of public U.S. BHCs 
with assets great than $1 billion, Minton et al. (2014) report that the fraction of independent 
directors with these qualifications ranges from 20% to 26% across the period from 2003 to 2008 
(see Table 1 of that study).  
I primarily rely on the Minton et al. (2014) definition of financial expertise, with two 
exceptions motivated by requirements within the Dodd-Frank EPS rules. First, I require functional 
experience in the industry, thereby eliminating academics and executives from non-financial 
industries, unless those individuals have prior experience in the banking industry. Second, because 




activities and the processes and systems for necessary effective risk management, I also require an 
individual's functional industry experience to be recent.  I define "recent" on a rolling basis, and 
consider any director that retired from the industry less than 10 years before a given BHC-year 
observation to have recent, functional experience. Using these classification rules, the mean annual 
percentage of independent financial experts on the Board (Board FS Exper) is, expectedly, 
somewhat smaller than the annual averages reported in Minton et al. (2014; see Table 1).114 
Nevertheless, average Board FS Exper exhibits an increasing trend throughout the sample period 
(untabulated), consistent with statistics reported in Table 1 of Minton et al. (2014). As E&Y only 
present sample-wide, but not annual, averages for the board experience indicator, this comparison 
provides some comfort in the validity of my financial services experience classification process.  
The fraction of RC members with financial expertise, RC FS Exper, exhibits a trend in line 
with Board FS Exper. In the PCA procedure, E&Y use an indicator variable for risk committee 
members’ financial services experience. I follow E&Y and define RC Exper equal to one if at least 
one of the RC members is both independent and meets the above definition of financial expertise. 
In comparing the annual means for RC Exper (Dummy), presented in Table F.2, with those reported 
in E&Y’s Table I, Panel C, I note that the average BHC in my dataset appears to be more likely to 
have a financial expert on its risk committee. Whether the differences are driven by the definition 
of financial services experience, or by the underlying committee used as the risk committee, is not 
readily determinable. 
The final RMI input is an indicator of risk committee activity. More specifically, ActiveRC 
is an indicator equal to one if the risk committee meets more times than the average risk committee 
in a given year. The sample-wide average for ActiveRC (0.451, see Table F.1) is comparable to 
                                                 
114 Aside from my exclusion of a few categories of experience from the Minton et al. (2014) measure of financial 
expertise, the measures I report will be systematically smaller than those reported in Minton et al. (2014). This is 
because Minton et al. (2014) report the percent of financial experts among independent directors (i.e., the 
denominator is the number of independent directors), whereas I define the corresponding measure, for both the 
board and the risk committee, as the number of independent directors with financial services experience divided by 
the total number of directors. In other words, because the denominator in my definition is always larger than that of 
the Minton et al. (2014) definition, the percentages I report for Board FS Exper will naturally be smaller, on 
average. As the majority of directors within my sample are independent, this alteration makes very little qualitative 
difference for the board-level measure of financial expertise. Risk committees, on the other hand, typically have 
fewer members (the replication sample average is 4.7 members), and more often than not, non-audit risk oversight 
committees include at least one non-independent director (many of these are current executives of the BHC). I 




that reported in E&Y (0.439).115 The underlying data on the number of meetings, however, 
suggests otherwise. E&Y report that the average RC meets 5.369 times per year. I find RC meeting 
frequency (Freq RC Meetings, Table F.1) to be significantly higher: the average RC in the 
replication sample meets 8.704 times per year. Some of the divergence is likely driven by 
differences in time periods presented, as listing requirements and market pressures have caused all 
types of committees to meet more frequently in recent years. The difference is likely also caused 
by differences in the committees chosen for data collection, an issue upon which I expand in 
subsection F.3.2 of this appendix. 
 
F.2.4. Correlations between Tail Risk and Explanatory Variables 
In Table F.3, Panel A, I present pairwise correlations for the period from 2004 to 2010 
between future Tail Risk, E&Y’s pre-crisis RMI, BHC Size, and the control variables most 
commonly used throughout this analysis.116 The correlations are largely consistent in direction, 
size, and significance with those reported in E&Y (2013), Table II, with a few notable exceptions, 
detailed below. 
Size is positively associated with future Tail Risk, as in E&Y, but the correlation is not 
significant in my replication sample. E&Y report positive and significant correlations between 
future Tail Risk and both board member independence (Board Indep) and CEO Tenure, whereas I 
find negative, but insignificant, correlations in my replication sample. As these variables are less 
sensitive to measurement choices and definitions, the observed differences are most likely 
explained by time. 
Independent board members’ financial services experience (Board FS Exper) is positively 
and significantly correlated with future Tail Risk, and negatively and significantly correlated with 
E&Y’s pre-crisis RMI. E&Y present correlations that are directionally consistent with these 
estimates, but the relationships are not significant in their dataset.117 In addition, E&Y report a 
positive and significant correlation between board members’ experience and BHC Size, whereas I 
                                                 
115 E&Y do not present annual averages for ActiveRC, but I include them, nevertheless, in Table F.2. 
116 The pre-crisis RMI is obtained from Appendix A of E&Y (2013). It is the average across the 2005 and 2006 RMI 
score for each BHC. 




find a strong negative correlation between Board FS Exper and Size (p < 0.0001, untabulated). The 
extent to which these differences are explained by time or by differences in the definitions of 
financial services experience is not easily determinable. I note, however, that the correlations in 
my replication dataset are consistent with those presented within Minton et al. (2014), whose 
sample period is from 2003 to 2008, and whose financial experience definition I rely mostly upon. 
 
 
F.3. Replication of RMI Measure 
E&Y’s RMI is the first principal component from a PCA of six variables: CRO Present, 
CRO Executive, CRO Top5, CRO Centrality, Active RC, and RC Experience. My intuition, based 
on the preceding analysis of the univariate statistics, is that the underlying committee used for data 
collection purposes may differ, perhaps to a large extent, across my replication dataset and 
E&Y’s.118 To further explore this conjecture, I present the pairwise correlations between the six 
underlying risk governance variables included in E&Y’s RMI, and E&Y’s pre-crisis RMI, in Table 
F.3, Panel B.  
While there is no corresponding table in E&Y (2013), previous working paper versions of 
E&Y report large positive correlations between each of the risk governance variables and RMI. In 
contrast, I only find positive correlations between CRO Exec, CRO Present, and E&Y’s pre-crisis 
RMI. All other correlations with E&Y’s pre-crisis RMI are negative within my replication sample. 
Notably, the correlation between the RC Exper dummy and E&Y’s pre-crisis RMI is negative, 
relatively large, and statistically significant (p < 0.05). This supports my conjecture that there are 
likely substantial differences in the choice of committee used for data collection purposes.  
In addition, I find it notable that there is a negative correlation between CRO Centrality 
and E&Y’s pre-crisis RMI (p < 0.05). I also find that CRO Centrality is positively correlated with 
future risk (correlation coefficient untabulated). Figures F.1 and F.2 plot the relationship between 
actual and fitted values of the replication sample BHCs’ crisis period risk (either Tail Risk or 
                                                 
118 It should be noted that E&Y do not present, nor discuss, the component loadings for each of the six risk 
management input variables, nor discuss the proportion of variance explained by any component. I am therefore 
limited in my analysis to comparisons with each sample BHC’s pre-crisis RMI, which is the average of each bank’s 
RMI scores across 2005 and 2006, reported in E&Y’s Appendix A. Where appropriate, I also attempt to corroborate 




RetVol, averaged across 2007 and 2008), and average CRO Centrality, measured across 2004 to 
2006.119  The data depict a clear positive relation between CRO Centrality and measures of future 
risk, suggesting that the relative importance of the CRO (as purported to be measured with this 
ratio) either is correlated with higher risk-taking, or is capturing some other aspect of the BHCs’ 
compensation structure that is associated with higher risk.120 With respect to the latter explanation, 
I note that these plots support my previous conjecture that CRO Centrality, as measured in this 
replication, is mostly capturing higher CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity (and therefore higher 
future risk). 
 
F.3.1. PCA Results 
The differences in my replication sample descriptive statistics notwithstanding, I next 
proceed with principal component analysis (PCA) with my collected data in an attempt to replicate 
RMI. Following E&Y, I run the PCA on an annual basis (RMI_y), and also on the full sample 
(RMI_fw). Table F.4 presents a summary of the PCA outcomes under both approaches. As results 
for the full sample PCA estimation (RMI_fw) are not qualitatively different, I restrict the following 
discussion to the annual PCA estimation results (RMI_y). 
The first component explains, on average, only 33.2% of the variance in the data (the high 
is 35.8% in 2005, and the low is 30.25% in 2008). The cumulative variance explained by the first 
three components is, on average, just below 70%. As E&Y do not present, nor discuss, the variance 
explained by the selected component used to predict RMI, I cannot draw conclusions as to whether 
or not this is in line with their results. Conventionally speaking, the use of only the first component 
with my data would result in a loss of roughly 67% of the information contained in these variables, 
and would likely be viewed as an inferior statistical approach. The overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olin 
                                                 
119 E&Y present a similar graph in working paper versions of the paper, where the data depicts a clear negative 
relation between CRO Centrality and measures of bank risk for these same periods. In contrast, my data not only 
depicts a clear positive relation, but the coefficient estimates for both measures of risk are also significantly different 
from zero. The coefficient estimate on CRO Centrality for the Tail Risk regression is 0.0897 (p = 0.018); in the 
RetVol regression, the coefficient estimate on CRO Centrality is 0.082 (p = 0.071). 
120 The result is similar when using the ratio of total CRO compensation to total CEO compensation (Total CRO 
Centrality). The correlation between Total CRO Centrality and measures of future risk (untabulated) is positive, but 
insignificant, in the full sample, and is positive and significant (p < 0.10 for Tail Riskt+1, and p < 0.01 for 




(KMO) measure of sampling adequacy, reported at the bottom of Table F.4, further supports this 
conclusion: based on the ratings within Kaiser and Rice (1974), the average overall KMO across 
the annual PCA estimations of 56.87 is “miserable,” indicating that PCA is not appropriate for 
summarizing the underlying data. 
E&Y acknowledge that annual estimation of the PCA procedure could generate 
inconsistent factor loadings.121 The results from annual PCA estimation with my data, presented 
in Table F.4 demonstrate that the loadings for the first component (and the second and third) are 
indeed unstable over time. For example, using a 0.3 cutoff (loadings with values > |0.3| are 
highlighted in bold font), the number and combination of variables loading on the first component 
is, more often than not, different across any chosen set of years. Many of the variable loadings, 
most notably CRO Centrality and ActiveRC, not only vary quite a bit in size, but also change signs 
from year-to-year.122 Finally, I note there is never an estimation period (annually or for the full 
sample period) where all six variables have meaningful positive loadings on the first component. 
Unsurprisingly, the correlations (untabulated) between the predicted RMI scores with my 
replication sample and E&Y’s pre-crisis RMI, for the years 2005-2006 (for which E&Y’s pre-
crisis RMI is averaged) are low. The correlation coefficients range from 0.0895 to 0.1451. Further, 
only the Pearson correlation between E&Y’s pre-crisis RMI and RMI_y is statistically significant 
at, but not below, the 10% level. Since it does not appear that my data yields a comparable measure 
of E&Y’s RMI, I conclude that I cannot use my predicted RMI scores (i.e., RMI_y or RMI_fw) in 
the subsequent analysis. 
F.3.2. Implications of the Choice of a Particular “Risk” Committee 
In the preceding sections, I highlight many of the reasons the PCA procedure, estimated 
within my data, does not result in a comparable RMI score to that within E&Y. Because the 
                                                 
121 The justification for the year-by-year approach is to “avoid possible look-ahead bias that may arise” when 
incorporating future information (E&Y, 2013; p.1767). 
122 In all but one specification, CRO Centrality loads negatively on the first component, and the loading is relatively 
large in all periods except 2004 and 2009. Taken together with the descriptive results for this variable, this is 
perhaps unsurprising. In untabulated analysis, I re-perform the PCA procedure (annually and for the full sample) 
with Alt CRO Centrality or Total CRO Centrality in place of CRO Centrality, and also without any measure of 
centrality. The results are somewhat better in that the loadings on the other variables are generally more stable over 
time (especially when omitting CRO Centrality, altogether), but there is little improvement in the proportion of 





underlying data is for the exact same set of banks, the discord must be attributable to differences 
in data collection procedures and choices. One particular area where differences in the E&Y data 
and my data likely depart is in the initial selection of the board-level committee to use for collection 
of RC characteristics. In this sub-section, I expand upon this issue. 
For the risk committee attributes captured by RC Exper and ActiveRC, E&Y use “the 
characteristics of the board committee designated with overseeing and managing risk, which is 
usually either the Risk Management Committee or the Audit and Risk Management Committee” 
(E&Y, 2013, p.1766). There is no explanation as to which committee’s characteristics were used 
either in the absence of an obvious risk committee, or if multiple committees had oversight of 
different risk areas. Similarly, it is also unclear whether E&Y identify risk committees based on 
the scope of risk oversight (i.e. enterprise-wide risk oversight, versus oversight of risk 
silos).Whenever the committee with primary responsibility for risk oversight was unclear, I coded 
an indicator variable, Many Cttees, equal to one. In Table F.2, the average annual values of Many 
Cttees range from a high of 40% in 2005 (28 BHCs) to a low of 25% in 2009 (16 BHCs). To state 
the implications more directly: for almost one-third of the bank-year observations in this sample, 
I could just as easily have chosen to use a different committee’s members and activities, as there 
was no single committee with clearly designated risk oversight responsibilities. As clarified by the 
following example, the choice of one committee over another could have a significant effect on 
the underlying relationships within the data. 
Zions Bancorporation had a “Credit Review/Compliance” Committee in place until 
2002/2003, when “compliance” was removed from the committee’s name (and presumably added 
to the responsibilities of the Audit Committee). Zions’ board formed its Risk Oversight Committee 
(ROC), which replaced the Credit Review Committee (CRC), in October of 2011. All members of 
the former CRC remained as members of the ROC, but the scope of the committee’s risk oversight 
was expanded to include the entire ERM function. Zions is in my primary sample, and I recorded 
committee characteristics (members and meetings) for the Credit Review Committee for periods 
up to October 2011, and for the Risk Oversight Committee for periods thereafter. 
Disclosures in Zions’ 2010 proxy statement (filed April 15, 2010) clarify that the Board 
does not have a separate Risk Management Committee. Instead, the entire Board is responsible for 
RM oversight, and Board is assisted in this process via the activities of three board-level 




Committee. Additional discussion suggests that of these three committees, the AC likely plays the 
largest role in overseeing the ERM function; but the extent to which that was the case in 2010, 
much less in previous years, is unknown. 
The oldest Audit Committee (AC) charter found within Zions’ publicly available filings is 
in the bank’s 2001 proxy statement (filed March 21, 2001).123 While the AC charter includes some 
discussion of risk oversight, the language is boilerplate (i.e., is almost identical to the 
NYSE/NASDAQ listing standards with respect to audit committee risk oversight responsibilities) 
and the discussion pertains only to the AC’s oversight of the independent audit function and 
financial risk exposures. Zions’ AC charter undergoes significant changes each year thereafter, 
and while the scope of the committee’s disclosed responsibilities widens over time, the focus is 
categorically centered on ensuring that appropriate financial reporting controls exist. With respect 
to risk oversight responsibilities and procedures, the AC Charter included within the 2007 proxy 
(filed March 28, 2007) differs from prior versions only in that the Chief Risk Officer is added to a 
list of executives that can be invited to attend AC meetings. Nevertheless, as the risk-related 
responsibilities of the AC do not appear to change, the purpose of inviting the CRO to attend AC 
meetings, the extent to which this occurs, and the nature of the meetings that the CRO attends, are 
unknown. Absent these types of details, a conservative approach to data collection would be 
assume that the CRO’s attendance would primarily relate to ensuring that risk-related accounting 
measurements and disclosures (such as the adequacy of the Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses, 
or the completeness of contingent liability disclosures) are appropriate.  
Ultimately, the decision as to which of Zions’ board-level committees is the “risk” 
committee depends on the research question. If the researcher is concerned about the types of risks 
typically overseen by an Audit Committee, then the AC should be used as the risk committee; 
however, if the researcher is interested in bank-specific risks, then the Credit Review (formerly 
Credit Review/Compliance) Committee is likely the more appropriate choice. In any case, prior to 
the company’s formation of the ROC in October 2011there would have been – and even in 
hindsight, continues to be – reasonable uncertainty as to which of Zions’ Board Committees, if 
                                                 
123 Refer to Section 4.2.2 for a discussion of the charter filing requirements for SEC registrants for the periods from 




any, should be used for the purposes of measuring the presence and strength of board-level risk 
controls. 
The Zions example underscores the ramifications of differences in collection choices: using 
the Audit Committee as the risk committee, the indicator for RC experience would equal one for 
all of E&Y’s sample period, and Active RC would equal one for the vast majority of the sample 
period (using E&Y’s sample-wide average of 5.369 RC meetings per year). On the other hand, 
using the Credit Review/Compliance (and later, Credit Review) Committee as the risk committee, 
RC experience would only equal one for the last three years of E&Y’s sample period (2007-2009), 
and Active RC would only equal one in the final year (2009). 
In line with the outcomes of different committee choices for Zions, I find in my replication 
sample that Audit Committees are more likely to be considered active under E&Y’s definition 
(recall, ActiveRC equals one if a committee meets more times than the average sample committee 
in a given year). The average AC meets 9.96 times per year, whereas the average non-audit 
committee with risk oversight meets an average of 6.61 times per year (untabulated). The mean 
difference in ActiveRC across AC- and other-type risk committees, 0.38, is highly significant (p < 
0.001; untabulated). 
Conceptually, the fact that audit committees are more likely to be classified as “active” is 
somewhat problematic. Since 2004, NYSE listing standards have tasked audit committees with the 
requirement to discuss the firm’s risk policies and procedures. The rule was cast in relation to 
Sarbanes Oxley, and it is not clear that any such “discussions” are meant to cover any areas outside 
of financial reporting-related risk. Because access to AC meeting minutes is not public, the extent 
to which ACs actually discuss risk matters is unknown. By contrast, while dedicated risk 
committees may meet less frequently, on average, than audit committees, it is reasonable to assume 
that risk is the primary item on that committee’s agenda.124 
 
                                                 
124 Similar concerns arise with respect to the RC Exper indicator. Audit Committees in my sample are fully 
independent, whereas other types of risk oversight committees usually include at least one non-independent director 
(average RC Indep is 81.4%; the annual average for RC Indep ranges from a low of 76.9% in 2004, to a high of 
85.2% in 2009). Furthermore, the 2004 NYSE and NASDAQ rules imposed more stringent independence and 
qualification restrictions on AC members. However, despite listing requirements for both independence and 
financial expertise (which is correlated with financial services experience), there is no difference in the sample-wide 
means of RC Exper (whether measured as a percentage or as an indicator) across BHC observations with AC risk 




F.3.3. PCA Summary & Alternative Approach 
In sum, I was unable to come anywhere close to the bank-specific RMI figures reported 
within EY’s Appendix A, so a bona fide replication was not feasible.125 However, as E&Y report 
the pre-crisis RMI scores (the average RMI across 2005 and 2006) by BHC within Appendix A of 
that study, I incorporated the actual disclosed scores (EY pre-crisis RMI) in my replication dataset 
to see if I can (1) obtain similar results to the published E&Y results when using the pre-crisis 
scores, and if so, (2) perhaps identify the sources of differences between my study and E&Y with 
respect to the risk governance data. This analysis is described below. 
 
 
F.4. Multivariate Results & Analysis 
I follow E&Y (2013) in defining all risk measures, control variables, and risk management 
characteristics. In the following sections, I report the results when replicating several tests within 
E&Y with the EY pre-crisis RMI measure. For each test replicated, I also report or discuss, where 
appropriate, the findings for alternative specifications of the E&Y tests, including (i) the use of 
board committee indicators, and/or indicators of CRO presence, instead of EY pre-crisis RMI; (ii) 
controlling for and/or dropping failed/troubled banks and banks acquired during or just after the 
replication sample period; and (iii) the use of this study’s risk oversight data in place of EY pre-
crisis RMI. 
 In Table F.5, I present the results from replicating E&Y’s Table IV, where the dependent 
variable is TailRisk, and the regressions are estimated for the 2006 to 2008 period, only. All 
estimates for the pre-crisis RMI measure are comparable in sign, size, and significance to those 
                                                 
125 I am not the only researcher to have trouble replicating E&Y’s RMI. Using a sample of international BHCs, 
Lingel and Sheedy (2012) also attempt to replicate E&Y’s RMI with PCA. Due to data limitations and low 
correlations between some of E&Y’s RMI variables, the authors perform the PCA procedure for the entire pre-2010 
sample period using just four variables: CRO Exec, CRO Top5, ActiveRC, and RC Exper. The definitions of these 
variables are similar to those in E&Y, with the exception that the ActiveRC designation is based on annual medians, 
rather than annual means. The component loadings for the first three components are presented in Table IV.a of the 
study. Consistent with my PCA results using six E&Y variables, Lingel and Sheedy (2012)’s first component 
explains just 36.3% of the variance in the underlying data. The cumulative variance explained by the first three 
components is 84.6%. With the exception of the loadings on RC Exper, which have the opposite sign for each 
component versus that reported in L&S, the PCA results using my data and the same four variables (untabulated) are 




reported by E&Y. Similar results are presented in Table F.6, where RetVol is the dependent 
variable, and are also comparable to E&Y’s Table IA.X (from the study’s internet appendix). To 
examine whether similar results can be obtained with committee and/or CRO indicators, I replace 
E&Y’s pre-crisis RMI with indicators for RC, EWRM, and the interaction of AC or RC with 
EWRM, in Table F.7. Here, RC equals one if a committee other than the audit committee oversees 
risk – irrespective of the committee’s scope – and AC equals one if the audit committee oversees 
risk (again, irrespective of scope). Scope of risk oversight is distinguished with EWRM, which 
equals one if the risk committee has enterprise-wide remit.  
The takeaways in Table F.7 are similar to those for EY pre-crisis RMI in my replication of 
E&Y’s Table IV if I instead an indicator for enterprise-wide risk oversight (EWRM), or an indicator 
for Audit Committee risk oversight interacted with EWRM (AC*EWRM) instead of EY’s pre-
crisis RMI. Inclusion of the CRO Exec indicator does not change inferences for EWRM oversight, 
but it does appear to subsume the significance of AC*EWRM. 
Interestingly, an indicator for CRO Reports to Board (rather than to the CEO or some other 
executive; untabulated) has a significant and positive (negative) relation with performance (risk), 
consistent with Aebi et al. (2012). This also provides support for the EPS requirement that the 
CRO has a direct and independent reporting line to the board of directors. 
In untabulated results, I re-estimate the same E&Y Table IV replication after either 
controlling for or dropping the BHCs that failed or were closed/acquired during or just after the 
crisis. Although the main takeaways remain unchanged (EY pre-crisis RMI continues to be 
associated with lower levels of non-performing loans, higher ROA and buy-and-hold returns, and 
lower tail risk in 2007 and 2008), the magnitude of the coefficient estimates on the EY pre-crisis 
RMI variable is generally much smaller than in my the baseline replication (Table F.5). For 
example, the coefficient on EY pre-crisis RMI in the tail risk tests is -0.036 in my base replication, 
and the same estimate varies from -0.21 to -0.29 in the models where I either control for or drop 
failed and acquired BHCs (untabulated). 
Table F.8 (Table F.9) presents the results from replicating E&Y’s Table V (Table IA.IV, 
from the study’s internet appendix), with the following caveats.  First, E&Y include the years from 
1995-2010 in this specification, whereas I can only include the period from 2004 to 2009. Second, 
I do not have Institutional Ownership, the G-Index, nor CEO Delta/Vega. In columns 3b and 3c, 




shares outstanding owned, as reported in the BHC’s proxy or 10-k) to control for BHC-specific 
ownership characteristics. Third, as the values for EY pre-crisis RMI are bank-specific and not 
time-variant, I am not able to include BHC fixed effects as E&Y do in column 5. 
 The results in Table F.8 are similar to those presented in E&Y’s Table 5. The pre-crisis 
RMI measure is significantly negatively related to future TailRisk. Likewise, the results in Table 
F.9 are similar to those presented in E&Y’s Table IA.IV (pre-crisis RMI is negatively related to 
future stock return volatility). Similar to the previous replication analysis, I then substitute the 
pre-crisis RMI measure with committee indicators in Table F.10, and obtain similar results with 
indicators for board-level enterprise risk oversight (EWRM), and this is driven by audit 
committees with EWRM scope (AC*EWRM). 
 
 
F.5. E&Y Replication Conclusion 
The results reported within E&Y (2013) suggest that higher quality risk management is 
generally associated with lower risk and better crisis-period performance, and are generally 
consistent with a “business model” explanation, where firms with low risk appetites adopt strong 
risk controls to prevent excessive risk-taking. However, measurement issues for several 
components of E&Y’s RMI leave the question as to whether the Dodd Frank EPS requirements 
will be effective on the table. For example, in the absence of a separate risk committee, the authors 
appear to use audit committee characteristics. This not only leaves unexplained the extent to which 
certain mechanisms explain the reported results within E&Y, but also prevents other researchers 





F.6. Appendix F Figures & Tables 
Figure F.1 Crisis Risk (TailRisk) versus pre-Crisis CRO Centrality 
 
 
Figure F.2 Crisis Risk (RetVol) versus pre-Crisis CRO Centrality 
 
Figures F.1 and F.2 show the fitted predicted values from regressing average crisis-period (2007 to 2008) 
Tail Risk and stock return volatility (RetVol), respectively, on average pre-crisis (2004 to 2006) CRO 
Centrality and an intercept. The coefficient estimates for both measures of risk are positive and 
significantly different from zero. More specifically, the estimated coefficient on CRO Centrality in the 
Tail Risk regression is 0.0897 (p = 0.018); in the RetVol regression, the estimate on CRO Centrality is 




Table F.1 Summary Statistics for E&Y Replication Sample, 2004-2010 
  Mean Median Std Dev p25 p75 N 
Risk and Return Characteristics1           
Tail Riskt+1 0.064 0.045 0.048 0.027 0.091 399 
Annual Returnt+1 -0.062 -0.024 0.315 -0.248 0.119 399 
              
Tail Risk 0.057 0.036 0.046 0.023 0.084 398 
Annual Return -0.053 -0.005 0.274 -0.215 0.134 397 
Characteristics of the Risk Management Function       
CRO Present 0.867 1.000 0.340 1.000 1.000 399 
CRO Exec 0.749 1.000 0.434 0.000 1.000 399 
CRO Top5 0.231 0.000 0.422 0.000 0.000 399 
CRO Centrality 0.219 0.187 0.137 0.116 0.287 399 
Alt CRO Centrality4 0.180 0.157 0.140 0.080 0.263 399 
RC FS Exper (%) 0.226 0.200 0.217 0.000 0.333 399 
RC Exper (Dummy) 0.662 1.000 0.474 0.000 1.000 399 
Freq RC Mtgs 8.704 8.000 4.212 5.000 12.000 399 
Active RC 0.451 0.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 399 
EY's Pre-Crisis RMI2 0.695 0.603 0.273 0.499 0.940 399 
Financial Characteristics             
Assets  134.757 16.160 366.216 9.627 62.757 399 
Size 17.177 16.598 1.481 16.080 17.955 399 
ROA 0.009 0.010 0.020 0.006 0.013 399 
Deposits/Assets 0.661 0.686 0.147 0.626 0.746 399 
Tier 1 Cap/Assets 0.086 0.079 0.055 0.069 0.090 399 
Loans/Assets 0.623 0.677 0.165 0.585 0.722 399 
Bad Loans/Assets 0.010 0.005 0.014 0.003 0.013 399 
Nonint Inc/Income 0.275 0.254 0.167 0.164 0.344 399 
Deriv Hdging/Assets 0.116 0.056 0.174 0.014 0.149 399 
Deriv Trading/Assets 1.422 0.004 5.788 0.000 0.197 399 
Governance Characteristics & Acquisition Activity3       
Board Indep 0.772 0.786 0.113 0.700 0.846 399 
Board Indep w FS Exper 0.163 0.154 0.102 0.083 0.222 399 
CEO Tenure 9.957 8.000 8.503 3.000 16.000 399 
∆ CEO 0.090 0.000 0.287 0.000 0.000 399 
Large M&A 0.170 0.000 0.376 0.000 0.000 399 





Table F.1 Continued 
  Mean Median Std Dev p25 p75 N 
Alternative Measures of Risk Management Characteristics4     
Risk Manager has EWRM Oversight Responsibilities (i.e., is a "CRO")   
EW CRO 0.602 1.000 0.490 0.000 1.000 399 
Dedic EW CRO 0.524 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 399 
CFO-CRO 0.038 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.000 399 
Many roles, incl RM 0.040 0.000 0.196 0.000 0.000 399 
EW CRO is Exec 0.551 1.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 399 
EW CRO is Top5 0.158 0.000 0.365 0.000 0.000 399 
Alternative types of Risk Managers           
Alt Risk Mgr 0.266 0.000 0.442 0.000 1.000 399 
CCO or CLO 0.206 0.000 0.405 0.000 0.000 399 
Other Type RMgr 0.060 0.000 0.238 0.000 0.000 399 
Alt RMgr is Exec 0.198 0.000 0.399 0.000 0.000 399 
AltRMgr is Top5 0.073 0.000 0.260 0.000 0.000 399 
Risk Committee Details             
AC Details Used 0.624 1.000 0.485 0.000 1.000 399 
Lack Cttee Info 0.065 0.000 0.247 0.000 0.000 399 
Multiple Committees 0.323 0.000 0.468 0.000 1.000 399 
EWRM Ovst 0.266 0.000 0.442 0.000 1.000 399 
AC*EWRM 0.110 0.000 0.314 0.000 0.000 399 
RC*EWRM 0.155 0.000 0.363 0.000 0.000 399 
              
              
Notes:             
1  Unless otherwise subscripted, all variables are measured in time period t for the years 2004 to 2009; 
variables measured in t+1 are for the period from 2005 to 2010. 
2  This variable containes the values reported in E&Y (2013), Appendix A (i.e., pre-crisis RMI, or the 
average RMI, by BHC, across 2005 and 2006). Note that it is not time-variant. 
3  E&Y (2013) include four variables in this group that I was not able to obtain or calculate reliably: G-
Index, Institutional Ownership, CEO Delta, and CEO Vega. 









Panel A: Original RMI Inputs, as defined by E&Y (2013) 
 
                          
Year   
CRO 
Present   
CRO 
Exec   
CRO 
Top5   
CRO 
Centrality   
RC Exper 
(Dummy)   
Active 
RC 
2004   0.7536   0.6667   0.2754   0.2833   0.5507   0.4493 
2005   0.8286   0.7286   0.2571   0.2555   0.6000   0.4857 
2006   0.8592   0.7324   0.1408   0.1849   0.6197   0.4507 
2007   0.8939   0.7727   0.1818   0.1895   0.6970   0.4242 
2008   0.9365   0.8095   0.2698   0.1893   0.7619   0.4444 
2009   0.9500   0.8000   0.2667   0.2087   0.7667   0.4500 
                          
 
Panel B: Potential Sources of Differences between Replication Data & E&Y (2013), Table 1 (Panel C) 
 
Year   
Alt 
Centrality   EW CRO   
EW CRO 
is Exec   
EW CRO 
is Top5   
RC FS 
Exper (%)   
Freq RC 
Mtgs 
2004   0.2066   0.3913   0.3478   0.1304   0.1923   8.83 
2005   0.1979   0.5429   0.5000   0.1714   0.2036   8.80 
2006   0.1469   0.5775   0.5352   0.0845   0.2207   8.56 
2007   0.1579   0.6364   0.5909   0.1364   0.2401   8.73 
2008   0.1733   0.7302   0.6667   0.2222   0.2538   8.68 
2009   0.1978   0.7667   0.7000   0.2167   0.2539   8.62 
                         
Year   AC Used   
Lack 
Details   
Many 
Cmttees   
Audit 
Committee   
Risk 
Committee   
EWRM 
Ovst 
2004   0.7391   0.0870   0.3623   0.6522   0.2319   0.0870 
2005   0.6714   0.0714   0.4000   0.6000   0.3000   0.1286 
2006   0.6338   0.0845   0.3380   0.5493   0.3662   0.2535 
2007   0.6061   0.0606   0.3030   0.5455   0.4091   0.2879 
2008   0.6032   0.0476   0.2698   0.5556   0.3968   0.3492 







Table F.3 Pairwise Correlations, E&Y Replication Sample, 2004-2010 
Panel A: Correlations between Risk Proxies and Explanatory Variables 
              
  Tail Riskt+1   
EY's Pre-crisis 
RMI2005-2006   Sizet   
Tail Riskt+1 1.000           
EY's PreCrisis RMI -0.091   1.000       
Size 0.064   0.422   1.000   
ROA -0.301   -0.003   -0.081   
Tier1 Cap/Assets -0.022   -0.110   -0.189   
Deposits/Assets -0.085   -0.007   -0.426   
STBorrow/Assets 0.186   0.102   0.237   
BadLoans/Assets 0.436   0.030   0.069   
Non-Int Income/Income -0.195   0.208   0.354   
Deriv Hedging/Assets -0.006   0.314   0.546   
Deriv Trading/Assets 0.012   0.194   0.586   
Board FS Exper 0.110   -0.174   -0.222   
Board Indep -0.038   0.273   0.309   
CEO Tenure -0.069   -0.170   -0.214   
              
              
 
Panel B: Correlations between Risk, E&Y’s pre-crisis RMI, and RMI Inputs, 2004-2010 
                    
  Tail Riskt+1   RetVolt+1   
EY's Pre-crisis 
RMI2005-2006   
CRO is Exec 0.085 *   0.083 *   0.258 ***   
CRO is Top5 0.022     0.056     -0.051     
CRO Centrality -0.075     -0.005     -0.105 **   
RC Exper (Dummy) 0.171 ***   0.185 ***   -0.127 **   
ActiveRC 0.055     0.089 *   -0.088 *   
CRO Present 0.116 **   0.115 **   0.240 ***   
Experienced Board 0.011     0.011     -0.067     
                    
Unless otherwise indicated, variables are measured in time period t. In Panel A, bold font indicates 
correlations are significant at p < 0.10. In Panel B, correlations significant at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and 







Table F.4 Results of Principal Component Analysis with E&Y Replication Sample 
 
 
  PCA by Year Full 
period  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 Eigenvectors (component loadings) 
Comp1         
CRO Present 0.6109 0.5788 0.6238 0.5809 0.6105 0.5112 0.6111 
CRO Exec 0.6258 0.6072 0.6414 0.6118 0.6196 0.5523 0.6279 
CRO Top5 0.4496 0.3711 0.2513 0.2728 0.3676 0.3711 0.3549 
CRO Centrality -0.1174 -0.3404 -0.3413 -0.3889 -0.2194 0.0612 -0.2568 
RC Exper 0.0953 0.1416 0.1040 0.0674 0.1871 0.3988 0.1855 
ActiveRC 0.1007 -0.1508 -0.0945 0.2409 0.1584 0.3649 0.0776 
                
% Variance Explained 0.3547 0.3584 0.3198 0.3416 0.3025 0.3153 0.3272 
Cumul. % Var. Expld. 0.3547 0.3584 0.3198 0.3416 0.3025 0.3153 0.3272 
                
Comp2 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Full 
period 
CRO Present -0.0372 0.1509 0.0948 0.2454 0.0076 -0.2581 0.0074 
CRO Exec -0.1435 0.0773 -0.0015 -0.0054 -0.1695 -0.1172 -0.0381 
CRO Top5 -0.0983 0.1822 0.4279 -0.3576 -0.1704 0.4193 0.1488 
CRO Centrality -0.1973 0.5668 0.6437 0.0880 0.2753 0.8292 0.6217 
RC Exper 0.6337 0.5418 0.6177 0.8550 0.5719 0.1465 0.4083 
ActiveRC 0.7266 0.5685 0.1094 -0.2704 0.7344 -0.1866 0.6505 
                
% Variance Explained 0.1841 0.1897 0.2157 0.1836 0.2100 0.1760 0.1869 
Cumul. % Var. Expld. 0.5388 0.5481 0.5355 0.5252 0.5125 0.4913 0.5141 
                
Comp3 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Full 
period 
CRO Present 0.1410 0.0530 0.0405 0.0298 0.0271 -0.0506 -0.0836 
CRO Exec 0.0697 0.1873 0.1938 -0.0194 0.1434 -0.2785 0.1142 
CRO Top5 -0.1226 0.1015 0.1103 0.2243 0.3298 -0.5511 0.5262 
CRO Centrality 0.8699 -0.0556 0.1557 0.6418 0.7620 0.3101 0.2764 
RC Exper 0.4305 -0.7133 -0.3993 0.2381 -0.4953 0.3281 -0.7833 
ActiveRC -0.1348 0.6632 0.8746 0.6927 0.2094 0.6421 0.1148 
                
% Variance Explained 0.1701 0.1632 0.1805 0.1725 0.1857 0.1647 0.1599 
Cumul. % Var. Expld. 0.7089 0.7113 0.7160 0.6977 0.6982 0.6560 0.6740 
                














Return Tail Risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PrecrisisRMI_EY -4.123 -2.365 5.114 -0.027** 0.018*** 0.347*** -0.036*** 
 (2.565) (2.532) (4.862) (0.011) (0.005) (0.089) (0.010) 
        
Size2006 4.414*** 4.691*** 7.134*** 0.001 -0.002 -0.116*** 0.003 
 (1.151) (1.090) (2.103) (0.002) (0.001) (0.029) (0.003) 
Size22006  2.180** 6.843*** -0.001 0.001 0.032 -0.003 
  (1.082) (2.121) (0.001) (0.001) (0.020) (0.002) 
ROA2006 284.298** 270.717** -207.145 0.006  3.705 -0.418 
 (129.800) (129.810) (189.550) (0.283)  (4.237) (0.577) 
(Tier1Cap/Assets)2006 -113.515*** -104.424** 68.006 0.013 0.308*** -1.543 0.065 
 (38.911) (40.577) (56.216) (0.075) (0.017) (1.192) (0.167) 
(BadLoans/Assets)2006 -31.076 -5.875 -46.077 3.812*** -0.539 -8.421 2.123* 
 (200.685) (173.381) (209.013) (1.140) (0.370) (11.645) (1.211) 
(Deposits/Assets)2006 -8.959** -6.369 11.670 0.038 -0.009 0.084 -0.030 
 (4.411) (4.806) (9.870) (0.035) (0.013) (0.256) (0.027) 
(Loans/Assets)2006 -14.364*** -12.591*** -5.150 -0.030 -0.016 -0.451** 0.006 
 (4.972) (4.588) (5.107) (0.026) (0.010) (0.190) (0.019) 
Constant 27.070*** 22.427*** -8.263 0.004 -0.008 -0.108 0.079*** 
 (5.676) (6.611) (10.388) (0.013) (0.006) (0.175) (0.019) 
        
R2 0.670 0.723 0.644 0.424 0.756 0.196 0.726 
N 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 
Notes: Explanatory variables measured in 2006; dependent variables – indicated by the column headings – are measured in 2007 & 
2008. Standard errors, clustered by BHC, in parenthesis. All regressions include year fixed effects; coefficients not reported for 






Table F.6 Replication of E&Y Table IA.X, Panel A; 2006-2008 




Assets ROA BHR Tail Risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CRO_Centrality2006 -3.455 3.288 0.050*** 0.002 -0.442 0.063** 
 (2.715) (4.026) (0.017) (0.008) (0.272) (0.027) 
OversightQual2006 1.982* -0.745 0.006 -0.006 -0.051 0.006 
 (1.159) (1.433) (0.005) (0.003) (0.065) (0.007) 
       
Size2006 4.428*** 7.997*** 0.001 -0.003* -0.098*** 0.003 
 (1.323) (2.736) (0.002) (0.001) (0.034) (0.003) 
Size22006 2.487** 6.592*** -0.001 0.000 0.025 -0.002 
 (0.974) (1.996) (0.001) (0.001) (0.025) (0.002) 
ROA2006 219.313** -194.084 -0.212 1.064*** 5.127 -0.686 
 (107.196) (161.477) (0.278) (0.192) (4.710) (0.644) 
(Tier1Cap/Assets)2006 -88.732*** 69.047 0.088 0.007 -1.915 0.154 
 (32.949) (50.380) (0.083) (0.058) (1.319) (0.189) 
(BadLoans/Assets)2006 -4.766 -24.953 3.100*** -0.171 -0.952 1.255 
 (146.572) (199.674) (0.859) (0.412) (10.870) (1.024) 
(Deposits/Assets)2006 -6.917 13.699 0.041 -0.010 0.097 -0.027 
 (5.666) (11.330) (0.036) (0.016) (0.312) (0.031) 
(Loans/Assets)2006 -11.379*** -3.759 -0.033 -0.013 -0.360 0.002 
 (3.412) (4.805) (0.028) (0.012) (0.228) (0.022) 
Constant 19.091*** -7.577 -0.027 0.015* 0.147 0.041** 
 (5.813) (10.206) (0.019) (0.009) (0.182) (0.019) 
       
R2 0.753 0.633 0.426 0.763 0.145 0.718 
N 137 137 137 137 137 137 
Notes: Explanatory variables measured in 2006; dependent variables – indicated by the column headings – are measured in 2007 & 
2008. Standard errors, clustered by BHC, in parenthesis. All regressions include year fixed effects; coefficients not reported for 





Table F.7 Alternative Risk Oversight Indicators versus E&Y Table IV and Table F.5 
 
 DV = Tail Risk in 2007 & 2008 
 Baseline 
Replic. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PrecrisisRMI_EY -0.036***     
 (0.010)     
RCt-1  0.010 0.011 0.010 0.011 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) 
EWRM t-1  -0.014**  -0.014**  
  (0.006)  (0.006)  
AC*EWRM t-1   -0.013*  -0.013* 
   (0.007)  (0.008) 
RC*EWRM t-1   -0.014  -0.014 
   (0.009)  (0.009) 
CRO_Exec t-1    -0.000 -0.000 
    (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant 0.079*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
      
R2 0.726 0.705 0.705 0.705 0.705 
N 138 137 137 137 137 
Notes: Dependent variable (TailRisk) measured in 2007 & 2008. Indicators for RC, CRO_Exec, EWRM, and 
AC are lagged one year. All other control variables are measured in 2006. Standard errors, clustered by BHC, 
in parenthesis. All regressions include year fixed effects; coefficients not reported for brevity. Results on 
control variables (the same as those included in EY’s Table IV, and measured in 2006) do not qualitatively 
differ from those presented in my replication of Table IV (Table F.5), and are therefore omitted from this 







Table F.8 Replication of E&Y Table V, Columns 1, 3 and 5 (TailRisk); 2004-2010 
 DV = Tail Riskt 
 (1) (3) (3b) (3c) (5) 
PrecrisisRMI_EY -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.012** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Size t-1 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Size2t-1 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA t-1 -0.656*** -0.664*** -0.651*** -0.623*** -0.669*** 
 (0.202) (0.201) (0.201) (0.198) (0.202) 
AnnualReturnt-1 -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
(Deposits/Assets) t-1 -0.010 -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) 
(ST Borrow/Assets) t-1 0.047 0.056* 0.058* 0.067** 0.048 
 (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) 
(Tier1Cap/Assets) t-1 0.184*** 0.190*** 0.185*** 0.191*** 0.189*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) 
(Loans/Assets) t-1 -0.011 -0.013 -0.011 -0.017* -0.013 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
(BadLoans/Assets) t-1 0.747*** 0.725*** 0.710*** 0.742*** 0.741*** 
 (0.151) (0.152) (0.154) (0.152) (0.154) 
(Non-int Inc/Income)t-1 -0.011 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.012 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
(Deriv.Trdg/Assets)t-1  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(Deriv.Hdg/Assets)t-1  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
∆CEO t-1  -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Large M&At-1  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEO_Tenure t-1  -0.000* -0.000 -0.000  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
CEO_Ownership t-1   0.025 0.050*  
   (0.033) (0.030)  
Board_Exec Ownshpt-1    -0.029***  
    (0.008)  
Constant 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.045*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
      
R2 0.820 0.822 0.823 0.825 0.821 
N 397 397 396 396 397 
Notes: DV=TailRisk in year t (2005-2010); explanatory variables measured in year t-1 (2004-2009). Standard errors, 
clustered by BHC, in parenthesis. All regressions include year fixed effects; coefficients not reported for brevity. 





Table F.9 Replication of E&Y Table IA.IV, Panel B (RetVol); 2004-2010 
 DV = RetVolt 
 (1) (2) (3) (3b) (3c) 
precrisisRMI_EY -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.028*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Size t-1 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Size2t-1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ROA t-1 -0.904*** -0.928*** -0.932*** -0.949*** -0.949*** 
 (0.278) (0.278) (0.275) (0.278) (0.275) 
AnnualReturnt-1 -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
(Deposits/Assets) t-1 -0.023 -0.024 -0.026 -0.024 -0.027 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 
(ST Borrow/Assets) t-1 0.050 0.048 0.043 0.044 0.036 
 (0.073) (0.070) (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) 
(Tier1Cap/Assets) t-1 0.289*** 0.293*** 0.292*** 0.293*** 0.290*** 
 (0.088) (0.089) (0.089) (0.090) (0.089) 
(Loans/Assets) t-1 -0.028 -0.030 -0.030 -0.032* -0.028 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.023) 
(BadLoans/Assets) t-1 1.879*** 1.878*** 1.889*** 1.904*** 1.886*** 
 (0.287) (0.294) (0.295) (0.294) (0.304) 
(NonintInc/Income)t-1 -0.062** -0.061** -0.059** -0.057** -0.059** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
(Deriv.Trdg/Assets)t-1  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(Deriv.Hdg/Assets)t-1  0.011 0.012 0.011 0.010 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
∆CEO t-1  -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Large M&At-1  0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
CEO_Tenure t-1   0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO_Ownership t-1    -0.006 -0.013 
    (0.047) (0.050) 
Founder_Familyt-1     0.004 
     (0.007) 
Constant 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.107*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
      
R2 0.711 0.713 0.714 0.714 0.715 
N 397 397 397 396 396 
Notes: DV=RetVol in year t (2005-2010); explanatory variables measured in year t-1 (2004-2009). Standard errors, 
clustered by BHC, in parenthesis. All regressions include year fixed effects; coefficients not reported for brevity. 





Table F.10 Reconciliation between E&Y Table V, Table F.8, and Table 9 – Committee 
Characteristics versus E&Y’s pre-crisisRMI; 2004-2010 
 
 DV = TailRiskt 
 (1) Baseline (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PrecrisisRMI_EY -0.014***     
 (0.005)     
EWRMt-1  -0.007** -0.007**   
  (0.003) (0.003)   
AC t-1  -0.002  0.001  
  (0.003)  (0.003)  
RC t-1   0.004  0.004 
   (0.003)  (0.003) 
AC*EWRM t-1    -0.011**  
    (0.005)  
RC*EWRM t-1     -0.004 
     (0.004) 
Constant 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
      
R2 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.823 0.819 
N 397 397 397 397 397 
Notes: DV=TailRisk in t (2005-2010); Explanatory variables in t-1 (2004-2009). Standard errors, clustered by BHC, 
in parenthesis. All regressions include year FE; coefficients not reported for brevity. Asterisks indicate significance 
(* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01); all tests are two-tailed. Control variables include all those reported in my 
replication of EY’s Table V, column 3 (Table F.8, column 3); coefficients not reported for brevity.  
 
 
 
